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Preface
I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement between
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials
should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline
and good order in their institutions. To translate that proposition
into a workable constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, cast
upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular
school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school
concerns.... Finding nothing in this record which impugns the
good faith of respondents in promulgating the armband regulation,
I would affirm the judgment below.'
-Justice John Marshall Harlan
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Although "'special needs' inhere in the public school context,"
those needs are not so expansive or malleable as to render
reasonable any program of student drug testing a school district
elects to install. The particular testing program upheld today is
not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse: Petitioners' policy
targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk
from illicit drugs and their damaging effects. I therefore dissent.2
-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg
I. INTRODUCTION
It is, by now, well established that something has happened in the field of
education law, most dramatically in the area of student rights. The dissenting
opinions above denote the relevant period-almost thirty years-of an extraordinary
effort by the courts to accommodate legitimate but competing interests in a unique
constitutional context. Whatever one might think of individual rights in the
abstract, the process of acknowledging and then accommodating the interests found
on the public-school campus has proven both challenging and frustrating.3
The rules on student rights have been reconfigured largely as a result of this
process. The doctrinal picture that emerges would be, in any other legal area, a
welcome settling of expectations. But in the field of education law, it represents a
bull's eye for the groups whose interests are affected. This Article offers an
exploratory look into the public policy implications of the emerging constitutional
equation on student rights and the correlative duty of educators to provide a safe
and effective learning environment.
2. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 843 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
3. Chief Justice Burger spoke to this challenge in the famous dissent in Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In Pico, the Court struggled to determine how to review a decision made
by school officials to remove certain books from school libraries. The Court remanded the case with
instructions to the lower court on how to determine whether the school board was acting in good faith.
See id. at 872-75. The Justices wrote a plurality of opinions, each illustrating the degree of difficulty
presented by such cases. In Chief Justice Burger's view, the challenge was a result of trying to harness
local democratic processes:
[T]he people elect school boards, who in turn select administrators, who select
the teachers, and these are the individuals best able to determine the substance of
that policy. The plurality fails to recognize the fact that local control of education
involves democracy in a microcosm. In most public schools in the United States
theparents have a large voice in running the school. Through participation in the
election of school board members, the parents influence, if not control, the
direction of their children's education. A school board is not a giant bureaucracy
far removed from accountability for its actions; it is truly "of the people and by
the people." A school board reflects its constituency in a very real sense and thus
could not long exercise unchecked discretion in its choice to acquire or remove
books. If the parents disagree with the educational decisions of the school board,
they can take steps to remove the board members from office. Finally, even if
parents and students cannot convince the school board that book removal is
inappropriate, they have alternative sources to the same end.
Id. at 891-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted). 3
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A. The Disjunction Between Student Rights Law and Policy
Rights and duties frequently collide in the context of public education. In
descriptive terms, constitutional law has found the campus climate to be a fertile
ground for the discovery and refinement of a surprising variety of doctrines.4
Normatively, one has to consider the possibility that something unique to the
educational enterprise attracts disparate interests, creating a propensity for mischief
and conflict.' Under any characterization, the relationship between education policy
and constitutional law has long been interdependent and, in the area of student
rights, indeterminate as well.
Policy making in education has, of late, been extraordinarily difficult.
Education has always been primarily a local enterprise with decision making
necessarily focusing on the needs of students at a particular time in a specific place.
The accountability created by this link between the education mission and parental
demands, while providing a critical self-check against abuse in decision making,
often comes into conflict with constitutional limitations. The difficulty is plain:
popular school district policies may sometimes fail to pass legal muster while, at
other times, what the law allows may fall short of fully accommodating the
perceived needs of the community. What makes good law may not make good
policy.
Until recently, the contribution of the United States Supreme Court to any
clarity on the subject has been intermittent and uneven. The Justices have focused
on narrow constitutional questions in cases that produce defining moments for
educators as litigants but provide no unifying clarity for them. Against the broad
canvas of the euphemism that "students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional
rights.., at the schoolhouse gate,"6 stands a decidedly abstract portrait of student
rights.7
4. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (using the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate gender segregation in higher education); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (using the
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate state public school residency requirement that excluded students
based on alienage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (using the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate racial segregation in public education).
5. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall Of Orthodoxy": Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 17-18 (1987).
A fundamental tension exists between the ideology of liberalism, which focuses
on individual autonomy, and that of community, which emphasizes institutions
that shape character. Nowhere is this tension between liberalism and community
more blatant than in our attitude about educating children. Children in fact
constitute the "Achilles heel" of liberal ideology. Although liberalism "posits
individuals capable of choosing among values without constraint from others or
the state," its core assumptions Of autonomy and neutrality break down as we
examine how children actually acquire values. Children are not born with a
particular cultural orientation. Society must teach values if children are to have
conceptions of the good as adults. Yet if society cannot distinguish teaching
values from imposing values, it severely breaches value neutrality.
Id.
6. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
7. The most consistent rulings have come out of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. It has unquestionably become the foundation for evaluating the fundamental fairness ofcampus
policies by defining the education mission so as to discourage use of invidious classifications. Other
[Vol. 56: 1
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Competing advocates in the student rights debate (for example civil rights
groups and safe schools groups) have grown accustomed to a level of uncertainty
in the contest over how the education policy landscape should evolve in the face of
an almost unwieldy body of judicial decisions. For educators considering a range
of policy options, the challenge has been to find the good law.8 Unfortunately, in
such a climate, education policymakers find themselves in trouble over student
rights in two distinct ways.
First, obtaining useful legal advice becomes surprisingly problematic.9 In the
search for an understanding ofthe link between law and policy, educators encounter
a form of art when seeking science. Almost any advisor can, and does, become an
expert in education law by holding fast to a favorite set of cases on student rights,
arguing the correctness of a preferred position by analogy, by force of reason, or by
force of effort.
Second, and as a direct result of this volatility, the search for solutions to
campus conflicts is filled with disincentives. A palpable frustration about the role
of student rights undermines many good faith efforts to implement effective
policies. The inability to eliminate any of the nagging elements in the spectrum of
advice (from fear of the filing of a lawsuit itself, to the costs associated with
defending any policy, to the judicial uncertainty faced along the way) and the
substantive constitutional guarantees have found a less comfortable home in the public-campus setting,
effectively making student rights discussions almost transparent except for the discrimination cases.
The rigor of the Religion Clauses has, for the most part, settled expectations in student rights cases. The
guiding presumption in these cases appears to be that a school policy that supports inclusion of a
religious ceremony is per se illegitimate and outside the education mission, and curricular policies that
are otherwise valid become suspect when motivated by a desire to attack students' religious beliefs. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see generally Nadine Strossen, "Secular Humanism " and
"Scientific Creationism ": Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting
Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333 (1986) (discussing "secular humanism" and
"scientific creationism" policies). The Due Process Clauses provide little fire to which the feet of
educators can be held, and therefore, few student rights emerge under due process analysis. Education
is not a fundamental right. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,37 (1973). State
compulsory education laws do not create the type of custodial relationship giving rise to traditional
duties of care and efficiency. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (finding no duty to protect a child from his father despite a state agency's knowledge of
suspected abuse). Procedural due process applies when students face deprivation of education as a
"property interest." Although properly interpreted, this creates, at best, incentive to develop a paper trail
in the hope of finding illegitimate educational concerns as a motivating factor in a suspension or
dismissal, with an added expectation that any deprivation the student experiences will be of a limited
duration. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring minimum dueprocess protection
prior to denying a property interest due to misconduct).
8. In fairness to the student rights decisions by the Court, the task of applying constitutional
norms to conflicts on public school campuses has always had a surface simplicity belying entrenched
complexities. Litigation over school policies defies attempts at nomenclature, in part because of the
diversity and breadth of the educational enterprise itself, and in part because the Court focuses its
rulings only on the doctrinal significance of the narrow questions presented therein.
9. See Suzanne Painter, School District Employment Practices Regarding School Attorneys, 27
J.L. & EDUC. 73 (1998) (discussing research data on hiring and use of lawyers, including a one-third
turnover in lawyers over a three-year period); see also Wandalyn Rice, Don't Waste Your Attorney's
Time: Heed This Wise Counsel on When Legal Advice Is Vital and When It's Wasteful, 169 AM. SCH.
BOARD J. 24 (1982) (discussing when school boards should consult attorneys). 5
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relative certainty of second-guessing by the courts have led to timidity and inaction
in education problem solving.'0
Acknowledgment of this hesitancy to act, often in the face of actual or
imminent conflicts, has welcomed a level of legislative micromanagement of local
school officials that would be divisive in other contexts. State and federal statutes
prompt uniformity by requiring or forbidding action in certain "no brainer" areas."
Educators do not necessarily benefit from this close scrutiny. Another round of
conflict emerges particularly when the law usurps the preferences of local school
10. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), for a description of how confusing legal
requirements foster poor policymaking. In Gonzaga, the Court held that the nondisclosure requirements
of FERPA did not give rise to a private right of action. In discussing the misunderstood regulation's
impact on educators, Justice Breyer noted in concurrence that:
Much of the statute's key language is broad and nonspecific. The statute, for
example, defines its key term, "education records," as (with certain enumerated
exceptions) "those records, files, documents, and other materials which (i)
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an
educational ... institution." This kind of language leaves schools uncertain as to
just when they can, or cannot, reveal various kinds of information. It has led, or
could lead, to legal claims that would limit, or forbid, such practices as peer
grading, teacher evaluations, school "honor society" recommendations, or even
roll call responses and "bad conduct" marks written down in class. And it is open
to interpretations that invariably favor confidentiality almost irrespective of
conflicting educational needs or the importance, or common sense, of limited
disclosures in certain circumstances, say, where individuals are being considered
for work with young children or other positions of trust.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
11. For example, The Federal Gun-Free School Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (2000),
requires states to pass legislation requiring local educators to expel students possessing weapons in
school from school for at least a year. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2003):
[(]The following student conduct shall constitute grounds for long-term
suspension, expulsion, or mandatory reassignment, subject to the procedural
provisions of the Student Discipline Act, when such activity occurs on school
grounds ... (5) Knowingly possessing, handling, or transmitting any object or
material that is ordinarily or generally considered a weapon; ... (9) Engaging in
any other activity forbidden by the laws of the State of Nebraska which activity
constitutes a danger to other students or interferes with school purposes .... [.]
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311(2) (West 1997):
[(]If a pupil possesses in a weapon free school zone a weapon that constitutes a
dangerous weapon, commits arson in a school building or on school grounds, or
commits criminal sexual conduct in a school building or on school grounds, the
school board, or the designee of the school board as described in subsection (1)
on behalf of the school board, shall expel the pupil from the school district
permanently..."). Some legislation also clarifies student rights by imposing
limits on educators.[).]
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.50 (West 1996) ("Any official, employe [sic] or agent of any school or
school district who conducts a strip search of any pupil is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.").
Numerous states have created statutes instituting clothing regulations for students, many tending toward
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officials or parental demands. Often, the result is legal challenges that call into
question the validity of the legislative choice.,
2
B. The Supreme Court's Restatement of Education-Law Doctrine
Dramatically, within the period between the dissenting opinions of Justices
Harlan and Ginsburg quoted in the preface, the Court shifted both its focus and tone
in an attempt to address the disjunction between law and policy on student rights.
The emerging constitutional restatement dramatically settles expectations about the
pupil-tutor relationship. Its roots are found in the most controversial of student
rights areas: school search policies that trigger the privacy protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,13 the Justices agreed to relax Fourth Amendment
standards to allow educators to conduct searches based not upon probable cause, but
rather on the suspicion "that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."' 4 In Vernonia
School District v. Acton, 5 educators were allowed to conduct random, mandatory,
suspicionless searches (by testing urine samples for drugs) of students who
participated in school-sponsored athletic programs. Fourth Amendment standards
were sufficiently flexible to allow such testing because the "relevant question,"
opined the Justices, "is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and
tutor might undertake."' 6
Most recently, in Board of Education v. Earls,7 the Court clarified and
extended the Fourth Amendment rules on suspicionless searches by upholding a
policy that required all students participating in any interscholastic competitive
activities to submit to drug testing. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion for
a Court that declared the power to maintain safe campuses includes the authority "to
discover... latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development.""8 "'[The
interest in keeping children safe] is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion
on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion."" 9 In place of an objective requirement of some nexus
or precision between those tested and any actual drug problem, the Court substituted
a presumption that educators will act in good faith in the communities to which they
12. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding Congress lacked authority to
enact the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), which provided a criminal penalty for
possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public school, because the statute exceeded the authority
of Congress under the Commerce Clause); see also Dohmen ex rel. Dohmen v. Twin Rivers Pub. Sch.,
207 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Neb. 2002) (holding that educators could be sued for damages under the
Americans with Disabilites Act when parents sued to challenge the application of a zero-tolerance
statute to a special education student).
13. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
14. Id. at 342.
15. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
16. Id. at 665.
17. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
18. Id. at 829 (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
19. Id. at 828-29 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668).
2004]
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are accountable.2" As a result, drug testing policies are valid if they "reasonably
[serve] the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use
among its students."'"
These decisions reach beyond their Fourth Amendment contours, providing the
elements for an extraordinary model of deference to the authority of educators as
to policies far less intrusive, if not less controversial. In this model, educator
policies are presumed to represent a good faith attempt to maintain safety and
discipline and are thus valid when certain factors are at work. Four factors provide
the basic framework for this restatement of student rights analysis:
(1) The Education Mission Factor
This factor acts as a limit on the presumption of validity, covering campus
policies that are "undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of
children entrusted to its care."22
(2) The Custodial Factor
This factor is based on the historical view that educators have a natural
zone of authority, if not a legal duty as to "(1) children, who (2) have been
committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster.'
23
(3) The Due Process Factor
This factor serves to validate the reasonableness of a policy. It is based on
an emerging view that there should be a link between the educator's
interest in implementing a policy and the character of the intrusion created
by the disciplinary process when the law is enforced.24
(4) The Accountability Factor
This is a requirement that the challenged policy actually represent the
views of the affected community, giving rise to an expectation that
educators will reach out for parental input by providing a "democratic,
participatory process to uncover and to resolve differences, 25 particularly
over controversial policies.
These components, working together, are designed to produce settled
expectations regarding student rights on public-school campuses. Interestingly, the
equation itself is neither novel nor particularly unexpected in its components. Each
factor, standing alone, is reasonably well established in education law, albeit in
narrower contexts. What is significant is the synergistic effect that the Court
produces by combining the elements in a manner that creates landmark effects in
favor of educators and against previous assumptions about student rights.
20. See id. at 835-38.
21. Id. at 825.
22. Id. at 830 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
23. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654).
24. Id. at 832-34.
25. Id. at 841.
[Vol. 56: 1
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C. The Journey Through the New Education-Law Landscape
The practical result of the student-rights restatement is a shift in presumptions
about education policymaking that is no less dramatic than the shift in constitutional
presumptions about social and economic regulations that effectively ended the
substantive due process era in the 1930s.26 The components of the restatement
provide both a nomenclature for policy formulation and a barometer for resolving
disputes over the reasonableness of educators' actions. When its components are
present in the background of a challenged school policy, the level of judicial
deference that should result is similar, if not identical, to the constitutional
framework applied in a post-Lochner analysis. When educators and their legal
advisors focus on the elements of the restatement in fashioning a solution to a
campus conflict, uncertainty is likely to give way to a short list of policy options,
each with its own relative tradeoffs and shortcomings. When parents and
communities participate in the process, even if only at the margins, the form of
accountability acts as a self-check on the reasonableness of educators' actions. In
the absence of evidence of bad faith, school officials are, in the words of Justice
Harlan's Tinker proposal, "accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline
and good order in their institutions."27
Any clarity in such a model, while settling expectations, highlights a
fundamental conflict set in perspective by Justice Ginsburg's Earls dissent quoted
in the preface of this Article. As a matter of law, a zero-sum game results with
significant implications about the larger role of the Bill of Rights as a limitation on
government officials when these officials are educators. The restatement
reconfigures the concept of reasonableness in a manner that produces results
anomalous to the usual constitutional case, because "when the government acts as
guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a
reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake."28
This Article provides a template for understanding the new student-rights
landscape and its effect on education policymaking. Part II traces the evolution of
the student-search cases as a predicate for understanding the Court's need to offer
an ameliorative model on the authority of educators. Part III offers a closer look at
Earls as the catalyst for a restatement from which all of the elements of a doctrine
26. Substantive due process has become a code of sorts in constitutional law for the willingness
of the federal courts to review state and federal statutes for validity using the Due Process Clause. The
history of the exercise of the judicial review power is best understood in terms of the shifting resolve
of the courts to defer to legislation rather than striking down laws that violate subjective notions of due
process. The "Lochner Era" depicts a period (1900-1936) of judicial activism when federal courts
routinely invalidated social and economic laws determined to violate the liberty to contract. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The post-Lochner era represented a shift away from a
liberty to contract and toward greater deference to social and economic legislation unless the legislation
violated specific provisions of the Constitution. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938). For a well-annotated article on modem substantive due process, see Peter J. Rubin, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2003).
27. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
28. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,665 (1995)). 9
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of deference emerge. Part IV assesses the student-rights restatement, laying out its
components and tracing their doctrinal roots to explore the new landscape of
education-law jurisprudence. It is organized around the theme that the shift of
presumptions in the restatement is remarkably similar to the view of Justice Harlan
in his Tinker dissent that any new rule "cast upon those complaining the burden of
showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate
school concerns." 9 Finally, part V applies the restatement to the broader range of
student rights conflicts to provide a preliminary exploration of the adjustments, if
any, that may evolve when lower courts apply the Earls model as intended.
The message herein is simple enough: With Earls serving as the barometer, a
new era ofpolicymaking emerges, particularly as to the wider range of school codes
of conduct that are far less intrusive than the student drug testing upheld in the Earls
decision. As to education policy, the implications are just as far-reaching. If Earls
reflects the manner in which the elements of the restatement are to apply, limitations
on policymakers will become harder to articulate. Educators would, on the surface,
be empowered to act in ways previously thought unreasonable because their needs
are "so expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug
testing a school district elects to install."30
This level of empowerment is not filled with the good news for an educator that
appears at first glance. As a result of this authority, a correlative duty to provide a
safe campus is within reach as a constitutional matter, bringing into play an array
of tools to make educators accountable for their deliberate indifference to conditions
that are known or foreseeable with due diligence. Such a duty would be anchored
in a competing constitutional presumption that educators should act reasonably to
protect "children who ... have been committed to the temporary custody of the
State as schoolmaster."'" This would bring the education reform movement full-
circle, effectively creating a good faith exception for educators in a system now
balanced with substantive liability acting as a disincentive to timidity and inaction
in campus problem solving.
II. FALLING STUDENT RIGHTS AND ASCENDING EDUCATOR INTERESTS
A. Lowering the Reasonableness Standard in Schools: New Jersey v. T.L.O.
With the Supreme Court's 1985 term, education law began to undergo a not-so-
subtle restatement of the rights of students attending public schools. Prior to the
decision in New Jersey v. TL.O.,32 it was generally thought that rights-based
challenges to school policies would trigger ordinary constitutional rules in the
relevant area. Indeed, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,33 the
Supreme Court acknowledged educators' special position as tutors and guardians
but nonetheless barred educators from infringing upon student rights absent a
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 825 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
32. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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material and substantial interference with school discipline.34 However, the
Supreme Court's and lower courts' decisions after Tinker did not remain true to the
decision's admonishment that educators may only infringe on students'
constitutional rights under limited circumstances directly tied to preservation of the
educational mission.
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court cut deeply into the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement in the name of preserving educators' interests. This was the first
of the Court's landmark decisions conferring wide deference to school officials
acting to maintain campus safety, order, and discipline that continued so
dramatically with the Earls decision.
To reach its decision regarding what level of individualized suspicion school
officials must have that a student may have broken a school rule or the law before
they may properly search the student, the Court acknowledged that students retain
a legitimate expectation of privacy in their person and effects when they come to
school.3" With this acknowledgment, the Court declined the state's invitations to
treat schoolchildren as the Court treats prisoners, wholly lacking an expectation of
privacy within the institution.
3 6
However, the Court found the students' expectation of privacy did not extend
as far inside the schoolhouse gate as outside of it. Recognizing that "the underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be
reasonable, [and that] what is reasonable depends on the context within which a
search takes place,"37 the Court assessed whether the Fourth Amendment's standard
requirements of probable cause and a warrant fit into the school environment.3" The
Court determined that they did not.39 In so doing, the Court began its modem trend
of wide deference to the educators' interest in controlling the school environment.
According to the Court, schools possess a substantial interest in maintaining
safety, order, and discipline inside and outside the classroom. 40 While
"[m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, in recent years, school
disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the
schools have become major social problems."'" Because of these challenges, the
Court determined that discipline in public schools "requires a certain degree of
flexibility" that the warrant and probable cause requirements do not permit.
4 2
Balancing student privacy rights with the schools' need for flexibility and authority
to maintain order, the Court granted school officials permission to search students
based upon mere reasonable suspicion of a rule or law violation, as long as the
scope of the search is reasonable.
43
Within a short period, educators and the courts began developing a vernacular
for forming "individualized suspicion" in a variety of campus contexts. While
34. Id. at 507-09.
35. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 338.
36. Id. at 338-39.
37. Id. at 337.
38. Id. at 338-40.
39. Id. at 339-40.
40. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985).
41. Id. at 339.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id. at 341-42.
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courts continued to use the basic formula of the Fourth Amendment, including the
totality of circumstances element and a reliance on reasonableness as "the ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search,"' the elements of the
equation began to expand to account for a growing awareness of the special needs
of the educational environment. Lower courts' opinions recited the mantra of this
low standard of suspicion and provided educators (and, after TL. 0., arguably any
law enforcement officials working with them),45 with expansive authority to search
students upon almost any good faith suspicion of wrongdoing that a search could
confirn.46 To be sure, the relative seriousness of carrying, selling, or abusing illegal
drugs or carrying weapons on campus has promoted lower courts to apply TL.O.
most liberally to allow educators to take an extremely proactive role in ferreting out
drugs and weapons on campus.47
But the Court in T.L.O. declined to address the proper Fourth Amendment
standard for searches of students without individualized suspicion, reserving that
question for another day. That question-what to do when educators suspect a
category of students of wrongdoing but do not know precisely who is breaking the
rules-resulted in a variety of approaches and holdings regarding testing students
for illegal drug use.
44. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
45. These cases present an extraordinary variation on the theme of delegation. Educators are
permitted to bring law enforcement into the student-school official relationship by initiating a request
for assistance, combined with a measure of supervision and control. See, e.g., Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d
188, 191-92 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding the reasonable suspicion standard applicable where a police
officer conducted a pat-down and some questioning after school officials found evidence of theft);
J.A.R. v. State, 689 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding reasonable suspicion standard
applicable where a police officer "merely assisted the school official during school at the school
official's request" for safety reasons); In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436-37 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999)
(asking a police officer to conduct a weapons pat-down does not increase the level of suspicion
required); In re Interest of Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Wis. 1997) (finding that where school
officials "initiate an investigation" and they conduct it "in conjunction with police, the school has
brought the police into the school-student relationship").
46. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding drug
testing program in conditioning participation in extracurricular activities on consent to test for drugs,
alcohol, or tobacco because the program was designed to protect students' health, and participation in
extracurricular activities is a privilege carrying an obligation); In re Interest of F.B.,726 A.2d 361,363
(Pa. 1999) (finding constitutional a uniform "point of entry search" for weapons as a condition for
entering the school where searches were minimally intrusive and notice was posted); Commonwealth
v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 365 (Pa. 1998) (finding that general searches of lockers, if carried out in a
neutral and clearly articulated manner, do not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Fourth
Amendment); In re Interest of S.S., 680 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (upholding as
constitutional the search of a student and his belongings, even though not based on individualized
suspicion, due to safety concerns because of the "high rate of violence" in schools); People v. Dilworth,
661 N.E.2d 310, 321 (111. 1996) (concluding that the seizure and search of a flashlight was reasonable
under the "totality of the circumstances" where it was unusual for students to carry flashlights and the
students behaved suspiciously). See also A.J. Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 335
(9th Cir. 1995).
47. See, e.g., Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, No. 91-C1 887 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2913 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 13, 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993) (validating a search for drugs that
included crotch of student's sweatpants under TL.O.).
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B. What to Do with the Problem of Unsafe Schools
After T.L.O., lower courts reviewed several school districts' attempts to deal
with students' illegal drug use. The drug-testing policies' fate generally rested on
whether the school district had a real drug problem and how well the policy was
aimed at solving it. For example, while one district's.targeted testing of a group of
students at the center of an acute drug crisis was upheld, other schools' policies of
testing large groups of students in hopes of deterring unsubstantiated drug use fell
short.4"
Each court anchored its analysis in T.L. O.'s determination that schoolchildren
were not like adults, and so could be searched for more reasons and on a lower level
of suspicion in order to preserve school safety, order, and discipline.49 But the
reasonable suspicion standard was ill-suited for evaluating categorical searches of
students, such as through mandatory drug testing as a condition of participation in
extracurricular athletics. So the courts developed new and varied approaches to
evaluating the propriety of school drug testing programs.
In 1985, two courts easily disposed of schools' attempts to drug test students
without enough particularized suspicion to form reasonable suspicion of any
individual tested." In Anable v. Ford, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas invalidated a policy under which students found with
any trace of illegal drugs in their body were subject to parental notification, law
enforcement referral, and severe school discipline."' Students who refused to take
the test when asked by school officials, even when no reasonable suspicion
supported the request, were severely disciplined.12 The Anable court read T.L.O.,
in the context of suspicionless categorical searches, to require a reasonable relation
between the policy and the educators' interest in keeping order in school.5 3 Because
the policy punished drug ingestion that could have nothing to do with any behavior
at school, the court rejected the policy. 4
The policy at issue in Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East RutherfordRegional School
District,ss a case later overruled by the New Jersey Supreme Court, tested students'
urine samples for drugs and alcohol in conjunction with the school's annual
physical examination of all students.5 6 Annoyed by the school's attempt to disguise
drug testing for discipline purposes as a medical procedure to keep students healthy,
the New Jersey Superior Court rejected the policy under T.L. O. 's reasonableness
48. Compare Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988)
(upholding school's random drug testing policy), with Actonv. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514,
1527 (9thCir. 1994) (striking down school's random drug testing policy), rev'd, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
49. See Tippecanoe, 864 F.2d at 1314; Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1522.
50. Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22,41 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-E. Rutherford
Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709,713 (N.J. Ch. 1985), overruled by Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High
Sch., 826 A.2d 624 (N.J. 2003) (holding state constitution's privacy guarantees did not invalidate the
drug testing policy).
51. Anable, 653 F. Supp. at 25-30.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 38-40.
54. Id. at 40-42.
55. 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Ch. 1985).
56. Id. at 709-10.
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standard. 7 In this context, the court found the reasonableness standard's balancing
of privacy against school interests favored the students because the school simply
did not have a drug or alcohol problem."
While the results may have been reasonable in these cases, their analytical
framework left something to be desired. Surely mandatory drug testing of large
categories of students ought to be based on something more than a general inquiry
into whether the drug test is reasonably related to an actual drug problem. A mere
rational basis inquiry did not square with T.L.O.'s careful findings that
schoolchildren retain legitimate, fundamental privacy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Appropriately, then, later cases gave more rigorous assessment
of the reasonableness of schools' drug testing policies.
In 1988, the Seventh Circuit validated a school district's program of
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes and cheerleaders. Schaill v.
Tippecanoe County School Corporation9 involved schools with a documented local
drug problem,6" which would become a required earmark of permissible drug testing
programs until the Earls decision. The Seventh Circuit's analysis foreshadowed the
Supreme Court's analytical approach to student drug testing cases.
The Tippecanoe policy arose out of a drug test of the high school baseball team
in which five of sixteen students tested positive for marijuana.6' On top of these
results, there were reports of drug use among athletes and concern over the
nationwide drug problem in schools.62 In response, the school board instituted
random urine testing for athletes and cheerleaders.63 If the student tested positive
and agreed to counseling, he or she faced no punishment.' And any punishment
after a refusal of counseling or subsequent positive tests was limited to
disqualification from athletic or cheerleading participation.6" No other school
discipline or law enforcement action was taken against offending students.66
Taking T.L. O. 's acknowledgment of students' low privacy expectations with
the Supreme Court's approach to special-needs cases,67 the Seventh Circuit distilled
three relevant factors for assessing the validity of drug testing programs: (1) the
degree of the student's privacy expectation; (2) the governmental interests furthered
by the search, the effectiveness of alternative searches, and amount of discretion
vested in the official conducting the search; and (3) whether the search is intended
to detect criminal activity.68
57. See id. at 712-13.
58. Id. at 713.
59. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
60. Id. at 1310.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1311.
64. Id.
65. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir. 1988).
66. Id.
67. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding random drug
and alcohol testing of railway employees); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(upholding policy of random drug testing of customs agents without suspicion of wrongdoing). These
cases lay the foundation for special needs as a predicate to a valid suspicionless search policy. The
Court in Earls rejected its application to school officials. See infra Part III.
68. See Tippecanoe, 864 F.2d at 1315-18.
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The Tippecanoe policy survived Fourth Amendment scrutiny because: (1)
students' privacy expectations are low where the method of sample collection was
not as invasive as it could be, and athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy
because of the "communal undress" and routine physical examinations involved in
athletics; (2) the school interest is high because the statistics regarding the local
drug problem mirror the national drug problem, drug use poses a particular safety
risk to athletes, and athletes are role models in school; and (3) no criminal penalties
attach to positive tests.69
Furthermore Tippecanoe, as Vernonia would some years later, accompanied its
endorsement of the school's drug testing program for athletes with warnings that the
analysis would not play out the same way regarding, and that the decision should
not be read to approve of, students involved in other extracurricular activities or the
student population in general.7"
Four years later, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
looked to Tippecanoe, as well as the Supreme Court's unfolding special-needs and
administrative-search doctrines, to uphold a similar drug testing program in Acton
v. Vernonia SchoolDistrict 47J.7' The district court found that, while drugs had not
been a major problem in the district, the district's high school experienced a three-
fold increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports in the mid-to-late
1980s. Additionally, the staff directly observed students using and glamorizing
drugs and alcohol.72 Leading this drug culture were the student athletes, and
testimony described the unique dangers faced by athletes on drugs and specific
occasions where drug use affected athletes' performances.73 The Vemonia School
District first tried to deal with the drug problem with special classes, speakers, and
presentations regarding drug use, and even brought in a drug dog to try to detect and
remove contraband from the school. The problem persisted.
74
The district's next effort to combat the drug crisis was to institute consent to
initial and random drug testing as a condition of participation in extracurricular
athletics.7" The results were only used for counseling and, ultimately,
disqualification from sports if positive tests persisted.76 No criminal or school
discipline followed positive test results.
77
To review the policy's propriety, the district court reviewed the Supreme
Court's developing administrative testing cases, finding that they require the
government, in the absence of individualized suspicion, to demonstrate a
compelling need for the intrusion that outweighs the privacy invasion. 7' The court
found that safety and security concerns in schools are different in type and
magnitude than those involved with the jobs at issue in the Supreme Court's
69. Id. at 1319.
70. See id. at 1318-24.
71. 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 646
(1995).
72. Id. at 1357.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1357-58.
75. Id. at 1358.
76. Id. at 1358-59.
77. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1358-59 (D. Or. 1992).
78. Id. at 1359-61.
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administrative search cases.79 However, the court found T.L.O. recognized that the
Fourth Amendment is "relaxed" in schools and so the safety concerns need not be
as acute as with a railroad operator or armed border agent."0 Thus, the court applied
the "compelling need" analysis to the drug testing policy."'
The district court approved the Tippecanoe policy, relying primarily on the
specific instances of poor athlete performance caused by drugs, the district's
targeting of the students who, due to their leadership of the drug culture and status
as role models, were most likely to affect overall drug use in the school, the use of
test results only for limited purposes not involving law enforcement, and the
athletes' diminished expectations of privacy. 2
The Ninth Circuit reversed, disagreeing with the district court's assessment of
the students' privacy interests.8 3 The appellate court acknowledged the tragedy of
drugs in schools, as well as this policy's contribution to the school's goal of reduced
drug use evidenced by the teachers' observations of a decline in discipline problems
since the policy's institution.
8 4
However, the Ninth Circuit found this contribution was the policy's most
redeeming aspect. The policy failed because students enjoy basic privacy rights and
there is "no sufficient basis for saying that the privacy interests of students are much
less robust than the interests of people in general,"8' 5 even after T.L. 0. Furthermore,
the court found that athletes' privacy interests are not substantially lower than those
of students in general because locker room conditions and heavy school regulation
of student athletic programs do not affect students' expectations of privacy in the
drug testing context.8 6 According to the court, the strength of the school's interests
and the goals of preventing injury, reducing attraction to drugs, and improving
discipline "suffer by comparison to the kinds of dangers that have existed when
random testing has been approved" in other Supreme Court special-needs cases. 7
The court reasoned that because having students who use drugs in schools is just as
tragic as having them use drugs in society, there is no special need to test in schools
when the government is not permitted to test elsewhere. 8
With the Seventh and Ninth Circuits weighing in on different sides of the drug
testing debate, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Vernonia and set the stage
for an assessment of whether students' diminished privacy expectations could stand
up to schools' interests in preserving safety, order, and discipline.
79. Id. at 1361.
80. See id. at 1361-62.
81. Id. at 1362-63.
82. Id. at 1363-65.
83. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Brooks v. E.
Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764-66 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (rejecting district
policy requiring all participants in extracurricular activities to undergo drug testing because school
failed to show special needs on par with those in the Supreme Court's special needs cases).
84. Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1522, 1526.
85. Id. at 1525.
86. Id.
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C. A Policy that a Reasonable Guardian or Tutor Might Undertake
Writing for the six-justice majority in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
Justice Scalia briefly pointed to T.L.O.'s finding that "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable" in the school setting, but acknowledged that T.L. 0. did not provide
the complete analytical framework necessary for Vernonia because of its
confinement to suspicion-based searches.89 After a one sentence acknowledgment
that the Court had approved suspicionless drug testing in Skinner and Von Raab, the
Court enunciated the new three-prong test for whether a school's drug testing
program survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny, without any explanation of why this
was the right test.90
The test turned out to be a traditional balancing of privacy interests against
government interests, fleshed out for the particular factual and policy questions
raised by subjecting students to faculty-monitored urine collection and institutional
review of the contents of one's bodily fluids as a condition of participation in public
school programs.
"The first factor to be considered is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the search here at issue intrudes." 9' The state's temporary custody and care
of the minors dramatically affected the Court's privacy interest inquiry. Since
parental control most significantly diminishes minors' rights and the school acts as
both parent and custodial and tutelary guardian, the Court found the students'
privacy expectations decreased upon entry into school.92 The Court found that
adding to this already low expectation of privacy was the athletes' participation in
an activity involving communal undress and heightened school regulation, which
the Court found akin to adult employment in highly regulated industries.93
The second prong of the analysis assesses the character of the intrusion-how
the school conducted the testing.94 This prong was, and has become for schools that
use it as such, a formality to simply insure against methods of urine-sample
collection that do not substantially deviate from the process by which students
normally use the bathroom in public schools. 9 The Court had no problem finding
that Vernonia's sample-collection policy did not materially differ from a student's
normal use of locker-room bathrooms.9"
Finally, the third prong considers the nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern at issue and the efficacy of the policy in meeting it.97 The
89. 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 654.
92. Id. at 654-57.
93. Id. at 657.
94. Id. at 658.
95. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658-60 (1995); see also Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833-34 (2002) (considering test administered in similar manner as
Vernonia); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 119-20 (3rd Cir. 2000) (considering test administered at
private health clinic); Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998) (considering test
administered at private health clinic).
96. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-60.
97. Id. at 660.
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Court declined to require a finding that the governmental interest supporting the
policy be compelling.98 Instead, the Court'opted in favor of requiring "an interest
that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy."'99 The Court easily found the governmental interest in this
case was "important-indeed, perhaps compelling."1 0
Referring to its administrative search cases, the Court found that deterring drug
use by our nation's schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the nation's laws against the importation of drugs and deterring drug
use by engineers and trainmen.'10 It also found that drug use causes actual
disruptions in the educational process.
0 2
For the Court, adding to its finding of importance was the policy's targeted
population, which was particularly at risk of injury from drug use: "[I]t must not
be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school
athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with
whom he is playing his sport is particularly high."'0 3 Thus, the Court could not find
clear error in the school's argument that "a large segment of the student
body... was in a state of rebellion... fueled by drug and alcohol use."'
As to the policy's efficacy for addressing the problem, the Court found it "self-
evident" that a drug problem fueled by athlete role models is best addressed to
athletes alone.'0 5 Further, the Court explained that requiring individualized
suspicion as a precondition to drug testing would actually be more intrusive and
problematic because it would come with several risks: parents may not accept
targeted testing because it results in a "badge of shame" on their student; teachers
may test troublesome, but not drug using students; schools may be forced to bear
the expense of lawsuits based on arbitrary testing; students may demand greater
process before testing; and all of this may add to the ever-expanding diversionary
duties of teachers who have to spot and bring to account drug use.0 6
Not surprisingly, the majority opinion included the perfunctory warning that its
decision did not mean that all kinds of drug testing under different circumstances
would pass muster. 10 7 Justice Ginsburg wrote a brief concurrence to specify her
understanding that this holding applied to the unique facts of this case. 8 However,
the way Justice Scalia concluded his opinion made this promise hollow at its
making.
In the end, the Court emphasized that the "most significant element in this case
is the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the
government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor
98. Id. at 661.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1995).
102. Id. at 662.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 662-63.
105. Id. at 663.
106. Id. at 663-64.
107. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995).
108. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
[Vol. 56: 1
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss1/3
STUDENT RIGHTS AFTER BOARD OF EDUCATION v. EARLS
of children entrusted to its care."109 The Court concluded its entire analysis by
summarizing that its inquiry was simply one into the question of "whether the
search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake."11
Vernonia left the doors wide open for school districts to do three things:
approve drug testing of student-athletes; apply the Vernonia test to allow other
kinds of categorical searches in public schools; and approve drug-testing of other
groups or all students. Lower courts widely accepted the first invitation, and drug
testing student-athletes is now functionally beyond reproach, even without the
rigorous factual showing made by the Vernonia School District. As to the second
invitation, schools have met with much success in their efforts to detect criminal
activity and code-of-conduct violations through categorical searches. Of course, it
would take another Supreme Court decision to resolve the inter-circuit controversy
over drug testing non-athletes.
The potential within Justice Scalia's distillation of the three-prong inquiry into
a simple determination of whether a reasonable guardian and tutor might conduct
such a test was to allow courts to engage in careful, detailed analysis of issues faced
at each school initiating suspicionless searches of broad categories of some, if not
all, students as mere formalism. Because of the Court's traditional opinion that
local educators, not judges, are far better equipped to understand and respond to
school discipline issues, the "reasonable guardian and tutor" standard becomes, at
its essence, the same standard applied by the early courts confronted with drug
testing policies: a standard that simply looks to see if the educator's solution
reasonably relates to solving the problem and gives educators a wide deference to
control school safety, order, and discipline.
D. Drugs in Backpacks and Guns in Lockers: The Lower Courts Project the
Vemonia Standard All Over Campus
Besides prompting lower courts to approve school drug-testing programs for
athletes, the Vernonia decision gave courts a new framework for deciding Fourth
Amendment cases involving schoolchildren. These courts found the Vernonia
three-prong test a useful tool to decide whether school officials could properly
search categories of students suspected of committing a particular offense, whether
they could search students generally in an effort to keep contraband off campus, and
whether schools could expand the scope of mandatory drug-testing policies beyond
athletes.
In the first group of cases, the situation is a familiar one in schools across the
country: a teacher reports that something is missing-a ring or some money
perhaps-and that a particular group of students-who were in the classroom when
it disappeared, for example-is most likely to include the thief. The teacher or
other school official searches the suspected students as a group to fird the
contraband, not having individualized suspicion of any particular student.'
109. Id. at 665.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Smith v. McGlothlin, 119 F.3d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Vernonia to
validate search of a group of students over whose heads administrator observed a cloud of smoke);
Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Vernonia to validate
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Reviewing these kinds of searches, lower courts have found Vernonia's three-
prong test well-suited to their analysis." 2 Because these cases do not involve
individualized suspicion, TL.O. is not exactly on point. However, the Vernonia
framework for consideration of categorical searches of students based on the
educator's need to maintain safety, order, and discipline provides lower courts with
a workable method through which to assess a search's reasonableness.
For example, in Brousseau v. Westerly,"3 school officials conducted a
suspicionless search of a student and her classmates when an educator discovered
a knife was missing from the cafeteria." 4 The students were separated by sex and
patted down by an employee of the same sex." 5 Applying the three-prong test, the
Brousseau court noted the students' reduced privacy expectation at school and
found that the pat-down search was the least intrusive search consistent with the
goal of finding the knife." 6 The crucial governmental interest analysis showed that
the school had a strong interest in locating a potentially dangerous weapon, which
the school could reasonably assume someone took so that he could use it to injure
someone.
11 7
In the second group of cases, the Vernonia analysis also worked well for lower
courts in reviewing school policies of conducting suspicionless protective searches
of all students and their belongings, typically in the interest of keeping drugs and
weapons off campus."'
In Commonwealth v. Cass,"9 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed a school's decision to use drug-sniffing dogs to detect drugs in students'
lockers.2 The Cass court found, under Vernonia, that the school's interest in a
drug-free campus outweighed the students' small privacy interest in their lockers,
which students knew were school property subject to search. 2' The use of a dog,
already determined in other contexts not to be a search, was an appropriate,
search of several grades of students after a bus-driver reported that there might be a knife on campus);
Brousseau v. Westerly, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D.R.I. 1998) (applying Vernonia to validate the search
of a class after school officials discovered cafeteria knife was missing).
112. See supra note 111.
113. 11 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.R.I. 1998).
114. Id. at 180.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 181-82.
117. Id. at 182.
118. See, e.g., B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1263-69 (9th Cir. 1999)
(applying Vernonia to invalidate a school's use of drug-sniffing dogs); Florida v. J.A., 679 So.2d 316,
319-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (applying Vernonia to validate use of hand-held metal detectors to
search a student's belongings); Louisiana v. Barrett, 683 So.2d 331, 337-38 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(applying Vernonia to validate school's use of drug-sniffing dogs); In re S.S., 680 A.2d 1172, 1176
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (applying Vernonia to validate a school's use of metal detectors as students
entered school); see also infra notes 119-127 and accompanying text (discussing suspicionless
protective searches).
119. 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998).
120. Id. at 352.
121. Id. at 356-57.
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minimally intrusive search. 22 Hence, the court affirmed the practice as "a practical
means to effectuate the principal's compelling concerns over possible drug use.'
123
In People v. Pruitt,124 the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed a school's use of
metal detectors to secure the campus from weapons. 25 Applying the three-prong
test, the court found the school's interest in protecting students in an age of school
violence outweighed student's privacy interests. 26 Furthermore, the search was
minimally intrusive because it did not involve any touching unless the metal
detector went off, at which point school officials had individualized suspicion of a
particular student.
127
These two lines of decisions, allowing suspicionless searches of groups or of
the entire student population, show how easily a court may adapt Vernonia's three-
prong test to permit a wide range of searches when the search itself involves only
a minimal privacy violation. Lower courts readily approve educators' actions as
long as the search is not too intrusive and is founded on some articulable, good faith
concern for student safety, order, and discipline. Indeed, a documented local
problem with drugs or weapons is not necessary; courts have approved categorical
searches based on educators' general concerns about drugs and weapons in schools
nationally.
This expansion of Vernonia to permit such a broad spectrum of searches
foreshadowed its expansion to permit a broader range of suspicionless mandatory
drug testing. The Seventh Circuit, first to permit athlete drug testing, led the way
in permitting drug testing as a condition of participation in all extracurricular
activities in Todd v. Rush County Schools.128 Finding that successful extracurricular
activities need to be drug and alcohol free just like successful athletic programs, the
court approved the school's policy without reviewing the school's method of testing
or why students in extracurricular activities might have a lower expectation of
privacy than the general student population.
29
The Eighth Circuit joined in the Seventh Circuit's approval of suspicionless
drug testing as a condition of participation in extracurricular activities in Miller v.
Wilkes. 3 ° The Miller court found students who participate in extracurricular
activities, because the activities involve more school regulation of participating
students, have a lower expectation of privacy.' The school also had a compelling
interest in preventing a drug problem.'32 The Eighth Circuit determined,
foreshadowing the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Earls, that the school did
122. Id. at 357.
123. Id. at 358.
124. 662 N.E.2d 540 (Il. App. Ct. 1996).
125. Id. at 547.
126. Id. at 545-48.
127. Id. at 547.
128. 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
129. Id.
130. 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).
131. Id. at 579.
132. Id. at 581.
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not have to wait until it had a drug problem to do something about protecting itself
from a national problem.'33
Other courts to consider suspicionless drug testing as a condition of
participation in extracurricular activities found that the policies violated the Fourth
Amendment. 34 Schools with failing policies did not satisfy the courts with enough
local evidence that students involved in extracurricular activities were involved in
drugs. '35 Also, courts found that students' privacy expectations were not as high as
those of athletes when students were involved in non-athletic extracurricular
activities. 36 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Earls v. Board of Education'37
summed up these approaches by finding that special needs must rest on
demonstrated realities.1
38
Finally, between Vernonia and Earls, only one reported decision reviewed a
school district's policy of suspicionless drug testing as a condition of school
enrollment. In Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District,'39 the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas struck down random testing of all sixth
through twelfth grade students. 4 ° Using the Vernonia framework, and emphasizing
the requirement that the government show a special need for the test, the court first
decided that the general student population held a higher expectation of privacy
than athletes.' 4 ' While the testing method was the same as in Vernonia, the
Tannahill court did not find any evidence of a school-wide drug problem.'42
Indeed, the district's drug-use rates were lower than those in the surrounding area,
and district schools rarely observed positive drug tests. Furthermore, the schools
never attempted to deal with the alleged crisis with suspicion-based testing.'43
Vernonia's aftermath was this: most lower courts, given the chance, carried the
three-prong analysis out of the extracurricular athletics arena on their shoulders,
using it to easily validate sweeping searches of students' persons. But some courts
held back and resisted carrying Vernonia so far as to validate suspicionless drug
testing outside the extracurricular athletics arena.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF DEFERENCE: BOARD OFEDUCATION V. EARLS
Board of Education v. Earls, the second student drug-testing case, ends the
chain of decisions. 44  On its face, Earls appeared perfunctory; the opinion
133. See id. ("We see no reason that a school district should be compelled to wait until there is
a demonstrable problem with substance abuse among its own students before the district is
constitutionally permitted to take measures that will help protect its schools.").
134. See Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 1 33 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Trinidad
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998).
135. See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1109.
136. See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1110.
137. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
138. Id. at 1277-78.
139. 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
140. Id. at 921.
141. Id. at 929.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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presented the Court with another challenge to a public school drug-testing policy
wholly within the ambit of the Vernonia ruling. By the time the 5-4 decision in
favor of educators was handed down, it had the makings of a landmark case due
solely to the breadth of the language the majority brought to the authority of
educators.
The ruling in Earls and the restatement it packages complement prior decisions
on the breadth of the authority of educators, while offering for the first time an
equation for lower courts and policymakers to apply in evaluating a wide range of
campus policies. From Tinker to Earls, the trail is unmistakable. The opinions
reveal a gradual shift of the Court to the position originally set forth by Justice
Harlan in the Tinker dissent: courts should defer to good faith decisions of local
educators that further the educational mission. As discussed in part V below, the
decision's breadth may, in the long run, work against the philosophy the Justices
appear to desire-providing flexibility for education decisionmakers. Nevertheless,
the Earls rationale represents a leap beyond the prior cases in painting the big
picture of what the Constitution requires and permits of educators.
As such, Earls represents a defining moment for the Court in education law.
Some measure of adjustment of Fourth Amendment standards was to be expected,
given the national preoccupation with campus tragedies and student safety that
began in the 1990s. 14' The general acceptance of the T.L. 0. reasonable suspicion
standard is thus best understood as a modest adjustment of doctrine in response to
changed circumstances to which the courts took judicial notice. The
extraordinariness of the Earls decision is found in the public policy implications
when its brand of judicial deference is applied to the broader range of campus
disputes. The implications were immediately apparent when the Justices applied
the rules to uphold a drug testing policy in a factual setting that would have failed
to pass constitutional muster under any of the previous legal standards.
A. A School District Concerned
In Earls, a Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district's student drug testing policy
required students to submit urine samples for drug testing as a condition for
participating in competitive extracurricular activities. 146 The school district is a part
of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma, located about forty miles southeast of the state
capital of Oklahoma City.'47 The city of Tecumseh and Tecumseh High School are
145. See David Zeman et al., A Child Kills a Child: The Nation Asks Why, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Mar. 1, 2000, at 1A; see also Bryan Vossekuil et al., IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL
ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative (U.S.
Dept. of Educ. & U.S. Secret Serv. Washington, D.C.) May 2002, at 3 ("[E]xtensive examination of
31 incidents of targeted school violence that occured in the [U.S.] from December 1974 through May
2000."), available athttp://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssifinalreport.pdf; MattBai, et al.,Anatomy
of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 25 (recounting the Columbine tragedy); Derek Larson,
Answering 'Why'is Not Easy, ST. CLOUD TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at 7B (noting that "[s]ince 1995 there
have been more than two dozen shootings in American schools. Forty-three victims have died, not
including the shooters. At least 115 people have been wounded."); Associated Press, List of Recent
School Shootings, Apr. 21, 1999.
146. Earls, 536 U.S. at 825.
147. Id. at 826. 23
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a part of the school district. 4 ' The policy was implemented in response to
perceptions shared by parents, teachers, administrators, members of the community,
counselors, and the School Board that student drug use remained a persistent
problem in the schools.' 49
While some educators' accounts traced the problem as far back as the 1970s,
most focused on more recent anecdotal evidence. 5 These accounts described drug
use by students both independent of, and while participating in, school-sponsored
events.'' In these discussions, policymakers acknowledged that policies such as
anti-drug rallies, canine searches of school property, routine police patrols, and
counseling, were already in place to deter illegal and disruptive conduct by students
on campus, including the possession and use of drugs.'52 The district implemented
the drug testing policy during the 1998 school year as an additional tool to combat
student drug use, and it limited testing to students participating in extracurricular
activities like the plan approved in the Supreme Court's Vernonia decision.'53
The policy required all students participating in extracurricular activities to
agree to and submit to drug testing.'54 The testing screened urine samples for
amphetamines, cannabinoid metabolites, cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and
benzodiazepines. 1' The test did not screen for alcohol or cigarette use. 56 The
district barred students who refused testing from participation in any competitive
activity. 57 Participating students who tested positive were subject to a graduating
scale of requirements. After the first positive test, a student could continue in an
activity if he or she agreed to drug counseling and follow-up testing.'58 Students
who tested positive a second time were suspended from the competitive activity for
fourteen days and could return to the activity only after agreeing to four hours of
substance abuse education and follow-up testing.'59 Students who tested positive
three times within a school year were suspended from the competitive activity for
the rest of the school year. 60
Enforcement of the policy did not include suspension or expulsion from any
curricular class in which the student may have been enrolled.' Records of student
drug tests were kept separate from the usual education records and results were
148. Id.
149. Id. at 834-35.
150. Earls v. Bd. ofEduc., 115F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1285-86 (W.D. Okla. 2000) [hereinafter Earls
1], rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Earls ll], rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
151. Earls 11, 242 F.3d at 1272-73; Earls I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86.
152. Earls/, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 n.20. The official position of the school on the magnitude
of student substance abuse was quite optimistic. The educators believed that "the use of tobacco and
alcohol continue to be our number one problems." Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1274. School officials reported
that they had "not found other types of illegal or controlled substances to be a major problem although
they do exist." Id.
153. Earls!, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
154. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002).
155. Earls!, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
156. Earls 11, 242 F.3d 1264, 1267.
157. Id. at 1268.
158. Earls, 536 U.S. at 883.
159. Id. at 833-34.
160. Id. at 834
161. EarlsI, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92 n.40.
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shared only with the student, parent, principal, athletic director, and coach of the
relevant activity. 6 ' Law enforcement officials were not notified of a positive drug
test by a student.
63
Lindsay Earls (Earls) and Daniel James (James), then enrolled as students of
Tecumseh High School, filed suit challenging the policy.'64 Earls wished to
continue participating on the school's academic team, in show choir, and in
marching band. 65 James wanted to serve on the academic team. 66 Lacey Earls, the
younger sister of Lindsay, was added as a plaintiff in the litigation. 1
67
The lower courts disagreed on the constitutional question of whether the policy
was the permissible next step after Vernonia. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma ruled in favor of the school board, 6 but the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated the policy. 69 Both courts looked
to Vernonia in reaching their decisions. The district court found the similarities to
Vernonia dispositive: "students who elect to be involved in school activities have
a legitimate expectation of privacy that is diminished to a level below that of the
already lowered expectation of non-participating students."' 7° The Tenth Circuit
ruled that the school district policy failed what it perceived to be a "special needs"
requirement under Vernonia.'7' The court ruled that while there was some drug use
in the schools, most of the evidence was hearsay and anecdotal.' 72
In reversing, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a school must show "that there is [an]
identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the
testing, such that testing.., will actually redress its drug problem."'73
B. Deference to Schools' Custodial Responsibility to Keep Students Safe
On appeal to the United State Supreme Court, Justice Thomas wrote for the
majority and reversed the lower court, upholding the drug-testing plan.'74 The
power of school officials to maintain safe campuses, Justice Thomas wrote, includes
the power "to discover [ ] latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their
development. [The interest in keeping children safe] is sufficiently compelling to
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any
measure of individualized suspicion."' 75 In place of the usual objective nexus (of
some fit or precision) between those tested and any actual drug problem, the Court
substituted a presumption that educators will act in good faith in the communities
162. EarlsI, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
163. Id.
164. Earls, 523 U.S. at 826.
165. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002).
166. Id.
167. Earls II, 242 F.3d 1264, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
168. Earls I, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 2002).
169. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1264.
170. Earls I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
171. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1272.
172. Id. at 1272-75.
173. Id. at 1278.
174. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
175. Id. at 829 (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
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to which they are accountable. As a result, drug testing policies are valid if they
"reasonably serve [ ] the School District's important interest in detecting and
preventing drug use among its students .... ,176
The tone of the majority opinion is decidedly provocative and impatient, hoping
by force of attribution to the T.L.O.-Vernonia line of cases to convert remaining
disbelievers regarding the public educator's exemption from the ordinary operation
of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Thomas tries to close the door on further
speculation on this matter while explaining why this is so. At the heart of the matter
is the belief that "'Fourth Amendment rights... are different in public schools than
elsewhere; [thus,] the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial
and tutelary responsibility for children. ,,
177
The Earls majority used the Oklahoma litigation to reach beyond the actual
controversy in order to simplify the judicial resolution of future conflicts over
campus search policies. The Court offered several justifications for rethinking
educators' modem authority. Educators, accountable to their communities, have a
duty to provide a safe and effective learning environment:
A student's privacy interest is limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining
discipline, health, and safety. Schoolchildren are routinely
required to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations
against disease. Securing order in the school environment
sometimes requires that students be subjected to greater controls
than those appropriate for adults. "Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has the
obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children,
and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few
students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national
concern." 178
Such duty statements compel the result in Earls and are extraordinary in several
respects. First, they provide a foundation for broad assertions of state power in the
education context that are tom from the fact-sensitive moorings of the usual "totality
of circumstances" approach that is so dominant in Fourth Amendment analysis.
Justice Ginsburg said as much at the beginning of her dissent: "'[T]he legality of
a search of a student.., should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search. '179
Second, the duty statements operate, in the opinions of Justices Thomas and
Breyer, as rebuttals to limitations on educators that were largely assumed to exist
and that were implied in Vernonia and TL. 0. For example, after Vernonia, critics
176. Id. at 825.
177. Id. at 829-30 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,656 (1995)) (internal
quotations omitted).
178. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-31 (2002) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 350 (1985)) (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
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found some comfort in the impression, created by that decision, of a presumption
of a legitimate expectation of privacy by students in the ordinary course of campus
life. 8 ° Such a presumption seemed to distinguish the athletes tested in Vernonia
based on, among other things, communal undress. The Earls majority diminishes
the role of casual undress as a factor in the expectation of privacy by students.
"[Communal undress] was not essential in Vernonia, which depended primarily
upon the school's custodial responsibility and authority."''
Similarly, commentators had reached a near consensus on the notion that any
constitutional benchmark for student searches would have to place suspicion-based
searches in front of any policy to conduct generic, suspicionless searches.'82
However, the majority refused to make findings of individualized suspicion a legal
prerequisite to suspicionless searches, effectively placing the power to choose
which type of search to conduct in the hands of educators:
We also reject respondents' argument that drug testing must
presumptively be based upon an individualized reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing because such a testing regime would be
less intrusive. In this context, the Fourth Amendment does not
require a finding of individualized suspicion, and we decline to
impose such a requirement on schools attempting to prevent and
detect drug use by students. Moreover, we question whether
testing based on individualized suspicion in fact would be less
intrusive. Such a regime would place an additional burden on
public school teachers who are already tasked with the difficult
job of maintaining order and discipline. A program of
individualized suspicion might unfairly target members of
unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from such
180. "The holding in Vernonia can be understood, in its most narrow sense, as limiting the
Court's approval of suspicionless drug testing policies to those virtually identical to that of School
District 47J-policies affecting only student athletes." Darrel Jackson, Note, The Constitution Expelled:
What Remains of Students Fourth Amendment Rights?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673 (1996) (arguing that
Vernonia "departs from precedent"); Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal
for School-Wide Drug Testing, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 999, 1023 (1999); Samantha Osheroff, Note,
Drug Testing of Student Athletes in Vernonia School District v. Acton: Orwell's 1984 Becomes
Vernonia's Reality in 1995, 16 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 513 (1995) (arguing the Vernonia decision was
based on moral, not legal, grounds). But see Joaquin G. Padilla, Comment, Vemonia School District
47J v. Acton: Flushing the Fourth Amendment-Student Athletes' Privacy Interests Go Down the
Drain, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 571 (1996) (arguing that the Court's Vernonia decision erased students'
expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
181. Bd. ofEduc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 823 (2002).
182.
Vernonia must not be interpreted as condoning anything but suspicionless
searches of student-athletes who are known to be the leaders of a well-
documented and extreme drug problem among the student body. When the unique
circumstances of Vernonia are not present, an individualized suspicion standard,
based upon the Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. TL.O., should be
followed.
J. Nathan Jensen, Note, Don "t Rush to Abandon a Suspicion-Based Standard for Searches of Public
School Students, 2000 BYU L. REV. 695, 708.
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targeted searches may chill enforcement of the program, rendering
it ineffective in combating drug use .... [R]easonableness under
the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least
intrusive means .... 83
Third, the Court severed any remaining link between the student search cases
and ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. This attenuation, which began with the
decision of the Court in T.L.O. to allow searches by educators based only upon
reasonable suspicion, now removed its proportionalism as a prerequisite. The
T.L.O. proportionalism-that "the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances"-influenced the
appellate court in Earls to embrace the requirement of special need as an element
in justifying student drug testing.' 84 In its place, the Earls majority applied a "loose
fit" inquiry. Justice Thomas stated that "[w]hile in Vernonia there might have been
a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court's finding that the drug
problem was 'fueled by the role model effect of athletes' drug use,' such a finding
was not essential to the holding."'85 Justice Scalia implied as much writing for the
majority in Vernonia.'86 Educators, after Earls, do not have to establish an hermetic
link between the problem and policy as applied to students. The status of educators
as custodial and tutelary guardians is, in fact, the catalyst for establishing the type
of special relationship with their students that satisfies the special-need requirement.
Nothing more is needed before they exercise their power to protect their students.
A demonstrated problem of drug abuse ... [is] not in all cases
necessary to the validity of a testing regime .... We reject the
Court of Appeals' novel test that any district seeking to impose a
random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to
participation in a school activity must demonstrate that there is
some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number
of those subject to the testing, such that testing that group of
students will actually redress its drug problem.'87
The Justices in the Earls majority ended their effort by pointing to the theme
emerging from the Court's student rights decisions: a climate of deference based
on a constitutional presumption that educators will act in good faith when
implementing education policies. This shift, post-Lochner in tone, is expressly
intended as a by-product of the restatement of the authority of educators. Justices
183. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (citations omitted).
184. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985).
185. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663
(1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
186. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 ("The most significant element in this case is the first we
discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under
a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.").
187. Earls, 536 U.S. at 835-36 (internal quotations omitted).
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Thomas and Breyer, as though providing a lexicon for lower courts, adapt language
suitable for this more deferential level of judicial review. 8
C. The Earls Dissents: Recognizing the Length of the Majority's Step
Away from Protection of Student Rights
As is often the case in dramatic doctrinal shifts, dissenting opinions play a
useful role in marking the distance between the old and new ground. The model set
forth in Earls, with its implications, commands the Justices' full attention, but not
their full agreement. Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor, the latter writing only thirty-
one words in dissent, highlight in descriptive and normative terms the landscape
between the two groups in a manner that is useful in framing the tools for analyzing
the deferential model in part IV below.
There is nothing subtle about the clash of views. The dissenters take aim at the
deferential model and the zero-sum game that emerges. Student rights diminish as
the presumptions of validity of school policies expand. The judicial role decreases
as well, and objective balancing gives way to the expectation that educators will
collaborate with parents to find solutions to actual problems that compromise the
education mission. The concept of reasonableness is reconfigured in a manner that
produces results anomalous to the usual constitutional case because "when the
government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search
is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake."' 89 Absent evidence of
bad faith by educators or parents, the model redirects both local decisionmaking
practices and constitutional litigation away from the historical rigor commonly
associated with civil rights.
The Justices parry over these aspects of the new model, particularly the
underlying doctrinal question about the precise role of the Bill of Rights as a
limitation on public officials when that official is an educator. The position of the
four dissenters is organized around the theme of a return to normalcy. As a
practical matter, this means going back to the essentials of TL. 0.
[T]he legality of a search of a student... should depend simply
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search .... The particular testing program upheld today is not
reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse: Petitioners' policy
188. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) ("In upholding the constitutionality of the
Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a
reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug
use among its schoolchildren."); id. at 842 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I cannot know whether the
school's drug testing program will work. But in my view, the Constitution does not prohibit the
effort."). It is worth noting that the Court in Vernonia offered a similar statement although its
implications were not completely evident at the time. Justice Scalia ended the majority decision by
noting, "We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Vernonia's parents, its school board,
and the District Court, as to what was reasonable in the interest of these children under the
circumstances." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
189. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
29
James and Larson: The Doctrine of Deference: Shifting Constitutional Presumptions a
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk
from illicit drugs and their damaging effects. 9
Surprisingly, a workable compromise emerges in the dissents: a fact-based
inquiry of reasonableness balanced around individualized suspicion, which acts as
an exhaustion requirement for educators. This proposal is itself extraordinary,
representing a shift for the four Justices, all of whom, except Justice Ginsburg,
dissented in Vernonia. Under this scheme, a suspicionless search is permitted, but
only after a special need is objectively established. 9' The approach suggests two
virtues. The dissenters avoided presumptions, for or against the validity of a policy,
by using a more clearly objective standard than the equation favored by the
majority. More importantly, the Justices would have maintained close proximity to
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and expectations, with courts keeping a
watchful eye aware of the possibility that in the rare case, educators might have a
special need justifying a departure from the individualized-suspicion standard.
The dissenters' strategy in packaging this proposal is to clearly mark the ground
around T.L.O. and its individualized suspicion rules. Justices O'Connor and
Ginsburg reprise their attacks on suspicionless searches first raised in separate
opinions in Vernonia when both correctly sensed a shifting away from Fourth
Amendment norms in public education.'92
In her Vernonia dissent, Justice O'Connor challenged the very notion that
educators could ever possess an interest that would justify suspicionless searches
of students, expressing dismay that the majority could so lightly ease traditional
Fourth Amendment protections for students without proof of the futility of a
suspicion-based search.
[Vernonia] asks whether the Fourth Amendment is even more
lenient than [T.L.O.], i.e., whether it is so lenient that students
may be deprived of the Fourth Amendment's only remaining, and
most basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an
individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying
antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly
190. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 843-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The acceptance of Vernonia was both forgone
and inevitable. The Court acknowledged the notion of suspicionless searches in previous decisions.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding random drug and
alcohol testing of railway employees); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(upholding policy of random drug testing ofcustoms agents without suspicion of wrongdoing). It might
well be said that by the time the Court considered the application of such a policy in the education
context in Vernonia, the barn door to a relaxation of the individualized suspicion standards was already
wide open. The prior decisions carved a niche in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that, while small,
was well established. Justice O'Connor acknowledged as much in her Vernonia dissent: "Outside the
criminal context, however, in response to the exigencies of modern life, our cases have upheld several
evenhanded blanket searches, including some that are more than minimally intrusive, after balancing
the invasion of privacy against the government's strong need." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 673 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I dissented in Vernonia... and continue
to believe that case was wrongly decided."); id. at 842-55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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innocent people .... Thus, if we are to mean what we often
proclaim-that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate"-the answer must plainly be
no.
193
Justice O'Connor also lamented:
For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless
searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have
allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been clear
that a suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual. Because that
is not the case here, I dissent.'94
Justice Ginsburg, who concurred in the result in Vernonia,9 5 shifted to the
opposing side in Earls. She provides the chief opinion for the Earls dissenters, with
slight, but significant modification ofJustice O'Connor's opinion. Justice Ginsburg
uses T.L. 0. to isolate both the Vernonia and Earls rulings from Fourth Amendment
principles, but without repudiating Vernonia. This complicates the solidarity of the
effort and explains why Justice O'Connor wrote separately. Justice Ginsburg's
theme is related but clearly narrower; the two suspicionless search cases are cast as
incompatible to each other and together serve as poor vehicles for a sweeping
doctrine shift. Justice Ginsburg finds, "[t]his case presents circumstances
dispositively different from those of Vernonia."'96 Further, Justice Ginsburg found
that:
Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless
drug testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely
because drugs jeopardize the life and health of those who use
them .... Had the Vernonia Court agreed that public school
attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to test each
193. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 681 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
194. Id. at 667-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. Justice Ginsburg, concurring, stated:
The Court constantly observes that the School District's drug-testing policy
applies only to students who voluntarily participate in interscholastic
athletics .... Correspondingly, the most severe sanction allowed under the
District's policy is suspension from extracurricular athletic programs. I
comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question whether the District,
on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but
on all students required to attend school.
Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
196. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 844 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2004]
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student's blood or urine for drugs, the opinion in Vernonia could
have saved many words. 7
This position centers on the belief that students who participate in competitive
extracurricular activities other than athletics have a higher expectation of privacy.
Justice Ginsburg correctly observed that the majority in Earls deferred to educators
under an even more lenient standard because the testing program implemented in
Earls would "fail [] even under the balancing approach adopted in [Vernonia].'' s
Justice Ginsburg found that:
[T]oday, the Court relies upon Vernonia to permit a school district
with a drug problem its superintendent repeatedly described as
"not ... major," to test the urine of an academic team member
solely by reason of her participation in a nonathletic, competitive
extracurricular activity-participation associated with neither
special dangers from, nor particular predilections for, drug use.' 99
The dissenters then applied the Vernonia standards to the Oklahoma drug
testing policy, as they might have been applied in 1995, and found no basis for its
constitutionality. Students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities
other than athletics have a greater expectation of privacy than do athletes. 200 No
documented incidents existed relating drug use of any kind to this group of
students. 20 ' The activities in which these students engaged did not give rise to the
type of safety concerns that exist for athletes.202
In sum, the Justices after Earls are much closer doctrinally than a cursory
glance would reveal. The dissenters, now willing to accept Vernonia, find its
application in Earls disproportionate. They cite imbalance and extremism both in
fact203 and in law.2 4 If a desire to return to T.L.O. and its expectations of privacy
197. Id. at 844-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This rationale effectively moves Justice Ginsburg
away from the Vernonia majority (of which she was a part) and into the camp advocating a return to
Fourth Amendment normalcy. Interestingly, she does so without acknowledging that she is, in fact,
changing views; rather, Justice Ginsburg creates the impression that it is the Earls majority that has
moved further downstream by finding that " Vernonia applied.... not repudiate[d], the principle that
'the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search."' Id. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
198. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 847-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 849-50 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 852-53 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203. "No similar reason, and no other tenable justification, explains [the Oklahoma educator's]
decision to target for testing all participants in every competitive extracurricular activity." Id. at 852-53
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204. "Although 'special needs' inhere in the public school context, those needs are not so
expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug testing a school district
elects to install." Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 653 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 56: 1
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss1/3
2004] STUDENT RIGHTS AFTER BOARD OF EDUCA TION V. EARLS 33
is at the heart of the dissent, at its margins is the fear that, under the new model,
limitations on the actions of educators will be hard to articulate and establish.
IV. POST-EARLS: A MODEL FOR APPROVING EDUCATORS' GOOD FAITH POLICY
CHOICES
The Court in Earls set forth what is nearly a complete equation for a deferential
model on the authority of educators, largely culling the key components from the
Tinker- Vernonia line of cases. The model is a testament to the changes in both the
outcome of student-rights disputes in public schools as well as a primer on the
philosophical shift of the Court over this same time period. Most importantly, its
elements provide a glimpse into the future of both law and educational
policymaking suggesting that the judicial role will hereafter be narrowly confined
to a predictable set of inquiries.
In application to future conflicts over student rights, the model promises to
provide a nomenclature for policy formulation and a barometer for resolving
disputes over the reasonableness of the educators' actions. Four factors provide the
basic framework:
(1) The Education Mission Factor:
This acts as a limit on the presumption of validity, covering campus
policies that are "undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of
children entrusted to its care.
205
(2) The Custodial Factor:
This factor is based on the historical view that educators have a natural
zone of authority over, if not a legal duty to, "(1) children, who (2) have
been committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster.,
206
(3) The Due Process Factor:
This factor serves to validate the reasonableness of a policy. It is based on
an emerging view that there should be a link between the educator's
interest in implementing a policy and the effects created by the disciplinary
process when the law is enforced.20 7
(4) The Accountability Factor:
This requires that the challenged policy actually represent the views of the
affected community, giving rise to an expectation that educators will reach
out for parental input by providing a democratic, participatory process to
205. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
206. Id. at 654 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
207. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002) ("In practice, the Policy has been applied
only to competitive extracurricular activities"); see id. at 833 ("[T]est results are not turned over to any
law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have any
academic consequences."). 33
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uncover and to resolve differences,""2 ' particularly over controversial
policies.
As a constitutional restatement, the model comes remarkably close to codifying
Justice Harlan's dissent in Tinker in a manner that, at least at first glance, produces
for educators an almost total exemption from ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.
In place of the traditional objective, fact-based balancing of interests comes a set of
context-dependent presumptions accompanied by a framework designed to
standardize the judicial search for arbitrary, abusive, and bad faith policymaking by
educators. As will be seen below, debates over education policies, like
suspicionless drug testing, metal detectors, or drug-sniffing dogs, remain just as
controversial for educators, but less so for the courts due to the shift in
presumptions about the authority of educators in the absence of a finding of bad
faith.
Interestingly, the elements that emerge from the restatement are neither novel
nor particularly surprising. Each factor, standing alone, is well-established in
narrower education-law contexts. What is significant is the synergistic effect the
Court derives by combining the elements in a manner that shifts presumptions in
favor of educators and burdens toward opponents of school-safety reforms.
For example, the custodial and the education-mission factors are traditional
notions in education law such that their exclusion from any restatement would be
peculiar. Judicial references to both factors appear frequently, often as dispositive
factors in court decisions involving the authority of educators. As a result, the
Court in both the Vernonia and Earls decisions, does little more than formalize
judicial notice already taken of the fact that educators operate from a position of
strength when they act in good faith to further legitimate educational interests.
In Vernonia, the majority, without benefit of any citation, appeared to herald
this formalization: "The most significant element in this case is the first we
discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care.
20 9
Later in Earls, the Justices, citing back to Vernonia, completed the
formalization of these elements:
Respondents argue that because children participating in
nonathletic extracurricular activities are not subject to regular
physicals and communal undress, they have a stronger expectation
of privacy than the athletes tested in Vernonia. This distinction,
however, was not essential to our decision in Vernonia, which
depended primarily upon the school's custodial responsibility and
authority.
210
208. Id. at 841.
209. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995).
210. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (citations omitted).
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A. The Education Mission Factor
Examined separately, the education mission is frequently viewed as a
compelling interest by judges, effectively allowing schools to overcome assertions
of student rights with a showing of the deleterious effects, overt or subtle, caused
by the exercise of those rights. When applying the education mission precedent,
courts typically recite the mantra of "[tihe broad authority to control the conduct of
students granted to school officials permits a good deal of latitude in determining
which policies will best serve educational and disciplinary goals."
' 'I
This thinking that school officials require latitude in policy determinations runs
back to early education-mission decisions in which the Supreme Court first
introduced a more deferential judicial approach to good faith actions in support of
the education mission. In the Tinker decision, while the Court upheld "the students'
right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint,"
'2 12
it confirmed the educators' interest to respond to "speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students., 21 3 Later, in Bethel
School District v. Fraser,2t 4 where the Court upheld punishment of a student who
gave a lewd speech in a school assembly, the Justices highlighted the contours of
the education-mission factor:
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational
mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting
audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it was perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point
to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the "fundamental values" of public school
education.2"5
The deference announced in Fraser was later dispositive in the case of
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,21 6 a case in which the Court upheld
administrative censorship of articles in a high-school student newspaper. The
Court, citing Fraser, noted, "[w]e thus recognized that [t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests with the school board, rather than with the federal courts. 21 7 The Hazelwood
211. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'] Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir. 2002). This
mantra can be traced back to Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), when the Court, while
resolving a conflict over the teaching of evolution, noted: "Judicial interposition in the operation of the
public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint .... By and large,
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities."
212. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
213. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
214. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
215. Id. at 685.
216. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
217. Id. at 267 (citations omitted) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 35
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majority later concluded, "[t]his standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view
that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges."2 8
Historically, state and federal courts have applied this deference to public
schools at all levels, including higher education. Perhaps the most extraordinary
education-mission decisions involve judicial deference to race-based policymaking
in the so-called "affirmative action" cases. Prior to the landmark decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,"
9 and Gratz v. Bollinger,220
which upheld affirmative action in education, only a few courts had ruled that
deference to school officials was appropriate when reviewing non-remedial use of
racial classifications. For example, in Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the
University of California,221 the federal court deferred to the decision of educators
to use race as a basis for student selection into a special elementary school program
that served as a laboratory for the university.2 The school used gender, race or
ethnicity, and family income in its admissions process to obtain the desired student
population. The court applied strict scrutiny to the facial classification, but
nonetheless, upheld the policy. The court found a compelling interest that justified
the use of race as a proxy for student admission: "California's interest in the
operation of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the
quality of education in urban public schools is a compelling state interest." '223 As to
the least restrictive means element of the strict scrutiny test, the courts agreed to
defer:
Finally, in evaluating whether [the educators'] use of
race/ethnicity in its admissions process is narrowly tailored, we
recognize, as did the district court, that courts should defer to
researchers' decisions about what they need for their research.
The Supreme Court has stated: "Courts have stressed the
importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic
judgments. This Court itself has cautioned that 'judges ... asked
to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision . . . should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment."
2 24
The Gratz and Grutter decisions reinforce this astonishing deference to the
education mission. The Court, rather than repudiating affirmative action under the
usual "fatal in fact" application of strict scrutiny, deferred to school officials' belief
regarding the role of diversity in the education mission:
218. Id. at 273.
219. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
220. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
221. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
222. See id. at 1066.
223. Id. at 1063.
224. Id. at 1066-67 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.,
233 F.3d 1188, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Today, we hold that the [educator] has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body . . . . The [educator's]
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. The [educator's]
assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits
is substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of
the interest asserted by the [educator] is no less strict for taking
into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise ofthe university. Our holding today
is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to
a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits." 5
Therefore, prior to the Earls restatement, the courts laid a foundation for a
practice of sifting the facts of a conflict for evidence of arbitrariness or bad faith in
educational decision-making. In the absence of such evidence an established
deference to the education mission was given-even when fundamental rights were
involved.226
B. The Custodial Factor
Similarly, the notion of the custodial interest of educators, when examined apart
from the education mission, supports a more deferential restatement of the law.
225. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (citations omitted). Although one of the two race-based admissions
policies was invalidated because it was not narrowly tailored, both were deemed compelling. See Gratz,
539 U.S. at 270.
226. "School authorities must be given broad discretionary powers to ensure a better education
for the children of this Commonwealth and any restrictions on the exercise of these powers must be
strictly construed." Smith v. Darby Sch. Dist.,130 A.2d 661, 668-69 (Pa. 1957); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("'[T]he public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation
of a democratic system of government"') (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). For another example of deference, see Alabama Student Party v.
Student Government Association, 867 F.2d 1344 (1 1th Cir. 1989), stating the following:
The United States Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the right of state
universities to "make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce
resources," and to determine independently on academic grounds "who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study .... The central justification for a student government organization is that
it supports the educational mission of the University. This deference to the
educational mission of institutes of higher learning has resulted in the recognition
of a university's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.
Id. at 1345 (citations omitted). See also Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1330 (Ct.
App. 1992) ("Our states, through their colleges and universities, must retain the freedom and flexibility
to put before their students a broad range of ideas in a variety of contexts. The wisdom or political
desirability of the specific route chosen is not a question to be determined by the courts."); Downing
v. Sch. Dist. of City of Erie, 61 A.2d 133, 135 (Pa. 1948) ("The burden of showing to the contrary,
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Judicial discussions about the custodial interest are occasionally tied to the
education mission, but are more routinely found in a separate body of case law
organized around the notion of in loco parentis.22 7 Its prominence in Earls serves
to essentially codify a type of utilitarianism about the interest of educators to
provide a safe, effective learning environment for students, which outweighs the
rights of the few or of the individual student.
Unfortunately, discussions concerning in locoparentis can be daunting in many
respects; modem use of the term is often symbolic rather than precise, making it
difficult to navigate its three main branches in education law.22 In addition,
provisions of state education codes regulate certain aspects of the teacher-student
relationship creating a variety of hybrid situations.229 However, all branches lead
to the same stem: the mandate to educators to "exercise a 'custodial and tutelary'
authority that permit a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
227. The phrase "in loco parentis" means "in the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged,
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (6th
ed.). A person that is in locoparentis, in effect, assumes the duties of a guardian or custodian without
benefit of a court order.
228. Three distinct notions remain in play as to the degree to which educators stand in loco
parentis. The first is historical and rooted in the common law. At common law, educators were
deemed to stand in loco parentis in an absolute sense. This carried with it two important corollaries.
First, students had no rights on campus unless parents and educators agreed. Second, school officials
were subject to few, if any legal limits, asserting immunities because they were acting on behalf of
parents. This branch of in loco parentis was repudiated in the T.L.O. decision. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985). In TL.O., Justice Blackman summarized the common law notion and
declared it inconsistent with the Bill of Rights: "In carrying out searches and other disciplinary
functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as
surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
A second branch of the in loco parentis concept that survives the T.L. 0. denunciation involves
special functions performed or assumed by public educators that raise extraordinary care and safety
concerns. School trips and off-campus events (extra-curricular and non-curricular) are said to invoke
in loco parentis in a common-law form that conveys greater authority to educators. The parental
permission that is required, the fact that the trip does not involve the curriculum, combined with the
additional challenges to safety, supervision, and liability create "a need for a greater range of
intervention by an administrator than is the case when a student is only active within the relatively
orderly confines of a school." Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir 1987); accord
Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995); Rhodes v. Guarricino, 54 F. Supp.
2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The best argument for this branch appears to be based on liability. "To
expose administrators and school districts to increased tort liability while denying them the authority
necessary to lessen the likelihood of student injury would be inequitable." Webb, 828 F.2d at 1157.
The third branch is the quasi-in loco parentis that is articulated in the Vernonia-Earls decisions.
Careful to link the notion with the TL. 0. rejection of common law concepts, the Court still asserts that:
"[a]Ithough public school officials do not stand entirely [in locoparentis] with respect to the students,
they do exercise a 'custodial and tutelary' authority that permits 'a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults' and that cannot be ignored in conducting a 'reasonableness'
inquiry." In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405,410 (Md. 2000) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)). This language is best understood as a refusal by the Court to return to
the common law notion, effectively immunizing educators from liability, particularly for constitutional
torts that might arise out of litigation under federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
229. See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Sch., No. 90-3018, 90-3060, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1292 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991), aft'd, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (in locoparentis
created by state statute).
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over free adults and that cannot be ignored in conducting a 'reasonableness
inquiry. 11230
The body of law, accurately applied to the facts in Vernonia and Earls, suggests
that both decisions could have been more easily defended as a logical extension of
the notion of in locoparentis. Prior to the TL. O.-Earls line of decisions, educators
had largely assumed the existence of authority based upon in locoparentis to make
decisions in the best interests of the students during the school day. Assertions of
the custodial interest typically increased for extracurricular events that were
generally thought to create a need for a greater range of intervention by educators
because of the additional challenges in safety, supervision, and liability. Courts
held that it was unfair to "expose administrators and school districts to increased
tort liability while denying them the authority necessary to lessen the likelihood of
student injury."23' The Supreme Court never adequately explained, in Vernonia or
Earls, why a broader custodial rationale that is loosely tied to notions of temporary
custody is preferable to an alternate rationale based on the curricular-extracurricular
distinction. This branch of in loco parentis would seem tailor-made for the
conflicts.
The answer appears to be that, after Earls, the Court actually intends to use the
factor to complete a new nomenclature for resolving student-rights conflicts
generally. This objective required announcing a broader rationale to support future
application to a wider range of campus conflicts. For their effort, Justice Scalia in
Vernonia notes, "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be
perfectly permissible ifundertaken by an adult. '232 In Earls, Justice Thomas simply
states as a general principle that "[c]entral... is the fact that the subjects of the
Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody of
the State as schoolmaster., 233 However, neither a general custodial interest nor a
narrower notion of "temporary custody" is free from controversy. It raises serious
questions about the duty of educators to keep students safe on public school
campuses and suggests answers that are in conflict with current case law on
affirmative duties.3
C. The Due Process Factor
The remaining two elements of the equation act as substantive limits on the
implementation of student-discipline policies. The due process and the
accountability factors provide balance in a formula that, without their inclusion,
imposes only slight scrutiny on educational decision making. After Earls, the due
230. In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d at 410 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56).
231. Webb, 828 F.2dat 1157.
232. Vernonia, 515 U.S at 655 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
233. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654).
234. Courts currently hold that the custodial authority of school officials over students does not
give rise to a corresponding duty to protect. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412,
1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en bane); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 510 (6th Cir. 1996); Dorothy
J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731
(10th Cir. 1992); JO. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).
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process inquiry attempts to measure the practical impact of discipline on students'
property interests to receive a public education. The accountability factor focuses
on broad notions of republicanism: the degree to which student discipline policies
reflect the perceptions and desires of parents. As limits, each element provides a
way of ferreting out arbitrary, abusive, and bad faith policymaking. These two
factors focus on the tangible impact of education policies from the viewpoint of the
two most-affected groups: the students and their parents.
The due process element is so well-known that its presence in the restatement
would seem essential. Public school discipline policies have always been
susceptible to judicial concerns of fundamental fairness as to both form and
substance. Minimal requirements of due process in a public school setting emerge
from the seminal school discipline case, Goss v. Lopez.235 In Lopez, the Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause affords public school students both a property interest
and a liberty interest in the education that state government provides.236 These
interests are protected from arbitrary deprivation by requiring notice and a hearing
on charges.237 The legal community has viewed Lopez as mainly a procedural case,
but in fact, its influence in school discipline has been quite substantive, creating an
incentive for educators to ruminate the decisions regarding punishment for code
violations. The Lopez Court, while holding that Ohio educators could not suspend
a student for ten days without notice and a hearing, noted that the charges of
misconduct had practical consequences to the student. These charges seriously
damaged relationships with fellow pupils and their teachers and interfered with later
opportunities for higher education and employment:
[R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the
student to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful
hedge against erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be
alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and arguments
about cause and effect. He may then determine himself to
summon the accuser, permit cross-examination, and allow the
student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult cases, he
may permit counsel. In any event, his discretion will be more
informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced.238
235. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
236. Id. at 574.
237. Id. at 579.
238. Id. at 583-84. The dissenters in Lopez called this the "right of a student not to be suspended
for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing." Id. at 585 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). After Lopez, due process protections have undergone some alterations to match the
changing contexts of school discipline cases. Courts have allowed post-punishment hearings in some
circumstances. See, e.g., Butler v. Oak Creek Franklin Sch. Dist., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (E.D. Wis.
2000). And in some contexts courts have not required a hearing at all. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977) (considering no hearing before imposition of corporal punishment); Gaspar v.
Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975) (considering dismissal from vocational school for academic
reasons); Lesser ex rel. Lesser v. Bd. of Educ., 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (considering
challenge to academic standing).
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This link, of both process and substance, between the type of punishment and
its severity has led to a judicial expectation of proportionality in school discipline
that works its way into the Earls formula. These decisions typically examine
school-discipline cases for some reasonable fit between the code-of-conduct
violation, procedural fairness, and the actual deprivation the student experiences.
The connection is most clearly recognized in the so-called "personal security cases"
that apply the spirit of the landmark corporal punishment case, Ingraham v.
Wright.239 In Ingraham, the Court held that students possess a substantive interest
to be free from unreasonable and unjustified intrusions.24 Tests fashioned around
this principle by the lower courts agree that a deprivation of student interests occurs
when school discipline is "arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the
legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning. '2 4' The
emerging rule in the excessive-force school-discipline cases weighs "(1) the need
for the application of corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the need
and amount of punishment administered, and (3) the extent of the injury
inflicted.
2 42
In Earls, all of these considerations play an important, albeit understated role
as part of the "character of the intrusion" inquiry. Without citation to any case, the
239. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
240. Id. at 661. As early as 1977, the Supreme Court held that public-school students have a right
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause "to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusions on personal security." Id. at 673; see also Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir.
1989) (describing Ingraham as holding that students have a "liberty interest in personal security and
freedom from restraint and infliction of pain"). Although the Ingraham Court did not grant certiorari
regarding the specific question of whether unreasonable corporal punishment violates substantive due
process, the Court, in its analysis, declared that students have a liberty interest in freedom from
unreasonable restraint. The Court has recently described Ingraham as follows:
The same distinction applies to Ingraham, which addressed the rights of
schoolchildren to remain free from arbitrary corporal punishment. The Court
noted that the Due Process Clause historically encompassed the notion that the
state could not "physically punish an individual except in accordance with due
process of law" and so found schoolchildren sheltered. Although children sent
to public school are lawfully confined to the classroom, arbitrary corporal
punishment represents an invasion of personal security to which their parents do
not consent when entrusting the educational mission to the State.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citation omitted).
241. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Woodard v. Los Fesnos Indep.
Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1984). The groundwork for this development was generally set by
the United States Supreme Court in its early substantive due process decisions. The landmark corporal-
punishment case of Ingraham combines with Lopez to clarify the requirement that the Due Process
Clause "protects individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). The
Court has also said that "the substantive component of the due process clause is violated by [state
conduct] when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense." County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 128).
242. Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist, 855 F.2d 560, 563 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Metzger v. Osbeck,
841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying another variation of the test). For other such cases, see
London v. Directors of the Dewitt Pub. Schs, 194 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999); Saylor v. Bd. ofEduc., 118
F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 1988 (8th Cir. 1988); Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). 41
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Court merely noted that throughout the dispute over student drug testing, the impact
of the policy on student interests was limited:
[T]est results [must] be kept in confidential files separate from a
student's other educational records and released to school
personnel only on a "need to know" basis... the test results are
not turned over to any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test
results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have any
academic consequences. Rather, the only consequence of a failed
drug test is to limit the student's privilege of participating in
extracurricular activities. Given the minimally intrusive nature of
the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results
are put, we conclude that the invasion of students' privacy is not
significant.24 3
This reasoning succinctly established two realities about school-discipline cases
and due process. First, courts will tend to view deprivation of student interests
differently when it is limited to loss of extracurricular opportunities. Review of
school-discipline cases properly triggers greater judicial attention when
sanctions-directly or indirectly-harshly impact matriculation and core curricular
activities. The well-established right-privilege distinction is the obvious starting
point for justifying such an approach.2" Second, the notion of "harshness" is a
matter of degree, even when due process applies. Judicial concerns are only slightly
243. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833-34 (2002) (citations omitted).
244. With few exceptions, courts and legislators view extracurricular programs as a separate
enterprise in public education that does not give rise to a right triggering due process. See, e.g., Hebert
v. Ventetuolo, 638 F.2d 5, 6 (1 st Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is no property right to play interscholastic sports,
[so students] had no constitutional entitlement to any process whatsoever.") (internal quotation mark
omitted); Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1980) ("A student's
interest in participating in a single year of interscholastic athletics amounts to a mere expectation rather
than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement."); Mitchell v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 430
F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The privilege of participating in interscholastic athletics must be
deemed to fall.., outside the protection of due process."); Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F. Supp. 1134 (M.D.
N.C. 1979) (requiting no formal proceedings in a four-month suspension from extracurricular
activities); Dallam v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 391 F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that
participation in interscholastic high school competitions is neither a right nor a privilege protected by
the Due Process Clause).
For decisions finding a property interest in extracurricular activities, see Boyd v. Board of
Directors of McGehee Sch. Dist., 612 F. Supp. 86,93 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (requiring notice and a hearing
before a student could be suspended from the football team since "participating in interscholastic
athletics must be deemed a property interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602,
604 (D. Minn. 1972) (stating the interest of college athletes in participation in sports is of such
importance that it cannot be impaired without minimum standards of due process); Duffley v. New
Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 446 A.2d 462 (1982) (finding a due process right under the
state constitution for deprivation of extracurricular activity participation).
On the legislative front, Congress does require protection of certain extra-curricular activities.
The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74, guarantees public secondary school students the right
to participate voluntarily in extracurricular groups dedicated to religious, political, or philosophical
expressive activity protected by the First Amendment when other student groups are given this right.
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higher on the curricular side of the student-discipline impact analysis. This is
influenced as much by Lopez (and its dichotomy of suspensions ten days or less
from other, more severe punishments) as it is by the post-Earls sentiment of
deference in the absence of proof of arbitrary, irrational, and malicious conduct in
policymaking and enforcement. After Earls, the mantra of educators who enforce
safe-school policies in good faith will be the following: "Given our responsibility
for maintaining discipline, health, and safety we believe this policy reasonably
serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing [ithe
proscribed activity] among our students."
D. The Accountability Factor
The notion of accountability is the most provocative element of the doctrine of
deference. It is the most unique and undefined factor in the restatement. Unlike the
other three elements, no cases are compiled (or could be referenced by readers) in
either Earls or Vernonia that sharpen the role of parental agreement or acquiescence
to disputes over school policies. If the other factors represent the sense of the Court
that a sufficient body of law exists from which to cull a workable rule for future
cases, the accountability factor, at best, reflects a hope by the Justices of possible
alternative methods for resolving such disputes.
However, the references in Earls to some form of accountability should not be
left to speculation or attributed to a form of judicial altruism. It is woven
throughout both the Earls and Vernonia rationale, making discussion of its future
impact on education-law development a serious matter, especially in light of the
Court's decision to defer to local decisionmakers. Whatever else the Court
intended, an unmistakable preference emerges to restrain judicial intervention in
student-discipline disputes when the policy in question is forged through
community dialogue and participation.
Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Earls chronicled the participatory efforts
of the Oklahoma educators. After summarizing the process, which included the
observations and beliefs of teachers, administrators, law enforcement officials, the
school board, and members of the community, the Earls majority concluded that
deference was appropriate: "We decline to second-guess the finding of the District
Court that '[v]iewing the evidence as a whole, it cannot be reasonably disputed that
the [School District] was faced with a 'drug problem' when it adopted the
Policy."
2 45
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in Earls, gives weight to such a factor:
When trying to resolve this kind of close question involving the
interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it important that
the school board provided an opportunity for the airing of these
differences at public meetings designed to give the entire
community "the opportunity to be able to participate" in
developing the drug policy .... The board used this democratic,
participatory process to uncover and to resolve differences, giving
245. Earls, 536 U.S. at 835 (quoting Earls I, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000)).
2004)
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weight to the fact that the process, in this instance, revealed little,
if any, objection to the proposed testing program.
246
These assessments mirror those of the majority in Vernonia, who based their
decision to defer, in large part, on the accountability factor:
We may note that the primary guardians of Vernonia's
schoolchildren appear to agree. The record shows no objection to
this districtwide program by any parents other than the couple
before us here--even though, as we have described, a public
meeting was held to obtain parents' views. We fird insufficient
basis to contradict the judgment of Vemonia's parents, its school
board, and the District Court, as to what was reasonably in the
interest of these children under the circumstances.247
Ordinarily, such references would be disregarded when reading an opinion
involving individual rights. In the garden-variety civil-rights case, it is generally
assumed that the plaintiff is challenging the legitimacy of majoritarian preferences.
Therefore, a perverse tautology results when a primary basis for denying the rights
challenge is the degree of consensus by those favoring the policy. However, after
Earls, the accountability factor finds its needed anchor in the uniqueness of public-
education law that is organized around themes of federalism and the role of schools
in local civic life in American communities.
Early views on public education characterized it as a "participatory process with
maximum interaction and independent thought.' 24" Early court decisions defined
the constitutional contours around limits on zealous state and local educators in the
hope of preventing unilateralism from "strangl[ing] the free mind at its source." '249
These well-known Supreme Court rulings settled disputes over the role of
parents,250 communities,215' and private enterprise 22 with emphasis on a local
democratic, participatory process. Later, the Court added punctuation to the local-
246. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
247. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
248. Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake ofHazelwood,
26 GA. L. REV. 253, 258 (1992):
[T]he Court has articulated a general view of education that has shifted over time.
Court decisions from the 1940s through the mid-1970s reflect a 'progressive'
ideology of schooling as exemplified in the writings of John Dewey. According
to this view, education is a participatory process with maximum interaction and
independent thought. In fact, education's primary function is to develop the
child's thought processes. The 1970s seem to mark a turning point in Court
thinking. More recent cases reflect a model of "cultural transmission"
emphasizing education as the means through which societal values are inculcated.
249. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
250. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing a teachers' right to
teach and a parents' right to engage them to instruct their children).
251. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (reasoning that those who bring up
a child also prepare him to be a good citizen).
252. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that public officials cannot require
children to attend public school).
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control movement in the case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,253 holding that the federal interest, if any, in public education was not
of a constitutional dimension because a state-provided education was not a
fundamental right under federal law.254 As a result, the absence of judicial
intervention in school policymaking had a logical, if not a firm, foundation.255
This early course, charted for federal judicial intervention, animates much of
the public-education case law. State public education became a part of the police
power as a matter largely reserved to state and local policymakers, including
municipalities, counties, and local school districts, with frequent reminders about
the limited role of the federal courts.256 Perhaps the most frequently cited language
in this regard comes from an early free-speech decision originally written in dissent:
[L]ocal control of education involves democracy in a microcosm.
In most public schools in the United States the parents have a
large voice in running the school. Through participation in the
election of school board members, the parents influence, if not
control, the direction of their children's education. A school
board is not a giant bureaucracy far removed from accountability
for its actions; it is truly "of the people and by the people." A
school board reflects its constituency in a very real sense and thus
could not long exercise unchecked discretion in its choice to
acquire or remove books. If the parents disagree with the
educational decisions of the school board, they can take steps to
remove the board members from office.257
State law developed its own emphasis on local control, serving to compliment
the now general expectation that a linkage would exist between local policymakers
and parents in the decision-making process. Most states do not regard public
education as a central government function beyond creating the system and
providing for its support. Local officials are expected to administer public
education within a broad and permissive bureaucratic framework.5 8
253. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
254. Id. at 18.
255. It is, therefore, no surprise that many of the limitations on educator's authority in education
law under the federal constitution are organized around the prohibitions against suspect classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause and arbitrary decisionmaking under the Due Process Clause.
256. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of the
public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.") (quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-93 n.4 (1954)
(exploring the evolution of free public education in the United States into "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.").
257. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
258. For examples, see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4302, 32-901, 32-912; NEV. REV. STAT. § 385.005
("[P]ublic education in the State of Nevada is essentially a matter for local control by local school
districts."). Courts have also long acknowledged this situation. See. e.g., Eason v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 303 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[L]ocal school districts possess such rights and powers
as are necessary to maintain control of education of the children within their respective districts.")
(quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 385.000 (1973)); Wells v. Banks, 266 S.E.2d 270, 272-73 (Ga.1980)
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The Court's restatement in Earls thus reflects a basic acceptance that when
parents and educators agree on school policy, courts should give weight to the
result. However well understood its origins, the role of the accountability factor in
gauging judicial review of controversial policies is unclear. One is led to believe
that the outcomes in Earls and Vernonia are, in fact, easily reached because of the
absence of controversy and conflict in promulgating and implementing the student
drug-testing policy. However, the notion of "controversy" is a term of analysis, not
one of legal conclusion, such that one would expect the role of the courts to be more
vigorous as the degree of consensus declines regarding a particular policy. As
discussed in part V below, a minimum inquiry by the courts should include proof
that the local democracy is an effective one, that education policymaking is, in fact,
a participatory process with workable safeguards to insure accountability of local
educators.
The Court in Earls sets forth a restatement that is essentially a repackaging of
traditional notions of the authority and duty of educators. Factors, which are
familiar in history if not in law, are set in place to support a dispute-resolution
framework that removes judicial second-guessing from all but the most arbitrary
and capricious school policies. Admittedly limited to the education context, the
model nevertheless produces results anomalous to the usual constitutional case
because "when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is
whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. 259
There are, to be sure, examples in modem constitutional law of specialized
exceptions that highlight a disjunction with constitutional-rights protections
generally. 60 However, as a close relation to the "good faith exception" family, its
application in the case of educators is extraordinary. 261' The next section critically
examines the law and policy implications of this presumption.
V. THE DOCTRINE OF DEFERENCE APPLIED TO EDUCATORS' AND STUDENTS'
EXPERIENCES IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
If Earls is taken seriously, it ends the debate over whether educators have an
exemption from the ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In its place,
("[The Georgia] Constitution and Code provide the local school boards with sweeping authority in the
governing of local school systems."). For criticism of this tradition, see generally, Eric P.
Christofferson, Note, Rodriguez Reexamined: The Misnomer of "Local Control " and a Constitutional
Case for Equitable Public School Funding, 90 GEO. L.J. 2553 (2002).
259. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
260. The most disjunctive doctrine currently arises out of the Free Exercise Clause. The
landmark decision of Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by
statute in several states, is organized around the enormous presumption that neutral, generally
applicable laws should be presumed valid despite their impact on religious practice in the absence of
proof of animus and bad faith. A prototype for bad faith appears in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), in which an ordinance is invalidated for targeting religious
practice.
261. The role of "good faith" exceptions in law is surprisingly broad. Application of good faith
exceptions affects outcomes in labor law, criminal procedure, constitutional torts, and contracts. For
examples, see Aditi Bagchi, Note, Unions and the Duty of Good Faith in Employment Contracts, 112
YALE L.J. 1881 (2003) (labor law) and Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for
Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2001) (criminal procedure).
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a different discussion should convene over the logical implications of this legal
restatement as a matter of education policy generally. Undoubtedly, the new model
reconfigures rules on student rights. The courts' role is both clarified and
simplified. Any uncertainties that survive its application in future student-rights
disputes are also brought out of the darkness, and while only highlighted in the
discussion below, are worthy of closer study.
The public policy implications of any restatement are, in the short run,
speculative, but the landscape of education law after Earls is brightly lit. A public
school is highlighted in which educators possess extraordinary authority to manage
the education enterprise with a correlative duty to provide a safe and effective
learning environment. This level of empowerment is not necessarily filled with the
good news for an educator that appears at first glance. One can easily see how any
legal expectation to provide a safe campus might influence shifts in other rules of
law, especially with respect to affirmative duties and liability. However, these
shifts, if they should occur at all, lie at the end of a chain of predictable effects, the
first set of which are already taking place, effectively changing the education-law
landscape.
The discussion below of the policy effects produced by the Earls restatement
is largely exploratory in nature. Exhaustive and careful study of future decisions
and legislation will surely follow, helping state and local educators settle
expectations as to what does and does not work. As such, one should expect that
discussions will be organized around the existing legal categories out of which
student rights disputes arise: Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment
freedom of expression, and Fourteenth Amendment notions of due process and
equal protection. Within each category the four elements of the new model should
produce outcomes substantially similar to Earls. At the same time, these elements
should subject educators to varying levels of rigor in search of unlawful policies
that are arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of
maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.
A. The Fourth Amendment Standard in Public Schools
1. Following the Lower Courts' Cues
In the area of law once thought inscrutable by educators, the Fourth
Amendment emerges as a well-settled area after Earls.262 As a Fourth Amendment
case, Earls added only a small part to what, after Vernonia, was already set in
motion. Prior to Earls, lower courts, both state and federal, sensing a clarifying
shift in the philosophy of the Supreme Court, started to move toward a customized,
less restrictive view of Fourth Amendment doctrine for the benefit of educators.
Only in the larger, doctrinal sense, did Earls confirm the elements and the operation
of the new model on the authority of educators in search-and-seizure disputes.
262. Whether what emerges after this settling is desirable from a students-rights perspective,
however, is open to debate. See generally Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights: A
Critical Examination of Students' Privacy Rights and the "Special Needs " Doctrine After Earls, 3
NEV. L.J. 411 (2002) (discussing the application of the special needs doctrine in the school setting). 47
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As explained in part II, two different types of suspicionless search cases began
to work through the courts prior to Earls. The first category presented Vernonia -
like fact patterns: attempts by school officials to implement drug testing under
circumstances similar in purpose, if not in scope, to those of the Oregon educators.
The courts invalidated many of the suspicionless search policies, uncertain over the
precise fit of the elements presented in the Vernonia rationale and unsure of the
weight to be given to the fact pattern on athletes.263 These decisions reflect the
middle road taken by the courts on student drug testing, a policy seen as an extreme
measure when applied to juveniles in school. To these state and federal judges,
outcomes in favor of educators would be based not on a presumption of greater
authority when acting in good faith, but rather would be linked to T.L.O. and its
proportionalism. With few exceptions, the courts required an actual showing of a
special need to justify the searches. The Court in Earls repudiated this requirement,
and with it, the results in these cases.
In the second category of pre-Earls cases, also explained in part II, the lower
courts fully supported educators' application of the Vernonia principles to
suspicionless searches that, while less intrusive than drug tests, were more
expansive: the search for contraband. These policies relied on the presumption of
greater authority, upholding contraband searches of the entire student body even
when the special needs showing fell below the standard imposed by the lower courts
for validating student drug testing policies.2
263. In Trinidad School District No. I v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (1998), a member of the school
band refused to consent to suspicionless drug testing implemented by the school for participants in
extracurricular activities. Id. at 1097. The state court held that the testing policy was unconstitutional
because the policy was expanded to include students involved in all extracurricular activities without
proof that band members were actually involved in drugs. Id. at 1110. In Tannahill v. Lockney
Independent School District, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001), the federal district court
invalidated a mandatory drug-testing program for all students. Id. at 930-31. A parent's refusal to
consent to drug testing was construed as the equivalent of a "positive" test. Id. at 922. The
suspicionless program was too wide and intrusive. Once again, the school district was unable to show
a special need for such broad testing. Id. at 931. The court found that there was insufficient evidence
to support the claim by educators that drug use by students and staff was increasing. Id. at 929-32.
In addition, there is the lower court ruling in Earls II, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), where the
court held that testing all participants in extracurricular activities was unconstitutional. Id. at 1278. The
appellate court held that neither a concern for safety nor a concern about the degree of supervision
provided a sufficient reason for testing the particular students whom defendants chose to test under the
policy. Id. at 1276-77. Also, the immediacy of the defendants' concern was "greatly diminished"
because the evidence did not show an epidemic of illegal drug use in the school district. Id. at 1277.
Defendants failed to demonstrate that there was some identifiable drug abuse problem among a
sufficient number of those subject to the testing, such that testing that group of students would actually
redress its drug problem. Id.
Similarly, in Linke v. Northwestern School Corporation, 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),
rev'd, 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002), the appellate court invalidated a drug testing policy that included
athletes and extracurricular activities. However, the Indiana court relied upon the Search and Seizure
Clause, art. I, § 11, of the Indiana Constitution in its ruling that individualized suspicion was required
prior to such testing. See id. at 259. This result was overturned by the Indiana Supreme Court, which
relied upon Vernonia. See Linke v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 986 (Ind. 2002).
264. See supra notes 46, 111-27 and accompanying text. See also State v. Barrett, 683 So. 2d 331
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (applying Vernonia, the court upheld a dog search of students' belongings on top
of desks reasoning that the use of drug dogs was minimally intrusive to the student while the interest
of the government in keeping drugs out of schools was great); State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist.
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This body of pre-Earls lower-court decisions essentially applied Vernonia to
what now appears to be an impressive exercise of judicial dexterity. It is not so
much that the judges got it right in terms of the shift. More significantly, they were
able to clarify the application of Fourth Amendment principles in the student-rights
context. Clarity as to what the Fourth Amendment required and what it allowed
began to emerge at about the same time that educators were searching for effective
policies to combat campus crime and disruptions. More importantly, this body of
decisions served to isolate the areas of the emerging deference doctrine that needed
clarification, in effect, packaging the issues addressed by the Court in Earls.
2. T.L.O. 's Future Role in Student-Search Cases
These lower court decisions, now taken together with Earls, illustrate how the
Fourth Amendment both expands and contracts to accommodate the new model in
future Fourth Amendment student-rights disputes. The roles of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion are modified. The former is eliminated entirely while the latter
is made optional. The T.L.O. decision and its proportionalism are not overruled;
rather, it is repositioned after Vernonia and Earls. T.L. 0. is rejected as a minimum
requirement in student-search cases. A showing of a special need is not required
before implementing a suspicionless search. Moreover, the Earls majority did not
see the usefulness in micromanaging campus problem-solving and ruled that;
"reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least
intrusive means." '265 Justice Thomas was concerned that T.L.O. as a minimum
requirement would do more harm than good on some campuses:
[W]e question whether testing based on individualized suspicion
in fact would be less intrusive. Such a regime would place an
additional burden on public school teachers who are already
tasked with the difficult job of maintaining order and discipline.
A program of individualized suspicion might unfairly target
members of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from
such targeted searches may chill enforcement of the program,
rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.266
Justice Breyer agreed in concurrence:
[A] contrary reading of the Constitution, as requiring
"individualized suspicion" in this public school context, could
well lead schools to push the boundaries of "individualized
Ct. App. 1996) (holding a suspicionless search by hand-held metal detector was minimally intrusive
and therefore legal); DesRoches ex rel. DesRoches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Va. 997)
(determinating suspicionless search illegal where the school's need to determine whereabouts of
missing shoes did not outweigh minor's individual rights), rev'd, DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F. 3d 571
(4th Cir. 1998); In re Latasha W., 60 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (Ct. App. 1998) (upholding school district
policy of random, suspicionless searches of students for weapons using hand-held metal detectors
where educators were able to show a special need-an unsafe campus climate).
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suspicion" to its outer limits, using subjective criteria that may
"unfairly target members of unpopular groups," or leave those
whose behavior is slightly abnormal stigmatized in the minds of
others. If so, direct application of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" will
further that Amendment's liberty-protecting objectives at least to
the same extent as application of the mediating "individualized
suspicion" test, where, as here, the testing program is neither
criminal nor disciplinary in nature.
267
Suspicionless searches for contraband will become increasingly legitimate
options for educators seeking to maintain a safe campus environment, especially
after Earls. Explicably, individualized suspicion will survive in the new model as
simply another tool in the kit of safe-school policies. The tinkering of the Court
notwithstanding, its use in managing campus life should not diminish. Educators,
parents, and students have acquired a comfort zone with its use and it works well
in response to most campus-discipline scenarios.
3. Settling Expectations for Suspicionless Searches
As a practical matter, the Court's warning suggests to educators when a shift
to suspicionless policies should take place. The line appears to be drawn between
suspicions logically directed at identifiable persons connected to an event or
occurrence versus a general belief by school officials of the necessity to respond to
conditions or events that cannot be connected, without creative effort and/or delay,
to any specific person or group.
Three components-the search based on individualized suspicion, the
suspicionless search for contraband, and the proprietary interest search-provide
the benchmark for an effective use of the array of powers now available to the
educator. The comprehensive safe-school plan would combine both suspicion-
based and suspicionless policies, especially the suspicionless searches for
contraband, as a way of discouraging both drugs and weapons on campus.261 If the
more intrusive, invasive drug testing can be implemented after Earls, then the
contraband searches will be even easier to validate and implement. Complementing
this combination is the proprietary-interest search of the physical plant. This search,
which relies on the absence of a student expectation of privacy as to public
property, allows educators to monitor student use of lockers and other school
resources.
269
267. Id. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
268. The policy in Tecumseh, Oklahoma, was in fact, structured around such a combination.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent notes that "the School District here has not exchanged individualized
suspicion for random testing. It has installed random testing in addition to, rather than in lieu of, testing
'at any time when there is reasonable suspicion."' Earls, 536 U.S. at 853 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
269. See S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791,795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405,
414 (Md. 2000); People v. Overton, 229 N.E.2d 596,598 (N.Y. 1967); Shoemakerv. State, 971 S.W.2d
178, 182 (Tex. App. 1998); In re Interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993).
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Legally, all previous Fourth Amendment decisions will be redrawn in light of
the Earls restatement, their reconsideration properly seen as part of the adjustment
period, by lower courts and educators, in assessing whether or not student drug
testing makes good law and effective policy. Judicial review of education policy
in Fourth Amendment cases is simplified in response to this new reality. Educators
who correctly match needs (as perceived) to solutions (properly enforced) are
allowed to operate in a more fluid manner. This appears to have been in the minds
of the Justices as far back as T.L.O.: "'Events calling for discipline are frequent
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.' Accordingly, we
have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain
degree of flexibility ...""0
Court decisions dismissing challenges to the legality of suspicion-based
searches will become perfunctory. Moreover, searches in areas previously deemed
murky, involving metal detectors, dogs, and other devices, should be subject to
fewer Fourth Amendment challenges. For example, as to dogs, most courts were
already following the lead of the Supreme Court, when it ruled that a canine sniff
is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.27" ' This influenced
public-school litigation as a general rule began to emerge that a dog's sniff of a
student's property was not a search. Any subsequent alert by the dog provided the
cause to conduct a search. 72
After Earls, this rule expands to simplify the analysis when a dog sniffs a
student's person, a scenario fostering much lower-court disagreement. 2  Under the
new model, even if one assumes that such a sniff is a search, the constitutional issue
simply narrows to examine the justification for the search. The search is clearly
valid when individualized suspicion acts as a predicate to a dog's sniff of a student
or group of students upon whom the suspicion rests. Moreover, dog sniffs as part
of a random, suspicionless search policy enjoy a presumption of validity afterEarls.
In the absence of evidence of bad faith or a violation of some other right,
suspicionless dog sniffs of students should be invalid only if the policy fails the
reasonableness assessment-boiling down to a fact-based ruling of the
obtrusiveness of the search in light of the age of the student. Courts examining such
policies will simply conduct a comparative analysis, measuring the climate of
270. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985) (citations omitted).
271. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). In Place, law enforcement officials
detained a suspected drug dealer's suitcase in order to expose the luggage to a canine sniff. The sniff
was positive, and a warrant was subsequently obtained to open the suitcase. Id. at 698-99. The Court
rejected the argument that the sniff itself was a search, thus requiring an initial finding of probable
cause. Id. at 707. The Court classified the sniff as an investigative procedure that was unobtrusive in
the manner in which it is conducted and also limited in the content of the information revealed. Id.
272. This rule is most consistently applied to dog sniffs of personal property. See Hearn v. Bd.
of Pub. Educ., 191 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11 th Cir. 1999); Mamer ex rel. Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd.,
204 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 2002); In re Dengg, 724 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ohio 1999);
Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 358 (Pa. 1998).
273. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (dog sniff of student not
a search). For rulings in which dog sniffs of students were deemed a search, see B. C. v. Plumas Unified
School District, 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) and Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School
District, 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982).
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intrusiveness against that experienced by the students in the high-intrusive drug
testing cases, of Vernonia and Earls.
The Fourth Amendment will not be toothless. Significantly, the analytical
clarity the restatement provides should encourage a rigor in judicial findings of
arbitrary, irrational, or malicious conduct in campus policymaking and enforcement.
Courts will impose liability on educators whose search and seizure policies are
wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere
conducive to learning. Moreover, an otherwise valid policy should trigger Fourth
Amendment safeguards when implemented in a capricious manner that shocks the
judicial conscience.
For example, strip searches will enjoy no presumptive validity after Earls.
Even though the Court in Earls rejects a "least restrictive means" analysis for
searches generally, nothing in the new restatement abrogates the judicial axiom that
"as the intrusiveness of the search of a student intensifies, so too does the standard
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness." '274 In other words, "[w]hat may constitute
reasonable suspicion for a search of a locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may
fall well short of reasonableness for a nude search."27
The pre-Earls practice of disallowing strip searches in response to a minor
infraction of school policy should continue,276 while searches that involve removal
of some clothing should be supported when infractions are moderate to serious and
when procedures observe minimum standards of decency.277 These expectations
274. Lewis ex rel. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir.
1993). It is important to remember what the Court in Earls keeps in play in Fourth Amendment law.
The Justices characterize thejudicial task as "a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on the children's
Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Earls, 536 U.S.
at 823. Later the Court organizes its opinion around three factors, now traditional in Fourth Amendment
analysis: (1) the nature of the privacy interest; (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the policy;
and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy of the policy in
meeting them.
275. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321; see Fewless ex rel. Fewless v. Bd. of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 2d
806 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (invalidating, while totally ignoring the Vernonia test, a strip search where
school officials did not fully investigate the veracity of reports of marijuana possession upon which
reasonable suspicion might be based).
276. See, e.g., Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (N.D. Ga.
1999) (invalidating a strip search to find an envelope containing $26).
277. A test of sorts evolved in pre-Earls strip-search decisions. A partial listing of the evolving
factors is found in Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992). After
determining that the school officials had reasonable suspicion to initiate a search, courts looked for the
following factors: "(1) having members of the same sex perform the search, (2) using a room where
only the participants were present to conduct the search, and (3) limiting the search to exclude body
cavities," (4) not requiring the student to remove underwear, and (5) no inappropriate touching. Id.
Educators have been sensitive to these expectations. As a result, most strip searches resulting in
litigation before Earls were found valid. See also Singleton v. Bd. of Educ., 894 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D.
Kan. 1995) (validating search for stolen money where the search was conducted in the principal's office
with only two male administrators present, the student was not required to remove underwear, and the
studentwas not touched inappropriately); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35,38 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff'd,
12 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 1993) (validating drug search where student was removed from the presence of
his classmates, and the search was conducted by two security guards; where the student was made to
remove socks, shoes, and pants, but not underwear; to lift shirt, and where crotch area was visibly
inspected, but student was not touched); Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1146, 1150
(7th Cir. 1997) (validating limited strip search of outer jersey, hat, shoes, and socks); Williams ex rel.
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appear to provide educators with a sufficiently clear standard to meet the "fair
warning" requirement for purposes of defeating assertions of qualified immunity in
federal liability cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.278 Without these parameters,
educators would be able to invoke qualified immunity, thereby avoiding
accountability altogether, through mere reference to Vernonia and Earls as cases
that confuse constitutional limits on the validity of searches.279
4. The Sliding Scale of Empowerment
A sliding scale of empowerment emerges to which the Fourth Amendment is
sensitive. The new model provides an analytical vernacular for the reasonableness
formalism usually associated with Fourth Amendment cases. Coherence between
the restatement and prior case law is implied and underlying reasonableness analysis
remains the same. The cases will continue to organize around the decreased
expectation of privacy mantra, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the
severity of the need met by the search. But this framework will now be animated
with the elements of deference: the education mission, custodial responsibilities,
and proportional sanctions imposed as the result of a participatory process, with
parents poised to support or to resolve differences about the policy in question. The
burden of proof for a challenging plaintiff will be one of producing clear and
convincing evidence of abuse, and doubts about the validity of a policy should be
resolved in educators' favor.
Controversies, if any remain, should continue to be pressed in the area of
student drug testing. Due to the fragile majority in Earls, a suspicious judicial
attitude is likely to persist as school districts test the decision's contours with
student drug testing polices that will, no doubt, go beyond the facts presented in
Earls. The entire student body and staff will eventually be subject to a
constitutional inquiry about the scope of the doctrine of deference. Unless those
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 883-89 (6th Cir. 1991) (validating search for small vial of drugs
where student was taken into private administrative office and, with one witness, asked to empty her
pockets, lower her blue jeans to her knees, and remove her shoes and socks); Rudolph ex rel. Williams
v. Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1119-20 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (validating strip
search for drugs when it lasted only two to three minutes, was done in a private room, and involved no
touching).
278. The United States Supreme Court's recent clarification of qualified immunity in Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002), underscores its prior rulings that educators can only be held liable
for conduct that violates a standard that is "'sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand thatwhathe is doing violates that right."' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,270 (1997)
(citation omitted). The initial post-Earls casedevelopment on this question is essential because "where
the applicable legal standard is a highly general one, such as 'reasonableness,' preexisting case law,
that has applied the general law to specific circumstances will almost always be necessary to draw a
line that is capable of giving fair and clear notice that an official's conduct will violate federal law."
Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n.9 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
279. See Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951, 956 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (finding
that Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by strip searches of students, but concluding that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821,
828 (11 th Cir. 1997) (allowing qualified immunity for educators who conducted a strip search for
stolen money); Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. ofEduc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1311-12 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
(invalidating strip search for missing $26, but finding educators were entitled to qualified immunity). 53
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cases present evidence of bad faith or a violation of some other student right, such
as due process, it is easy to see how the Court would be inclined to favor such a
policy. However, opponents of drug testing policies are not without recourse.
Vernonia and Earls underscore a uniqueness about the drug testing polices that may
prevent any further expansion by educators. Justice Breyer conditions his
concurrence in Earls on these characteristics:
The school's drug testing program addresses a serious national
problem by focusing upon demand, avoiding the use of criminal
or disciplinary sanctions, and relying upon professional
counseling and treatment .... [T]he testing program avoids
subjecting the entire school to testing. And it preserves an option
for a conscientious objector. He can refuse testing while paying
a price (nonparticipation) that is serious, but less severe than
expulsion from the school.2 8°
Justice Breyer, then, is the controlling vote to hold the feet of educators to what
little fire the Fourth Amendment produces in the area of student rights as long as the
Court holds its current composition. The Court had already lost the vote of Justice
Ginsburg, who, while expressing alarm at the implications of the Vernonia ruling,
conditioned her vote on the belief that the ruling's application would not go beyond
athletes.2"' Now with a bare majority, any shift in the vote of Justice Breyer would
fortify the dissenters who collectively expressed alarm that, after Earls, the
educators' exemption from ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements is "so
280. Earls, 536 U.S. at 842, 838, 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). Both Justices Thomas and Breyer
spoke to this point. Justice Thomas was concerned that T.L. 0., as a minimum requirement, would do
more harm than good on some campuses:
[W]e question whether testing based on individualized suspicion in fact would be
less intrusive. Such a regime would place an additional burden on public school
teachers who are already tasked with the difficult job of maintaining order and
discipline. A program of individualized suspicion might unfairly target members
of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches
may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug
use.
Id. at 837. Justice Breyer agreed in his concurrence:
[A] contrary reading of the Constitution, as requiring "individualized suspicion"
in this public school context, could well lead schools to push the boundaries of
"individualized suspicion" to its outer limits, using subjective criteria that may
"unfairly target members of unpopular groups," or leave those whose behavior is
slightly abnormal stigmatized in the minds of others. If so, direct application of
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" will further that Amendment's liberty-protecting objectives at least to
the same extent as application of the mediating "individualized suspicion" test,
where, as here, the testing program is neither criminal nor disciplinary in nature.
Id. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
281. Justice Ginsburg noted: "I comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question
whether the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students required
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expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug testing
a school district elects to install. 282
The battleground for these concerns will be the degree of documentation
needed to support student drug-testing programs and its relation to the group of
students being tested. The Court noted in Earls that educators' custodial interest
justifies something less than a "closer fit" between the students who are tested and
those causing any perceived drug problem.2 83 In finding that the close fit in
Vernonia as to athletes was "not essential to the holding," the majority delegated to
the lower courts the task of crafting a workable approach evaluating the legitimacy
of drug testing programs.284
The process should impose a Tinker-like duty on educators to provide
documentation that connects perceptions regarding drug use to "interference, actual
or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students
to be secure and to be let alone."28 Policies with an absence of any link will be
rejected, as were the assertions of the educators in Tinker. Moreover, attempts by
educators to establish a linkage anecdotally should fail as well, despite the language
in Earls that the "nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing
concern in every school."2 6 This will be especially true when there is a
disagreement within the community over the need for student drug testing, although
something close to total parental concurrence or acquiescence will permit a more
attenuated fit between law and policy.
As for educators, policy concerns surrounding drug testing will survive
formidably as well. The relative firmness of the legal basis for student drug testing
says nothing about its desirability as a policy. Drug testing will always be a more
intrusive policy and subject to debate as to its effectiveness. In general, there does
not appear to be a receptive market for widespread use of drug testing as a school
policy. Beyond this, empirical studies on cause and effect will, no doubt, help
educators make better decisions about the role, if any, that drug testing will play for
school districts with a definite need.
School districts with a parental consensus will continue to lead the push to test
the effectiveness of such policies, but it is not clear at all that such a policy will
survive in communities divided and uncertain about drug testing students. The
educators' levels of comfort about student expectations of privacy may not shift as
easily as the doctrine of the Court, leaving a gap of credibility for such policies, at
least in the short run. Even the Justices in Earls declined to endorse drug testing
as good education policy.287 As a method for managing the campus, student drug
282. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 843 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 837-38.
284. Id. at 838.
285. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
286. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
287. Justice Thomas noted: "In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no
opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of
furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its
schoolchildren." Id. at 838. Justice Breyer echoed the sentiment in his concurrence: "I cannot know
whether the school's drug testing program will work. But, in my view, the Constitution does not
prohibit the effort." Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., concurring). 55
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testing may simply be a policy that, after a brief period of use, will run its course as
an approach to school safety.
B. The First Amendment Standard in Public Schools
1. The Erosion ofTinker's Disruption Rationale and Requirement
The outcomes in student discipline cases arising out of the First Amendment
are reinforced by the Earls restatement on the authority of educators. Prior to Earls,
and its predecessor Vernonia, student free speech cases had already shifted in favor
of the good faith decisions of educators, creating a disjunction with the analysis
applied in other areas. The Earls restatement unifies the law in this regard; the
approaches in the expression cases are now compatible with the student rights cases
generally. This uniformity provides educators and lower courts with an unexpected
benefit; it provides a larger body of case law to guide lower courts and educators
seeking comfort with the new model.
The shift in the free-speech cases can be traced back as far as the Tinker
decision, where ironically the students win the case battle, but lose the doctrinal
war. The Court, while upholding the right of students to wear black armbands to
symbolically express their dissatisfaction with the policies surrounding the Vietnam
War, articulates a surprisingly broad mandate for educators:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without "materially and substantially
interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school" and without colliding with the rights of
others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.2 8
Properly understood, the Tinker decision requires some rational nexus between
the student expression and actual or potential disruptions to the educational climate.
The educators in Tinker simply fail to document a link of any kind, prompting the
Court to suspect whether viewpoint discrimination was the better explanation for
the dispute.289 Thus, while the Court upheld "the students' right to engage in a
288. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
289. The Tinker Court eventually noted: "As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by
those participating in it." Id. at 505. Later the majority opined:
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent,
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nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint,"29 it confirmed the
educators' interest in responding to "speech or action that intrudes upon the work
of the schools or the rights of other students. '29 1 In post-Tinker disputes the
rationale of decisions began to focus on this link. Educators discovered that their
good faith concerns could, with proper documentation, meet the standard with little
difficulty. 292 Thus, it came as no surprise when the Court, in Bethel School District
v. Fraser, decided the case consistent with the Tinker standard by upholding the
punishment of a student who gave a lewd speech in a school assembly.
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational
mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting
audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it was perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point
to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the "fundamental values" of public school
education.293
Thereafter, the emerging judicial deference in the free-speech cases came
together quickly along two distinct rationales. First, the doctrine was anchored to
the notion of the education mission, underscoring judicial notice of the general
authority of public educators to regulate expression incompatible with legitimate
pedagogical goals. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,294 where the Court
upheld administrative censorship of stories published in a high school student
newspaper, the Court cited to Fraser noting, "We thus recognized that '[t]he
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board,' rather than with the federal
with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or
action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.
Id. at 508.
290. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
291. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
292. For example, inJeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District, 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal.
1993), which involved a challenge to a school district dress code, the court held "the First Amendment
does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act to curtail
exercise of the right of free speech but that they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances."
Id. at 1461. The court held that the defendant failed to carry its burden of proof justifying the
curtailment of the free speech of elementary and middle school students. Id. at 1461-62. With regard
to the elementary schools, the defendant offered no proof of gang presence or of any actual or
threatened disruption ormaterial interference with school activities related to students' dress. Id. There
was some evidence of a negligible gang presence at the middle school, but no actual or threatened
disruption of school activities. Id. at 1462. Evidence regarding the high school was conflicting, but
it carried defendant's burden justifying enforcement of the dress code. Id.
293. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
294. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 57
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courts."'2 95 The Hazelwood rationale later concluded, "This standard is consistent
with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges. "296
The second basis for judicial deference to educators emerged from the public
forum doctrine and the implied authority given government officials to place
reasonable restrictions on speech. The doctrine, while not designed solely for the
benefit of public educators,297 provides an independent basis for such broad
authority. The public school campus is a nonpublic forum, giving school officials
more control over speech than if it was a public forum. Schools are deemed to be
a nonpublic forum until educators intentionally take steps (by policy or by practice)
to open the campus for general public discourse. Unless this occurs, school
facilities are reserved for expression that is compatible with its intended purposes.298
In Hazelwood, the school paper was a nonpublic forum. The conduct of the
principal, censoring stories found to be inappropriate, easily passed the low
threshold rational basis test for validity.2 99 These so-called time, place, and manner
cases provide an additional basis for regulation of student speech on campus that
is not linked to a disruption theory, but rather is grounded on the assumption that
"school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,
teachers, and other members of the school community"3 "0 when the restrictions are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." '' The Hazelwood Court
recognized both elements in its decision to uphold the power of school officials to
censor stories in the student newspaper, and in so doing, made complete the First
Amendment shift toward deference. This approach to resolving campus disputes
is similar in temperament to the elements of the Earls equation. Use of the public
forum doctrine in free speech cases underscores the custodial interest of school
officials to take reasonable steps to maintain a safe and effective learning
environment.
Therefore, prior to the Earls restatement, the courts built a foundation to
support a preference to sift the facts of a campus conflict for evidence of
arbitrariness or bad faith in educational decision-making. In the absence of such
evidence, there was an established deference to the education mission even when
fundamental rights were involved.30 2 After Earls, the tendency away from rigorous
295. Id. at 267 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
296. Id. at 273; see also Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of
First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 692-99 (1988) (discussing the Court's deferential
approach in Hazelwood).
297. The non-traditional forum cases were forged out of public protests and demonstrations of
the 1960s and 1970s that took place on public property, begging the question: what type of limitations
can government officials impose on speech other than that on streets, parks, and public sidewalks? See,
e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839, 40 (1976) (upholding restrictions on public demonstrations
at a military base); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (upholding reasonable restrictions
on speech at a county jail).
298. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
299. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-76 (1980).
300. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
301. Id.
302. See supra discussion and notes in Part II, sections C and D.
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judicial review is reinforced, in effect, providing alternating grounds for justifying
campus policies that restrict student expression. Disruption becomes only a subset
of the concerns that may be addressed through campus codes of conduct. The
custodial interest element of the Earls restatement takes on a more prominent role;
educators under their custodial authority may restrict speech to protect children as
a part of the educational process.30 3 A list of sorts emerges. Student speech may
be regulated when it disrupts campus activities or as a necessary part of managing
a closed public forum in which children are "committed to the temporary custody
of the state as schoolmaster."3° School officials may also regulate student
expression when it conflicts with the education mission.
2. Expanding Educators' Control Over the Campus Forum
In the classroom and in other school-sponsored forums, students are
accustomed to yielding. After Tinker, the Bethel and Hazelwood decisions carved
out much of the school grounds and many school activities from Tinker's disruption
standard.30 5 But now, students must yield their rights not only when giving
speeches on campus and writing for the school newspaper, but also when deciding
what to wear to school,3 °" what substances to avoid consuming, and what to say on
the playground to their friends.30 7 While courts have been relaxing Tinker to curtail
these decisions for years, Earls simplifies it further, allowing Tinker's removal from
the entire process. The restatement again puts the burden on the complaining
student to show clear and convincing evidence of school officials' bad faith or
content-based actions.
Two cases arising out of schools' attempts to keep the confederate flag off
campus illustrate how the Earls restatement is consistent with prior restrictions on
students' First Amendment expression, as well as how it can broaden those
restrictions in the future. West v. Derby Unified School District Number 260308
303. In a free speech case, decided after Vernonia, that upheld a school policy that placed limits
on the distribution of outside publications, the court correctly deferred, noting that "[a] school under
its custodial responsibilities may restrict such speech that could crush a child's sense of self-worth."
Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996).
304. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
665 (1995).
305. See supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
306. See generally Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Green, 943 P.2d 836, 840 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1997) (determining the school's uniform policy was "viewpoint-neutral on its face" and applying
the O'Brien test to uphold the policy); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437,443 (5th Cir.
2001) (finding a school district's content-neutral dress code "[regulated] a method, not a message, and
[was] reasonable in view of the pedagogical mission of the Academy"); Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch.
Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Federal courts should defer to school boards to decide,
within constitutional bounds, what constitutes appropriate... dress in public schools."); Vines v. Bd.
of Educ. of Zion Sch. Dist., No. 01 -C7455, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382 at *10 (N.D. I11. Jan. 10, 2002)
(finding "dress code's restrictions of [student's expression [were] reasonably related to [legitimate]
pedagogical concerns").
307. See S.G. ex rel. S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding
suspension of student who threatened to shoot a playmate during recess).
308. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000). 59
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exemplifies school officials' authority to respond to campus disruptions in ways that
infringe students' free-speech rights under both a pre- and post-Earls analysis.
West arose in the Derby School District that, in 1995, experienced significant
racial tension at its middle and high schools. This tension led to verbal
confrontations between students, racist graffiti on campus walls, racial incidents at
football games, and at least one fight.3 °9 Several white students involved in these
incidents wore confederate flag shirts and a fight broke out as a result of a student
wearing a confederate flag headband.310 Responding to the incident, the Derby
School District convened a 350-member community task force to suggest a course
of action.3 ' Upon the task force's recommendation, the district adopted its "Racial
Harassment and Intimidation" policy.3t2 After the policy's adoption, the school
experienced a "marked decline of incidents of racial harassment and discord."3 '
Plaintiff Terry West (T.W.), a seventh-grader, was all too familiar with the
policy after having signed off on it as part of the school handbook, having it
explained to him by his teachers, and having been suspended for three days under
the policy after referring to another student by using a racial slur.3"4 In the spring
of 1998, T.W. drew a confederate flag on a piece of paper during math class.
Another student showed the drawing to T.W.'s teacher, who then handed it over to
the assistant principal. Under school policy, the school suspended T.W. for three
days. T.W. brought a § 1983 action against the district, alleging, inter alia, that his
suspension violated his First Amendment rights." 5
The Tenth Circuit affirmed T.W.'s suspension upon application of Tinker. The
court had little trouble finding that Derby officials acted, not out of
"'undifferentiated fear or apprehension' of disturbance," but based on the
reasonable belief that display of the Confederate flag "might cause disruption and
interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and let alone. 31 6 Repeating
a refrain widely used in lower-court post-Tinker decisions, the court reasoned that
The fact that a full-fledged brawl had not yet broken out over [this
display of] the Confederate flag does not mean that the district
was required to sit and wait for one .... In this case, the district
had a reasonable basis for forecasting disruption from display of
such items at school, and its prohibition was therefore
permissible. 3 7




313. Id. (quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228 (D. Kan.
1998)).
314. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (10th Cir. 2000).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1366 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss1/3
2004] STUDENT RIGHTS AFTER BOARD OF EDUCATION V. EARLS 61
Under the Earls restatement, T.W.'s suspension is again validated, but for
somewhat different reasons. The custodial factor weighs in the district's favor here
based on its duty to keep students safe. Preventing racial harassment and violence
falls into the category of valid custodial interests. Given national race problems and
the district's local history of racial problems, school officials would have no trouble
convincing a court of their good faith in acting to prevent future racial harassment
and violence.
Along similar lines, the education mission factor weighs in the district's favor
because of educators' interest in raising citizens that reject race-based prejudice,
harassment, and violence. Certainly if schools legitimately punish students for
describing student body election candidates as "firm,"' 8 they legitimately punish
students for describing other students with racial slurs and decorating classroom
work with racially offensive symbols.
The due process factor weighs in as T.W.'s strongest protection here, ensuring
the link between the educators' stated interest and his punishment. In this case,
however, T.W. still would receive little protection because of Derby's model
process of adoption and implementation of its racial-harassment policy. Indeed,
Derby did everything right: The district identified a real campus problem; looked
to a wide cross-section of the community for solutions; adopted a comprehensive,
content-neutral policy response; gave comprehensive notice of the policy; and
reasonably and consistently enforced it.319 The policy worked. The decrease in
racial problems in the school district after the policy's implementation testifies to
the strong connection between the educator's interest and the effects of the
disciplinary process.320
Finally, the accountability factor supports the district's policy because of
Derby's model behavior in looking to the community for a considered, focused
approach to a discipline problem. Because the school district worked with the
community to solve its discipline problem, a court, especially after Earls, would be
tremendously reluctant to disturb the judgment of the local democratic process in
favor ofjudicial veto of a proven solution.
The Derby decision, then, is validated in both a pre- and post-Earls world, and
it shows how the Earls restatement assesses educators' efforts to maintain campus
safety, order, and discipline. The Madison County School Board, as discussed
below, is in greater need of the Earls restatement to validate its policies.
In Castorina v. Madison County School Board,321 the Sixth Circuit reversed the
Eastern District of Kentucky's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school
board's application of its dress code to suspend two high-school students.322 The
dress code, for which the circuit court provides no explanation of the method or
reason it was adopted, prohibited clothing that, inter alia, "depicts alcohol, drugs,
tobacco or any illegal, immoral, or racist implication." '323
318. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
319. See supra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
320. See West, 206 F.3d at 1363.
321. 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
322. Id. at 544.
323. Id. at 538. 61
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Plaintiffs wore matching Hank Williams Jr. concert t-shirts to commemorate
the birthday of Hank Williams Sr. and "express their southern heritage." '324 The t-
shirts displayed two Confederate flags and the phrase "Southern Thunder.""32 When
the principal saw the students wearing the t-shirts, he gave them the option of
wearing them inside out, changing clothes, or being suspended for three days.326 If
the students turned the shirts inside out or changed clothes, they would face no
further disciplinary action.327 When the students refused to accept any of the
options, the principal called their parents.' With their parents' support, the
students chose the three-day suspension.329 When the students returned after their
suspensions wearing the same shirts, they were suspended for another three days.
The students did not return to school after the second suspension and were
homeschooled by their parents.330
As did the court in West, the Castorina court looked to Tinker for guidance in
resolving the students' challenge to their suspensions. Under its view of the record,
the Sixth Circuit found that the school district likely was acting on a "fear or
apprehension of disturbance" alone because there was no evidence of racial
problems supporting the district's ban on Confederate flag clothing.33" ' The
concurrence points out, however, that the day before plaintiffs were suspended, a
fight broke out between students wearing Confederate flag t-shirts. 332 Also, the
court's reading of the record showed that other students were allowed to wear
"clothing bearing the 'X' symbol associated with Malcolm X and the Black Muslim
movement." 33 Again, the concurrence points out that the principal testified to, on
several occasions, asking students to remove Malcolm X t-shirts in the past,
although he had not seen any lately.334 This, for the court, showed that the school's
action was an impermissible content-based restriction on speech. In so finding, the
court found controlling its analogy between the district's fatal ban of black arm
bands in the face of allowing students to wear the Nazi cross in Tinker and the
district's punishment of students for wearing confederate flags but not for wearing
the "X" symbol in this case.33 This analysis led the Sixth Circuit to remand the
case so that the district court could determine whether, in fact, the school selectively
enforced its policy.336
In the future, the Earls restatement would aid educators in the Madison County
School Board's position by giving their educational and custodial decisions
regarding student safety, order, and discipline more deference than given under
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 538-39.




331. Id. at 541 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
332. Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
333. Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2001).
334. Id. at 546 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 540.
336. Id. at 544.
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Castorina's application of Tinker. First and foremost, the custodial factor would
allow a district to assert its duty to keep students safe from racial harassment and
violence as justification for its policy without having to first show that racial
violence had actually erupted on its campuses.
The erosion of Tinker's disruption requirement in Earls would allow a district
to act based on concerns over national racial conflict rather than waiting for that
conflict to come home before taking action. In Earls, the Court permitted the
district to take dramatic action to prevent the nationwide drug epidemic from
sweeping onto its campuses. Similarly, racial prejudice and harassment can be
classified as a nationwide epidemic. Racial tension is certainly more historically
problematic in our public schools than recreational drug use, and racial harassment
and violence threaten students' safety and school discipline. Thus if the district in
Earls can point to the nationwide drug epidemic as a threat to its custodial
protection of safety, order, and discipline, districts can also point to nationwide
racial tension, harassment, and violence as threats to their custodial protection of
safety, order, and discipline.337
There is an even closer connection between the district's educational mission
and its prohibition of racist symbols in cases such as Castorina than there is
between the district's educational mission and its drug testing policy in Earls. As
pointed out by the circuit court in Earls, the drug testing policy there was both over-
and under-inclusive because it did not target many students who would be
endangered by drug use, but it did target many who did not engage in activities
made especially dangerous by drug use. The dress-code policy, on the other hand,
applied to all students during the school day, thus ensuring that racial harassment
and violence is prevented at all times. This tightens the connection between
educators' interest in preventing racial harassment and violence and the district's
policy, showing that the district is acting in good faith in order to combat a problem.
Another aspect of the education mission factor is where the district in Castorina
likely would again fail based on the evidence on which the majority opinion relied.
If the principal only disciplined students wearing confederate symbols but not other
allegedly racist symbols, then the facially neutral policy would be converted into a
content-based restriction on speech. This would destroy the district's position of
good faith and show that the district was acting not in response to valid educational
and custodial concerns, but instead in furtherance of personal prejudices. In this
respect, Castorina serves as a fresh reminder of the danger educators face when
their actions appear content-based. Nothing in Earls or lower courts' pre-Earls
expansions of Tinker implies that the wide deference educators enjoy to educate and
protect students would stand when, without a custodial or educational justification,
certain viewpoints are singled out for punishment.
337. Some may argue that drugs are a nationwide problem where race is a regional problem. So,
race would require a more localized showing of disruption to justify infringement of student rights. Just
as some school districts have bigger drug problems than others, which may be somewhat regional in
nature, however, some school districts have bigger race-relations problems than others. If the Court
ignores fluctuations in regional issues in favor of allowing school districts to respond to national
problems before these problems arrive in their areas in the drug context, then there is no principled
reason for the Court not to allow other national problems, which may also have regional fluctuations
in intensity, to support restrictive policies.
2004]
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3. The Remaining Options for Student-Rights Advocates
Tinker and Castorina, two pre-Earls decisions, would thus likely come out the
same today.33  Perhaps Tinker functioned only as an obligatory greeting: a
comfortable quote with which to begin an opinion, long before Earls. After Earls,
though, court watchers, parents, and educators must face the reality that we are at
the bottom of the slippery slope.
While cathartic, cries that Earls, even if defensible on its facts, is problematic
because of the even more obscene violations of student rights it may lead to in the
future are pass6 and miss the point. The standard is as low as possible in
constitutional jurisprudence339 thus the judiciary will only reject the most patently
offensive, content-based, or irrational of educator choices restricting student
expression. Instead of lamenting the passing of students' federal constitutional
rights, once protected by a watchful judiciary, student advocates are better served
to affect policy decisions on the local level. Those decisions, rather than the
decisions of the courts, will now provide the strongest shield against bad education
policy.
Absent student-rights advocates' ability to prevent constitutionally offensive
policies to come into being, the due process factor and the Equal Protection Clause,
instead of the disruption inquiry, emerge as the checks on educators' wholesale
restructuring of the relationship between students and the Bill of Rights.
340
According to the due process factor, after Earls, students still must know what
is expected of them and have the opportunity to explain why they have met those
expectations.34' In the First Amendment context, this factor protects the viability
of courts' historical insistence that educators' codes of conduct pass muster under
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.342 While educators now possess more
options as to what kind of conduct to require and prohibit, the codes of conduct that
make these prescriptions must still give sufficient notice of what those prescriptions
are. Further, educators must, under the due process factor, ensure some fit between
the violation a student commits, the process the student is given, and the
punishment meted out. This remaining requirement ensures that educators exercise
discipline proportionally with the interests the violation infringes.
4. The Religion Clauses and Student Rights on Campus
Longstanding uncertainty over the role of religion in public education has
spawned a score of disparate decisions on student rights.343 The first sixteen words
338. If the district in Castorina had the sense to avoid a content-based application of its facially
neutral policy, the outcome would be different.
339. When all that is required is a rational basis, no close fit between the ends and the means is
required. All that is needed in the context of students' Fourth Amendment rights is good faith, not proof
that the policy actually works. See Earls 11, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
340. See infra text and notes in Part V.C.1 and V.C.2.
341. See infra text and notes in Part V.C.1.
342. See infra text and notes in Part V.B.4.
343. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Bd. of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Westside
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of the Bill of Rights, however, carry a built-in complexity to which the campus
climate alone contributes only a part.344 At present, no single philosophy unifies the
interpretation of the Establishment and the Free Exercise clauses.3 45  Most
conspicuously, the Establishment Clause comes laden with an array of approaches,
each competing for dominance with each new decision.346 However, when taken
Cmty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Sch.
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Joanne Kuhns, Note, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet: The Supreme Court Shall Make No Law Defining an Establishment of
Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1599 (1995) ("[E]mphasizing the tremendous discontinuity in the Court's
Establishment Clause doctrine."). For cases decided under the Free Exercise Clause, see Lambs' Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
344. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court, to its credit, has acknowledged the difficulty of
deciding case arising out of the Religion Clauses, but has not shirked from the challenge of weaving
a doctrine from the text. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("[Both
clauses] are cast in absolute terms, and either of [them], if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend
to clash with the other."). Commentary and scholarship share in the struggle to identify common
ground between the Clauses. Recent commentary appears to reflect a sense of acquiescence to the
possibility that the Clauses may be irreconcilable. See also Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional
Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 119, 121 (2000).
Maybe we-academics, lawyers, and judges-who deal with these issues are not
very bright people. More probably, this incoherence and doctrinal instability
suggests that these constitutional clauses raise very difficult problems that cannot
be easily resolved. Acknowledging the difficulty of the problems and the futility
of searching for simple doctrinal formulas to solve them may be the necessary
first step in determining the constitutional relationship between church and state.
Id.
345. See JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.1 (6th ed. 2000)
("IT]he Court has reviewed the claims under the different clauses on independent bases and has
developed separate tests for determining whether a law violates either clause."); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Participation In Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1993) ("Any serious interpretation of the Religion Clauses must explain the
relation between the two constituent parts, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause,
which are joined together in the single command."); H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can
There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 248
(1999) ("There is unprecedented confusion in the courts today regarding the interpretation and
application of the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution. The First Amendment
seems straightforward but has engendered considerable debate.").
346. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Foreword: Oh God! Can I Say That in Public?, 17 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 307, 309 (2003) ("[There are] some unique American confusions over the
meaning of the religion clauses .... There is a profound difference between the separation of church
and state and the constitutional freedom of religion. The difference was of inmense importance to the
founders ... the difference... has become difficult to discern." (citation omitted)); Paul Earl Pongrace,
IH, Justice Kennedy and the Establishment Clause: The Supreme Court Tries the Coercion Test, 6
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 217, 217-18 (1994) ("[The prevailing test to determine whether challenged laws
or practices violate the Establishment Clause has been the three pronged inquiry established in Lemon 65
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from the larger group of Religion Clause decisions, the education cases reflect a
unique balancing of legitimate competing interests, all of which are explained with
reference to the Earls restatement. The descriptions below suggest that, even if the
doctrinal discontinuities persist within the religion clauses, the resolution of
disputes on public school campuses will be more discernible due to the Earls
formula.
a. The Free Exercise Clause
Of the two clauses, the Free Exercise Clause is most easily linked to the Earls
restatement. In Oregon Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith,347 which several
states have superseded by statute, the Court reconfigures free exercise analysis in
a manner that, while not crafted solely for the benefit of educators, is organized
around the theme of judicial deference. The Smith, decision requires courts to
accord a presumption of validity to government regulations that interfere with the
free exercise of religion when the policy is "an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate."348 In other words, after Smith one's
religiously motivated conduct is not exempt from a religiously neutral, generally
applicable regulation. Stated in an educational context, the Free Exercise Clause
"does not relieve [a student] of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
[school policy] of general applicability.'
349
Even the so-called "hybrid" student rights cases, which present stronger
constitutional claims (and therein a more stringent standard of judicial review) by
combining religiously motivated conduct with other constitutional protections under
Smith rationale, 35' revert to the Earls restatement. For example, "hybrid" claims
involving other communicative activity (freedom of speech or freedom of
association) would trigger the education mission and custodial elements of the
restatement, invoking the authority of educators to regulate expression incompatible
with legitimate pedagogical goals. The same result would be reached by applying
the public forum doctrine with the power of school officials to "impose reasonable
v. Kurtzman [sic] ... Justice O'Connor's test is the 'endorsement' approach .... Another approach
offered to replace the Lemon test is the 'coercion test' which Justice Kennedy has proposed.").
347. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
348. Id. at 878-79.
349. Id. at 879 (citations omitted). After Smith, the courts have consistently applied the rule to
the advantage of school officials. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th
Cir. 1998) (full-time attendance requirement); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177
(6th Cir. 1993) (course requirements); Vines v. Bd. of Educ. of Zion Sch. Dist., No. 01-C7455, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2002) (dress code); Jesuit Coll. Preparatory Sch. v. Judy, 231
F. Supp. 2d 520 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (sports regulation).
350. Smith describes the 'hybrid" case as one which raises a free exercise claim "in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press... or the right of
parents ... to direct the education of their children. . . compelled expression ... [or] freedom of
association." Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (citations omitted).
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restrictions on the speech of students... [when the restrictions are] 'reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,""" particularly in a closed forum." 2
Littlefield v. Forney Independent School District35 3 illustrates how post-Smith
decisions complement the elements of the Earls restatement. In Littlefield, school
officials implemented a dress code that "require[d] students to wear solid color
polo-type shirts with collars, oxford-type shirts, or blouses with collars in one of
four colors."3 4 The uniform policy included an "opt-out" provision that allowed
parents and students with "bona fide" religious or philosophical objections to apply
for an exemption to the policy.355 Violation of the dress policy triggered a
graduating series of penalties leading up to expulsion in the worst instance.356 The
lower court findings established the belief of school officials that implementation
of the program would yield positive results for the district.35 7 Educators had also
351. Vines, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382, at *9 (citations omitted) (quoting Muller v. Jefferson
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1537-38 (7th Cir. 1996)).
352. As a comparative matter, school officials lose control over the school climate when the
campus is deemed a limited public forum. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98 (2001) (holding that school policy of excluding student club because of its religious activities
violated the free speech rights of the students, and that the Establishment Clause was not a defense for
such a policy because the campus was a designated public forum).
353. 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
354. Id. at 280.
355. The opt-out provision was required by a state education-code provision that authorized
school districts to implement dress codes. See TEX EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.162 (Vernon 1995). The
school officials in Littlefield required parents seeking an exemption to fill out a questionnaire designed
to help determine the sincerity of the beliefs. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 281.
356.
[I]f a non-exempt student attends school in violation of this uniform policy, the
following disciplinary steps will be taken in order: [ 1 ] the student will be placed
immediately in isolation on the campus, either until the parent can bring
appropriate clothing or for the entire day, whichever comes first; [2] the student
will be sent to BAM [Behavioral Adjustment Modification] for a minimum of 3
days for the second infraction; [3] if the student still refuses to comply, the
student will remain in BAM for a maximum of two weeks; [4] if the student still
refuses to comply following the two week BAM assignment, the principal will
pursue due process for AEP [Alternative Education Program] or expulsion.
Id. at 280-81.
357. "'[School officials] came to the conclusion that the implementation of a school uniform
program would.., have the following beneficial effects on the students and the system as a whole:
improve student performance, instill self-confidence, foster self-esteem, increase attendance, decrease
disciplinary referrals, and lower drop-out rates."' Id. at 279-80 (quoting Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
Sch. Dist., 108 F.Supp. 2d 681, 686 (N.D. Tex. 2000)). Other educators testified that the policy was
implemented to:
[P]romote school spirit and school values, and to promote decorum (and thereby
the notion that school is a place of order and work), to promote respect for
authority, to decrease socioeconomic tensions, to increase attendance, and to
reduce drop out rates.... to increase student safety by reducing gang and drug
related activity as well as the likelihood of students bringing weapons to school
undetected and by allowing teachers to more readily distinguish Forney students
from outsiders.
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received positive feedback from parents about the policy prior to its
implementation.a58
On this record, both the lower and appellate courts in Littlefield upheld the
constitutionality of the program against legal attacks that included free exercise of
religion claims. Although all of the elements of the Earls formula were present in
the facts of the case, most of the claims were resolved with reference to the
custodial and the education mission factors. The courts deferred to school officials
with respect to the broad free speech claims brought by the students. The policy
was found to be viewpoint neutral and "rationally related to the state's interest in
fostering the education of its children and furthering the legitimate goals of
improving student safety, decreasing socioeconomic tensions, increasing
attendance, and reducing drop-out rates." '359 Without any evidence of bad faith on
the part of school officials, the courts fell back on the long tradition that "federal
courts should defer to school boards to decide, within constitutional bounds, what
constitutes appropriate behavior and dress in public schools.""36 The courts
continued their deference to educators in the face of a more substantial parental
rights claim by observing that "[w]hile Parents may have a fundamental right in the
upbringing and education of their children, this right does not cover the Parents'
objection to a public school uniform policy. It has long been recognized that
parental rights are not absolute in the public school context and can be subject to
reasonable regulation." '' In addition, the courts rejected the argument that the facts
of the case presented a "hybrid" case under Smith.
3 62
The more difficult claim in Littlefield was the free exercise argument that
squarely raised the applicability of the Smith decision. The Littlefield courts
declined to depart from the rational basis standard of review:
[T]here is no evidence to suggest that the Fomey school uniform
policy is not facially neutral or generally applicable. The evidence
clearly reveals that the policy was not enacted for the purpose of
inhibiting any religious belief or practice. The only reference in
the policy to religion is the opt-out provision, which obviously is
an attempt to accommodate, not hinder, the religious beliefs of the
358. Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2001).
359. Id. at 291.
360. Id. at 287.
361. Id. at 291.
362. On the "hybrid" analysis there is a split in the federal lower courts. The First, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits apply greater rigor to a plaintiffs' hybrid claim before raising the standard of review
to strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs are required to make "a colorable showing of infringement of recognized
and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right
to control the education of one's child." Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d
694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit refuses to apply the hybrid language of the Smith decision
until the Supreme Court provides further guidance. See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ.,
5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). However, at least one other federal court has allowed plaintiffs to merely
allege the violation of several constitutional rights, link them to a free exercise claim, and invoke the
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students and their parents. Clearly then, the policy was not
adopted "because of' Plaintiffs' beliefs, but "in spite of' them.363
Therefore, under Smith, only school regulations that have the purpose or the
effect of targeting religious expression by students will run afoul of the Free
Exercise and the Equal Protection Clauses, as laws that are neither "neutral" nor of
"general applicability." '364 But these policies should fail under the Earls formula as
well, falling outside the scope of the education mission or violating notions of due
process. Courts would not defer to a policy that (in purpose or effect) isolated
students, based on their religious beliefs, for special benefits or burdens.365
Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, which today is understood to
include not only immutable characteristics, but also the exercise of fundamental
rights, is per se beyond the legitimacy of the education mission.366 Exclusion of
student groups based on religious targeting would be particularly pernicious. 3 6 7 The
character of any intrusion on the expressive activities of the students so targeted
would be deemed arbitrary, capricious, and wholly unrelated to the legitimate state
goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning. Therefore, student claims
under the Free Exercise Clause would be upheld upon a showing of discrimination
of the sort that clearly falls outside of the presumption of validity for school codes
of conduct.
368
363. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 704 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
364. Church of the Lukuni Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
365. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 n.21 (2000) ("Even if the plain
language of the [school] policy were facially neutral, 'the Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide
behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its
actions."') (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment)). This is also true of the Free Exercise Clause. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534-35.
366. The presence of discrimination in an otherwise valid state education policy alters
constitutional presumptions. Compare Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (invalidating an
otherwise valid state textbook assistance program when it was implemented in a manner that provided
aid to a school discriminating on the basis of race) with Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(upholding state program of providing textbooks to students attending religious schools).
367. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 122 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(finding school policy of excluding religious community groups from access to an otherwise open
forum unconstitutional: "Lacking any legitimate reason for excluding the Club's speech from its
forum-'because it's religious' will not do... [the educators] would seem to fail First Amendment
scrutiny regardless of how [their] action is characterized. Even subject-matter limits must at least be
'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."') (citation omitted).
368. There are parallels between the Earls restatement and the Smith analysis. It is not clear in
either area why such deference should be preferred to an approach that would require a more careful
balancing of the interests. For its part, the Court, in decisions after Smith, continues to underscore the
belief that "[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable [laws] of socially harmful
conduct... 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of [the law] on a religious objector's spiritual
development."' Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). This rationale has been slow to abate
broad criticism of Smith. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical
Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2000) ("Justice Scalia's approach to the Religion Clauses
is unduly restrictive and would leave little constitutional protection for either free exercise or the
Establishment Clause."); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 570-75 (1991) ("[As a result of
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b. The Establishment Clause
Much of Establishment Clause law is built around the resolution of cases
challenging public school policies.369 It is fair to say that the outcomes in these
decisions underscore a suspicious judicial attitude about religion in public schools
that is animated by a variety of approaches, ordinarily resolving doubts against the
validity of questionable policies. As such, it is important after Earls to understand
what the Establishment Clause requires of school officials and what it permits when
policies collide with student rights. This is not as impenetrable a task as might
appear at first glance.
Most attempts to analyze Establishment Clause doctrine are diverted by
expressions of annoyance over the failure of the Court to organize its
decisionmaking around a unifying theme. Surprisingly, it is often lamented that
Establishment Clause analysis revolves around a loose inquiry on purpose and
effect.370 However, this criticism is tautological at best. All of constitutional law
Smith,] [c]ourts are essentially removed from the business of protecting religion from the incidental
burdens inflicted by general laws.").
369. The Establishment Clause has been used to address a wide range of public-school policies.
Some disputes centered on state programs that provide aid or special benefits to religious schools or
their students. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002) (upholding state
school voucher program); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703-04, 710 (1994) (invalidating a
state policy that formed a separate school district composed entirely of members of one religious sect);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (upholding a government program that
provided a public school sign language interpreter for a student attending a religious school); Witters
v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1986) (finding "no Constitutional
barrier" to vocational scholarship program that provided tuition assistance to students attending
religious school); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,412-14 (1985) (disallowing public school programs
that provided remedial assistance to students attending religious schools), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (upholding remedial programs in public schools that provided
services to students attending religious schools); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,397
(1985) (invalidating a school district program which provided classes to only nonpublic school students
at public expense); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402-04 (1983) (upholding a state tax policy of
permitting deductions for private educational expenses); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49
(1968) (upholding state program of providing textbooks to students attending religious schools);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding state program that provided transportation
services for students attending public and private schools).
Other challenges have focused on local school policies that serve to encourage or require acts of
religious observance. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316-17 (2000)
(invalidating school prayer over public address system before football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (invalidating school prayer at graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (invalidating moment of silence statute); Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (invalidating Bible reading in school); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962)
(invalidating school prayer).
A third category of decisions address the degree to which school officials may introduce religious
materials and doctrine into the classroom. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987)
(invalidating state statute requiring the teaching of "creation science"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
39-40 (1980) (invalidating practice of posting the Ten Commandments on the wall of each classroom);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (invalidating state statute forbidding the teaching of
human evolution).
370. "A significant source of this confusion is the Lemon test's lack of a conceptual
foundation .... If that issue was forthrightly addressed, the nature of the purpose and effects test to
be applied could be intelligibly determined." Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and
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is shaped by this general assessment of purpose and effect in determining when a
public policy has gone too far. The Court's reluctance to simplify Establishment
Clause analysis, at least in the area of public education, underscores a reality about
judicial review of educational policies that is formalized in the Earls restatement.
The Lemon test, the endorsement test, the history exception, the neutrality principle,
and the free-speech analysis all acknowledge, in varying degrees, the importance
of uncovering bad faith in policymaking. In this regard, the public education cases
provide a clearer set of guidelines on improper purposes and permissible effects
than some would care to acknowledge.
At the core of the Establishment Clause analysis of public school policies is the
mandate preventing school officials from using their authority and influence to give
direct support to religion. Loosely phrased against the rationale of the McCollum
decision, where the Court invalidated a policy of bringing sectarian teachers into
public schools to provide religious instruction, this framework tries to determine
whether classrooms are used for religious instruction and whether "the force of the
public school [is] used to promote [religious] instruction" or worship.
37 '
Surrounding this core are the various subsidiary inquiries used to highlight specific
concerns that emerge out of the vast array of educational policies.
A list of sorts emerges that effectively annotates judicial suspicions about
religion in public schools in contexts where arbitrary, abusive, and bad faith
policymaking is likely to be found. The Earls equation is forced to adjust to these
concerns by placing the presumption of validity beyond the reach of educators who
would otherwise wrap themselves and their policies in the doctrine of deference.
Instead, a presumption of invalidity attaches. This presumption forces a stricter
standard ofjudicial review that cancels deference to the education mission, imposes
affirmative duties on school officials as temporary custodians of students, and
makes more rigorous the due process and accountability factors.
At the top of the list are policies so directly in conflict with the Establishment
Clause mandate that they are presumed to fall outside of legitimate educational
interests. These per se "bad faith" cases involve policies that directly support
religion by creating a preference for students because of their religion,372 policies
that introduce a preferred religious doctrine onto campus,373 and policies that seek
Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equalty, and Speech in the
Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 127 (1990).
371. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ("Here not only are the State's tax-supported
public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also ... helps to
provide pupils for [sectarian groups'] religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public
school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State.") (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 207 n.1, 212 (1948)).
372. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (considering policy creating a
separate school district for members of one religion).
373. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (policy requiring the teaching of
creationism as science); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (policy requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in each classroom); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (policy making it
unlawful to teach evolution); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (policy
bringing religious teacher onto campus to teach students).
2004)
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to introduce all or part of a religious ceremony as official educational practice.374
Courts should routinely apply strict judicial scrutiny to such policies based on the
same rationale that is applied to policies that discriminate among students based on
suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. Such an approach
effectively rebuts the good faith exception for educators under the Earls equation.
Policies that advance religion on campus are beyond the legitimacy of the education
mission, take impermissible advantage of the temporary custody of children, and
deny due process by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint in a manner that
undermines academic interests.375
Beneath the per se "bad faith" cases, the remaining decisions are clearly under
the influence of the doctrine of deference. This category is the most revealing about
the Establishment Clause and the shift in presumptions about the authority of
educators in the absence of a finding of bad faith. Reinforced by notions of
neutrality, these decisions defer to school officials when the policies, "'following
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extend[] benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.
''3 76
These cases should more properly be called the "indirect-aid" decisions, in which
evidence of improper motive or effect is essential to altering the presumption of
validity. In its absence, "[t]he incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the
perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement
374. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (policy requiring prayer in school); Abington Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (policy allowing voluntary Bible reading); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (policy promoting prayer through a moment of silence); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1922) (policy allowing clergy invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (policy promoting student prayer at football games and other
sponsored events); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state policy directly subsidizing sectarian
schools' education costs).
375. Numerous opinions characterize the campus climate that results as one that is not suitable
for children in the formative years of development. "[M]andatory attendance requirements [means] that
state advancement of religion in a school would be particularly harshly felt by impressionable
students." Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 116 (2001). "[S]chool [officials]
supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students .... This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992); "The State exerts great authority and
coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation
of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peerpressure." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
376. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002)
(upholding state school voucher program); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (upholding
remedial programs as applied to public schools that provided services to students attending religious
schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (upholding a government
program that provided a sign language interpreter for a student attending a religious school); Witters
v. Wash. Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1986) (finding "no Constitutional barrier" to
vocational scholarship program that provided tuition assistance to students attending religious school);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402-04 (1983) (upholding a state tax policy of permitting deductions
for private educational expenses); Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (upholding state
program of providing textbooks to students attending religious schools); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding state program that provided costs of transportation services for students
attending public and private schools).
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of benefits. 377 Acknowledgment of this shift is central to the rationale of the Court
in Agostini v. Felton,37 a where a state aid program extending benefits to sectarian
schools was upheld.3 79 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, succinctly notes,
"What has changed since we decided Ball and Aguilar is our understanding of the
criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect.
380
Educators steer clear of violating the prohibition against establishment of
religion when their policies, in purpose and effect, are neutral towards religion.
Debates over the wisdom of education policies that give indirect aid to religion, like
suspicionless drug testing, metal detectors, or the use of dogs to discover
contraband, will remain just as controversial for school officials, but less so for the
courts due to the shift in presumptions about the authority of educators absent a
finding of bad faith. The neutrality principle casts a wider shadow over public
school law than any of the competing doctrinal tests. When neutral criteria and
evenhanded policies are in place, students tend to be on equal footing in their
relationships with school officials, in access to facilities, and in access to other
resources under a presumption of compatibility with the education mission.
Therefore, the Earls restatement formalizes a brighter line that separates permissible
policies from those enacted "with the purpose and perception of school endorsement
[of religion]." ''
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Standard in Public Schools
1, Due Process of Law
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive and
procedural limits on educators. Coupled with the Equal Protection Clause, these
rights provide what little rigor remains in judicial review of campus disciplinary
policies in the wake of the Earls restatement. The law supporting each of these
rights strikes a different chord toward a common objective: uncovering policies that
are arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of
maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning. The Due Process Clause
combines both a procedural framework and a substantive guide. The procedural
framework is based largely on the seminal case, Goss v. Lopez.382
377. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
378. 521 U.S. 236 (1997).
379. Id. at 209.
380. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
381. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000).
382. 419 U.S. 565, 578-84 (1975).
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a. Procedural Due Process
i. Short-Term Suspensions and Other MildDisciplinary Actions
The current doctrinal approach in procedural due process cases is deferential
with, at best, an uncertain promise of rigor. The Lopez rationale creates, in effect,
a dynamic linkage between the process due a student facing disciplinary action and
the nature of the deprivation at stake.383 The so-called "minimal process" is due a
student facing a suspension of ten days or less from any part of the curricular
learning process.384 Notice may be oral or written, at which time the student, if he
denies the charges, has an "opportunity to present his side of the story." '385 At this
stage the notice and hearing requirements are minimal, the informal discussion of
the events serving to satisfy constitutional concerns.3"6 It is also beyond debate that
the Due Process Clause requires even less process when the nature of the
deprivation affects non-curricular opportunities of the student facing disciplinary
action.387 It is, in fact, this thread-the presumed acceptance of school discipline
that is less invasive of the property interest of the student-that is woven throughout
the Earls outcome.388
The Earls restatement incorporates this expectation that school discipline cases
will manifest some reasonable fit between the code-of-conduct violation, procedural
fairness, and the actual deprivation the student experiences. The new model should
383. See id. at 576.
384. Id. at 581.
385. Id.
386. "There need be no delay between the time notice is given and the time of the hearing. Inthe
great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the
student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his
version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the
basis of the accusation is." Id. at 582.
387. See supra discussion at Part III.
388. The Court stated:
Moreover, the test results are not turned over to any law enforcement
authority. Nor do the test results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have
any academic consequences. Rather, the only consequence of a failed drug test
is to limit the student's privilege of participating in extracurricular activities.
Indeed, a student may test positive for drugs twice and still be allowed to
participate in extracurricular activities. After the first positive test, the school
contacts the student's parent or guardian for a meeting. The student may continue
to participate in the activity if within five days of the meeting the student shows
proof of receiving drug counseling and submits to a second drug test in two
weeks. For the second positive test, the student is suspended from participation
in all extracurricular activities for 14 days, must complete four hours of substance
abuse counseling, and must submit to monthly drug tests. Only after a third
positive test will the student be suspended from participating in any
extracurricular activity for the remainder of the school year, or 88 school days,
whichever is longer.
Given the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the limited
uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that the invasion of students'
privacy is not significant.
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
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produce outcomes substantially similar to Earls as the degree of the intrusion on the
student lessens. Short-term suspensions from the classroom (less than ten days), as
well as longer suspensions from extracurricular activities, will trigger both
presumptions of reasonableness and judicial deference in reviewing challenges to
the imposition of discipline. Conversely, judicial review of school discipline cases
will properly involve greater rigor when sanctions--directly or indirectly-harshly
impact matriculation and core curricular activities.
Educators, for their part, have shown a willingness to conform disciplinary
procedures to the Lopez guidelines as to short-term suspensions. If any incentives
exist to use the occasion of the Earls restatement to gain more of an advantage in
this area, they are hard to state realistically. In the larger arena, educators risk far
more by appearing to give short shrift to due process. Risk of loss of goodwill by
both courts and communities, along with the threat of advocacy and intervention,
far outweigh any benefits. In other words, arbitrary and capricious disciplinary
processes are the most direct path toward the erosion of the presumption of validity
that now exists.
ii. Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions
Long-term suspensions and expulsions raise a more challenging set of problems
not easily resolved with reference to the Earls model. Further examination and
refinement of what the law permits in this area is essential. After Lopez, the Court
has given, at best, only general guidance on what process is due when a student is
punished with a longer suspension or expulsion.389 Lower courts have developed
a "character of the intrusion" inquiry based upon the three-part analysis set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge.39
In Mathews, the Supreme Court explained that, in determining what process is
due, a generally applicable test should be used, taking into account three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 9'
From this test a rule has evolved that due process requires something more than
Lopez's informal notice and conversation; rather, some sort of meaningful
opportunity to be heard is required. 92
389. The Court in Lopez stated merely that "longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures." 419 U.S. at 584.
390. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
391. Id.
392. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2002); Black
Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1,484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973); Betts v. Bd. of Educ., 466
F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972); Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1972); Farrell 75
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However, expectations are unsettled as to what standards educators should meet
for expulsions and long-term suspensions. Courts loathe to impose strict adversarial
rules on the administrative hearings, fearing that a "meaningful opportunity" will
evolve into a judicial or a quasi-judicial proceeding. As a result, many current
decisions reflect an extreme pro-educator view, favoring few requirements on
educators beyond giving the student notice of the charges against him, and the time
of the hearing as well as a full opportunity to be heard.393 Ostensibly, this preserves
a measure of autonomy and flexibility for educators to respond to the vast array of
student misconduct.
A judicial presumption against the imposition of higher procedural standards
for expulsion hearings is, however, nonsensical. It directly collides with the goal
of preventing arbitrary, irrational, and malicious deprivations of property interests,
once thought to be at the core of procedural due process philosophy. First, it is not
clear in any of the cases disfavoring this approach that the imposition of a standard
process for expulsions would compromise educational options in any way. As a
practical matter, educators find that as the gravity of the offense increases, such
cases are actually easier to process toward the desired end with little, if any, burden
to educational interests.
Second, school officials bring flexibility to the imposition of discipline that
further reduces the impact of an expulsion event on the education mission. For
example, short-term suspensions often are imposed prior to any expulsion, giving
educators an opportunity to further investigate and prepare for the disciplinary
hearing without compromising campus life.
If, after Earls, the deferential procedural due process cases continue to reflect
a belief that courts should respect the desire of educators for administrative
convenience in disciplinary hearings, then, at a minimum, the burden of persuasion
should be placed upon school officials. Under such an approach, school officials
would need to establish in each case the nature of the burden on educational
interests that might result from the imposition of higher procedural standards in
expulsion hearings. Otherwise, Earls and its "character of intrusion" requirement
are incompatible with Mathews, making the due process element of the Earls model
harder to translate into a workable rule.
The concern with balancing fundamental fairness and administrative flexibility
in cases involving expulsions and long-term suspensions is not lost on a growing
body of lower courts that require schools to provide additional administratively
convenient safeguards.394 Moreover, the effect of lingering uncertainty casts doubt
v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 1970);
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. ofEduc., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961); Wagnerexrel. Wagner-Garay
v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs, 255 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ind. 2003); S.W. v. Holbrook Pub. Sch.,
221 F. Supp. 2d 222,229 (D. Mass. 2002); Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 719 (W.D. La. 1978).
393. See, e.g., Betts, 466 F.2d at 633 (requiring only receipt of notice, an opportunity to prepare,
and an "orderly hearing"); see also Remer, 286 F.3d at 1010-11 (requiring only notice of the charges,
notice of the time of the hearing, and a full opportunity to be heard).
394. See, e.g., Colquitt v. Rich Township High Sch. Dist. No. 227, 699 N.E.2d 1109, 1116-17
(I11. App. Ct. 1998):
[1]n expulsion proceedings, the private interest is commanding; the risk of error
from the lack of adversarial testing of witnesses through cross-examination is
substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring the admission
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in several practical areas: the admissibility of hearsay testimony, the right to
counsel for the student (especially when the school board attorney appears for the
educator), the ability of the student to discover and confront witnesses, and the
question of what constitutes proper notice of the alleged misconduct.39 Resolution
of this aspect of fundamental fairness will be all the more essential with the
continuing popularity of so-called zero-tolerance policies that often assume
expedited imposition of punishment.396
2. Substantive Due Process
The four elements of the Earls restatement essentially formalize an almost
piecemeal evolution already occurring in the courts toward deference to educational
decisions about most student rights. As to case outcomes, this congruity is
profoundly, perhaps unwittingly, present in the area of substantive due process.
Student rights claims brought under substantive due process are extraordinarily
difficult to maintain, for reasons having very little to do with the underlying
philosophy behind the elements of the deference model. Institutional justifications
abound: framers' intent, judicial restraint, federalism, and respect for state-based
remedies. Each notion, in varying degree, influences how claims brought under
substantive due process will be resolved.
At first glance, the empowerment given educators under the Earls model
appears incompatible with the rationale in the substantive due process student rights
cases. Currently, substantive due process comes with built-in impediments for
students. Most claims raise issues concerning the accountability of educators for
misconduct that results in harm to students. The cause-in-fact of such harm may be
from a school official or from the actions of a third party, usually another student.
In both cases, the student assertions have a common objective: the imposition of
a duty on the educator to provide a safe environment for learning. Accompanying
this is often a demand for compensation for injuries, in the form of money damages,
for breach of the duty.397 It is, in fact, because substantive due process cases "sound
of hearsay statements is comparatively outweighed .... [T]he expansive use of
accusatory hearsay, as was done in the instant case, is inconsistent with and
violative of due process.
Id. (citation omitted). Courts tend to require at least some access to witnesses. See Wayne v.
Shadowen, 15 Fed. Appx. 271 (6th Cir. 2001); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961); Nichols ex rel. Nichols v. DeStefano, 70 P.3d 505 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), cert. granted,
DeStefano v. Nichols ex rel. Nichols, No. 02-SC667, 2003 Colo. LEXIS 465 (May 27, 2003); In re
Expulsion of E.J.W., 632 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Stone v. Prosser Consol. Sch. Dist. No.
116, 971 P.2d 125 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
395. See Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless School
Violence, Due Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An Examination ofFuller
v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 174-75
(2002).
396. See Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending And Expelling Children From Educational
Opportunity: Time To Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1039 (2001).
397. Most student-rights claims filed in federal court are framed as constitutional torts under the
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 77
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in tort" that courts have interpreted the due process clause narrowly, attempting to
prevent a collision between the Fourteenth Amendment and state tort laws.398
Injury claims against public school officials brought under substantive due
process must either be based on a deprivation of a specifically identified liberty or
property interest protected under the notion of due process, 399 or be based upon
gross misconduct by school officials that "shocks the conscience."400 Most student
rights claims fall under the latter category because of the short list of rights deemed
fundamental under substantive due process. The list does not recognize a
fundamental right to an education or a right to a safe learning environment as an
interest that implicates life, liberty, or property.4"'
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
This hundred-year-old civil-rights provision allows a person to sue government officials and entities
for violation of federal rights. "To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Resident Council of
Allen Parkway Vill. v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir.
1993) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). A claim may also be brought against a local
governmental agency or unit when the injury is alleged to have occurred as a result of an "official
policy or custom." Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see also Webster
v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (adopting a definition of "official
policy"), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Local
governmental units may not be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell,
436 U.S. at 691; Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
398. In Paul v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause should
not become a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered
by the States." 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Later, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, the Court noted:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended .... It is
important, therefore, to focus on the allegations in the complaint to determine
how [a plaintiff] describes the constitutional right at stake and what the
[government] allegedly did to deprive [plaintiff] of that right.
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
399. See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
400. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In Rochin, the Court held that the
government could not use evidence obtained by pumping a defendant's stomach against his will because
the government's conduct was so egregious that it "shocked the conscience" and offended even
"hardened sensibilities." Id. at 172.
401. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Johnson v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994). Of course, current substantive due process doctrine does
protect citizens against intrusions by government into specific fundamental liberty interests. See Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (right to travel); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (right
to refuse medical treatment); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain abortion). These interests rarely, if ever, conflict with those of
public educators, and case development is understandably scant. For decisions involving liberty
interests and education policies, see Martinez ex rel. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona
fide residency requirement colliding with the right to travel); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
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a. Student Rights Claims Based on Intentionally or Maliciously
Inflicted Injuries
A provocative body of case law exists regarding what constitutes conscience-
shocking behavior under substantive due process that will merit further scholarly
and judicial rumination in the wake of Earls. The most advantageous branch of
"shocks the conscience" decisions under substantive due process supports injury
claims brought against school officials for intentionally and maliciously inflicted
injuries. These substantive due process claims allege injuries inflicted by school
officials as a result of conduct that is arbitrary, disproportionate, or unrelated to
legitimate education interests.40 2 These cases complement the Earls model quite
well, under the theory that, as to such conduct, government is "abusing [its] power,
or employing it as an instrument of oppression.""4 3
The factors of the Earls restatement assume punishment of bad faith conduct
and policies by school officials even while shifting the burden of production onto
students to overcome presumptions of validity. However, judicial deference is
designed to give way to proof of intentional or wrongheaded conduct that a
"reasonable guardian and tutor [would not] undertake."4  Bad faith conduct both
(citizenship requirement runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause). Procedural due process offers
some level of protection against deprivation of the right of access to a public education as a property
interest. The expulsion and suspension cases are built around the notion of notice and some kind of
hearing as a way to protect students from arbitrary deprivations. See generally supra notes 392-94 and
accompanying text.
402. See, e.g., Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (pattern
of assaults by angry gym teacher); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996) (hitting, grabbing, and
pushing of several students by principal); Metzger ex rel. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.
1988) (nose broken by teacher); Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (pattern of
physical violence against special-education students).
403. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (alteration
in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d
650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987) (determining that corporal punishment of students may "shock the
conscience" if it "caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so
inspired by malice or sadism.., that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power")
(quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980)). Usually, the courts devise a test to
provide guidelines for evaluating the merit of substantive due process claims brought by students. For
example, in corporal punishment cases, a substantive due process claim is analyzed under the following
test: "1) the need for the application of corporal punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and
the amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury inflicted; and 4) whether the punishment
was administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." See, e.g., Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir.
1988).
404. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995). An excellent example is found
in the judicial response to the enforcement of certain provisions of so-called "zero tolerance" policies.
Courts have refused to treat such policies as unique and have refused to exempt them from the ordinary
legal requirements in the relevant legal area. In Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000), for
example, the court invalidated the enforcement of a campus weapons policy as applied to a student who
was expelled after a friend's knife was found in the glove compartment of the expelled student's car
without his knowledge. After acknowledging "[t]he fact that we must defer to the Board's rational
decisions in school discipline cases does not mean that we must, or should, rationalize away its
irrational decisions," the court noted its reasons for refusing to do so. Id. at 579. The court invalidated
the provision as applied to the expelled student: 79
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undermines the presumption of reasonableness after Earls and falls sufficiently
outside of the education mission as to be indefensible.4"5
b. Student Rights Claims Based on a Duty to Protect
The second branch of "shocks the conscience" substantive due process
decisions is somewhat incongruent with Earls. The cases present the issue of a
"duty to protect," with students seeking damages for injuries suffered as a result of
the conduct of third parties rather than a school official. The typical claim is based
on the notion that educators have, through deliberate indifference, breached an
affirmative duty to maintain a safe campus. The elements of the Earls model are
of little help in understanding this body of law; currently, courts uniformly dismiss
such suits, applying a no-duty principle rooted in the traditional jurisprudence of
governmental immunity from liability for the commission of torts. The
longstanding rule has been that government owes no affirmative duty to act on
behalf of any citizen." 6
The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by
the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-
executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed.
For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in
the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of
That said, suspending or expelling a student for weapons possession, even
if the student did not knowingly possess any weapon, would not be rationally
related to any legitimate state interest. No student can use a weapon to injure
another person, to disrupt school operations, or, for that matter, any other purpose
if the student is totally unaware of its presence .... We would have thought this
principle so obvious that it would go without saying ....
We believe, however, that the Board's Zero Tolerance Policy would surely
be irrational if it subjects to punishment students who did not knowingly or
consciously possess a weapon. The hypothetical case involving the planted knife
is but one illustration of why.
Id. at 575-76, 578.
405. Courts occasionally simplify the burden of production for students in liability suits for bad-
faith conduct by educators by taking the student claim out of substantive due process and placing it in
a more clearly defined category of law. For example, an assault by an educator on a student may be
treated as a violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment. Some courts have held that
unreasonable liberty restrictions or corporal punishment could violate a public school student's Fourth
Amendment rights. See Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) ("A decision to
discipline a student, if accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may
constitute an invasion of the child's Fifth Amendment liberty interest in his personal security and a
violation of substantive due process prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment."). This creates an
advantage for the plaintiff by decreasing the possibility of an educator's successful qualified-immunity
defense, a reality that often plagues substantive due process cases. Bad faith acts by educators may also
be actionable under other constitutional provisions. The Equal Protection Clause also provides a
remedy under § 1983 for injuries caused by bias on the basis of race, gender, or national origin.
406. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968). See generally Barbara
E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982,
985 (1996) (discussing a "strong presumption against governmental liability in failure-to-profit cases").
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protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably
determine how the limited police resources of the community
should be allocated and without predictable limits.
40 7
i. DeShaney and Its Impact on Educators'Duty to Protect
Before Earls
Application of the no-duty rule has led to complete immunity from common-
law tort claims brought against government for failure to provide police protection
and other protective services to members of the public.4"' State tort-immunity
statutes underscore and formalize this protection from suit. Significantly,
substantive due process claims acknowledge this immunity as well, adding a
constitutional dimension to the no-duty rule. This was the basis for the decision in
the seminal case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services. °  In DeShaney, the Court announced that "the Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may
be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government
itself may not deprive the individual. 410
Two exceptions to the no-duty rule exist. First, the Due Process Clause
provides a substantive remedy when a special relationship exists between the
government and a citizen. In such a case, the law imposes an affirmative duty to
protect persons from harm. Second, an affirmative duty to protect is imposed when
the government plays a role in creating the danger that poses a risk of harm.
DeShaney controls application of both the special-relationship and the danger-
creation exceptions.
In DeShaney, a father beat his four-year-old son so severely that he suffered
permanent brain damage.41' The beating took place after the Winnebago County
Department of Social Services had been informed of ongoing child abuse. 12 The
government agency had obtained a court order placing the son in the temporary
custody of a hospital after previous beatings. Thereafter, the County Department
of Social Services released the boy into his father's custody, choosing instead to
make periodic home visits during which the agency ignored evidence of further
beatings.4 3 The Supreme Court rejected an injury claim brought against the agency
on the boy's behalf under substantive due process. The Justices ruled that no
special relationship existed because the boy did not sustain his injury while in state
407. Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860-61.
408. See, e.g., Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (applying immunity to
police failure to make good on promise to arrest ex-boyfriend after threat made against plaintiff and
children, the latter of whom where killed by the ex-boyfriend); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996
F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no duty to protect witness); Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d
1243 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no duty to protect public after escape of an inmate from a prison). See
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
409. 489 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1989).
410. Id. at 196.
411. Id. at 193.
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custody." 4 The Court did, however, define the scope of the special relationship for
future cases:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care
for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic
human needs---e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state
action set by ... the Due Process Clause .... [It] is the State's
affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his
own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the "deprivation of
liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not
its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms
inflicted by other means.41 5
DeShaney also spoke to the narrow application of the danger-creation
exception, applying an act-omission dichotomy in its reasoning. The government
was not liable for the boy's injuries because it did not play an active role in placing
the boy in danger. "While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the
boy] faced in the free world," the Court opined, "it played no part in their creation,
nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.,
416
414. Id. at 200-01.
415. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (citations
omitted).
416. Id. at 201. The danger-creation exception precedes DeShaney. Courts recognize it as a
simple affirmance of the principle set forth in numerous rulings, holding that "[i]f the state puts a man
in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that
its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616,618 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370-71
(8th Cir. 1988) (applying danger-creation exception where state transported released inmate to store,
the owner of which he killed); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding undercover officers did not deprive an individual killed in barroom shooting of due process
where officers did not create risk of harm); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722 (1st Cir.
1986) (finding no due process violation when woman was killed by furloughed prisoner where state had
no special relationship and did not affirmatively place the victim "in a position of danger"); Jones v.
Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642, 646 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding no due process violation in a case where woman
was raped by prisoner furloughed without warning when the state did not have a special relationship
or affirmatively place in dangerous position). The two exceptions are exclusive in their operation, even
though occasionally they blend at the margins. The state is liable when it affirmatively places a citizen
in danger, even though the person injured may not have been in custody. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering a case where a victim was left in high-crime area after
their automobile was impounded); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1979) (considering
a case where children were left by the side of the road after the driver of a car was arrested); Reed v.
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering a case where an auto collision was the
proximate result of police leaving a drunk driver in control of car after arresting initial driver who was
sober). See generally Joseph M. Pellicciotti, "State-Created Danger, " or Similar Theory, as Basis
for Civil Rights Action Under 42 US.C.A. § 1983,159 A.L.R. Fed. 37 (2000) (summarizing case law
in the area of danger-creation exception in due process theory).
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Lower courts after DeShaney consistently place both exceptions beyond the
reach of student-injury claims. These decisions uniformly hold that no special
relationship exists because the student is not in physical custody, nor is the
compulsory education system like incarceration, institutionalization, or other
restraints that trigger an afflmnative duty under the Due Process Clause.4 17 Courts
refuse to apply the danger-creation exception under similar reasoning; liability does
not arise when government stands by and does nothing in the face of danger. In the
absence of school officials creating danger or increasing students' vulnerability to
danger in some way, the failure to provide protection does not make the state liable
for harms caused by third parties.418
ii. The Diminished Rationality of the No-Duty Rule Under
the Earls Restatement
These duty-to-protect cases may not survive serious scrutiny after Earls. 9 It
is not clear why school officials avoid a constitutional duty to protect children who
attend public schools under compulsory attendance laws when the law imposes a
similar duty on other government officials. The circumstances under which the duty
to protect is said to arise provide a clue about its precarious status. In DeShaney,
the Court identified the core scenario as one that is "sufficiently analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization."4 ° This logically includes the range of
custodial activities by law enforcement officials as well as involuntary commitment
and supervision by other government agencies.4"' Lower courts have had little
417. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997); Doe v.
Claibome County, 103 F.3d 495,510 (6th Cir. 1996); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729,
732 (8th Cir. 1993); L.R. ex rel. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1992); J.0. v. Alton
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).
418. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
419. Scholarly criticism since DeShaney has laid a solid foundation for its inapplicability to the
school setting:
[Ulnless a school fails to follow disciplinary policies and procedures, has
knowledge of specific dangerous propensities of a particular student has received
reports of threats against a student or knows that a student has a weapon at school
and does not investigate, then the school probably is not liable for student-upon-
student violence.
Georgia A. Staton & Rachel Love, Campus Violence: School District Liability and Students 'Fourth
Amendment Rights, 37 ARIZ. ATTORNEY 14, 16-17 (2000); see also Stephen Faberman, Note, The
Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships, Schools & the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C.L. Rev. 97, 139
(1993) ("Were a court to find that an affirmative obligation to protect did exist, the school would be
under a duty to protect the child from harm at the hands of both public and private actors."); Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 426 (1990) ("It is both astonishing and disheartening to witness
the DeShaney court manipulate the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause by construing it in light of the history of the fifth amendment due process clause.").
420. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).
421. For custody cases, see City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). For
danger-creation cases, see Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998); Reed
v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993).
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difficulty applying the two exceptions to protect children under circumstances
similar to compulsory education, imposing a duty to protect children placed
temporarily in foster homes.422
The educator-student relationship after Vernonia and Earls is configured for
imposition of a duty on educators to act in conscious regard of known campus risks.
The custodial factor underscores the applicability of the special-relationship
exception. Temporary custody emerges as the foundation of the new model.
Judicial deference is, in fact, based on the belief that school officials will act
reasonably as to "children, who.., have been committed to the temporary custody
of the State as schoolmaster."423 The application of the danger-creation exception
serves as a corollary to this presumption: that educators will be mindful to avoid
creating danger on campus or doing anything to render students any more
vulnerable to dangers posed by other students and third-parties. The potential for
the imposition of a duty to protect was not lost on the Court in Vernonia.
[T]he nature of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over
free adults. "[A] proper educational environment requires close
supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules
against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken
by an adult." While we do not, of course, suggest that public
schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over
children as to give rise to a constitutional "duty to protect," we
have acknowledged that for many purposes "school authorities act
in locoparentis," with the power and indeed the duty to "inculcate
the habits and manners of civility." Thus, while children assuredly
do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate," the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children
in school.424
Reconciliation of substantive due process doctrine to the Earls model is thus
ripe for critical examination. An adjustment injudicial thinking about the authority
of educators that includes affirmative duties would bring the education reform
movement full circle, effectively creating a good faith exception for educators along
with substantive liability that would act as a disincentive to timidity and inaction in
campus problem solving.
422. "[Plublic officials may be held liable for damages when they place a child in a foster home
knowing or having reason to know that the child is likely to suffer harm there." Camp v. Gregory, 67
F.3d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); see K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990); Doe v. N.Y.
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
709 F.2d 782, 791 (2d Cir. 1983); Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Taylor v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,795 (11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs.,
959 F.2d 883,892 (10th Cir. 1992); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th
Cir. 1993).
423. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002).
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Educators would not necessarily be at a disadvantage in such cases. Courts
would uphold student claims upon a showing of deliberate indifference under a
framework that is similar to that which applies to injury claims brought against
school officials for intentional and maliciously inflicted injuries.425 Congress has
from time to time enacted laws that provide for student damages claims using a
similar approach.426 Educators found liable for breaching such a duty would be
rare, and the facts that give rise to the liability would be compelling, consistent with
the "shocks the conscience" jurisprudence under which "only the most egregious
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense. '427 The Earls
model, while presuming good faith by school officials, would subject
decisionmaking to varying levels of rigor in search of unlawful policies that are
arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining
an atmosphere conducive to learning.
3. Equal Protection of the Laws
Finally, the body of equal protection case law in the public school arena will
survive the Earls restatement and satisfy its required linkage of the education
mission, school policy, and the imposition of discipline.
a. Non-Suspect Classifications
Standard equal protection doctrine outside the realm of suspect classifications
requires state actors to articulate legitimate reasons for treating identifiable groups
of citizens differently from other citizens, and requires that the action against that
group have some rational relation to the legitimate state interest. 2 This rational-
425. For example, to make out a proper danger-creation claim, a student must demonstrate that
(1) the school and the charged individual educators created the danger or increased the student's
vulnerability to the danger in some way; (2) the student was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group; (3) the school officials' conduct put the student at substantial risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known; (5) defendants acted recklessly in
conscious disregard of that risk; and (6) such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.
See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2003); Kallstrom v. City of
Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1998); Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62, 64 (1st
Cir. 1997); Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 567 (11 th Cir. 1997); Pinder v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 1169, 1175-77(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567,572 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995);
Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1994); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d
1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993); Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989).
426. See, e.g., Education Amendments Act (Title IX) of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1972).
Title IX creates a cause of action for damages when school officials engage in the discriminatory
conduct. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) ("Congress did not
intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX."); Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) ("We have held that money damages are available in such suits.")
(citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72).
427. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
428. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-48 (1985)
(rejecting, as having no legitimate connection to its proffered safety and densityjustifications, the city's
requirement that group homes for the mentally disabled, but not for fraternities, nursing homes, and
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basis review can actually have teeth, as shown by the Court's decision in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.42 9 When the state's regulation of any
identifiable group of citizens relies "on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational," the
regulation fails to withstand rational-basis scrutiny.43 °
In the education context, this low threshold becomes important under the Earls
restatement, with its remaining insistence that educators' policies, and their
application of those policies, remain reasonably related to their educational and
custodial interests. For example, in Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School
District,43' decided after Earls, the Ninth Circuit refused qualified-immunity
protection to educators who stood idle in the face of severe anti-gay harassment of
several students in the district. The district's anti-harassment policy prohibited the
harassment that the plaintiffs suffered; however, school administrators did not
adequately or uniformly respond to the harassment, which included physical
violence against allegedly gay students.432
To decide Flores, the court reaffirmed the Equal Protection Clause's
prohibition of educators' intentional discrimination and deliberate indifference
towards an identifiable group.433 The court held that plaintiffs presented enough
evidence that the administrators acted with deliberate indifference for a jury to find
equal protection violations. For example, one administrator, informed by students
that they were assaulted because they were allegedly gay, merely told the students
to report the incident to the campus police officer.434 The administrator did not
conduct an independent investigation or even follow up on the report.435 Another
administrator disciplined only one of six students involved in an assault on another
student at a bus stop.436 Still another administrator repeatedly promised a student,
whose locker was defaced and filled with pornography by harassing students, that
she would change the student's locker.437 Instead, she did not change the harassed
student's locker and told her to stop bringing the pornographic material to her.438
After Earls, then, educators are still required to refrain from intentional
discrimination towards, or deliberate indifference to, violations conmitted against
identifiable groups of students. The Flores case demonstrates that educators must
reasonably wield their extensive power to regulate and control students in their
custody. In other words, if educators are going to use their authority to prohibit
other group housing, obtain a special zoning permit).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 446.
431. 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
432. See id. at 1135.
433. The court held that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when it can be shown that
educators "intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference." Id. (citing Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134,
140 (2d Cir. 1999))). "'Deliberate indifference' is found if the school administrator 'respond[s] to
known peer harassment in a manner that is ... clearly unreasonable."' Id. (quoting Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999)).
434. Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135.
435. Id.
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behavior, such as student-to-student harassment on campus, they must ensure that
the prohibition is equitably enforced without favor towards some students over
others.439
The Equal Protection Clause also ensures that educators' actions against
individual students are not wholly arbitrary and can withstand rational-basis
review.44 ° In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,"' the Court clarified the nature of
government officials' duty to fairly administer the law: "The purpose of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents.""' 2 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits "irrational and
wholly arbitrary""' 3 treatment of individuals, including safeguards for students in
a post-Earls world, from educators' arbitrary enforcement of otherwise proper rules.
West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260,'4 described above in the First
Amendment discussion, shows how a student can require that educators not only
adopt proper policies but evenhandedly enforce them once adopted.44 In West, the
student's First Amendment challenge to the district's ban on possession of
depictions of the Confederate flag passed constitutional muster as a policy matter,
but still had to withstand an as-applied equal protection challenge."46 Plaintiff
alleged that, because other students were allowed to possess the Confederate flag
in "history books and other approved materials," his discipline for drawing a
confederate flag in math class constituted selective enforcement in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.447
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that educators' decisions on how to enforce school
policy must be "rationally related to a legitimate government interest. "44s However,
the court easily rejected plaintiffs claim because the district's "legitimate
interest... to prevent potentially disruptive student conduct from interfering with
439. The mixed blessings of educators' broad authority emerge here, as they do in the substantive
due process context. Given the extent to which a school's code of conduct can now regulate student
behavior, educators must recognize the commitment they must make on a daily basis to ensure that the
policies are equitably and consistently applied to all students. To retain enough time and energy for
educating students, educators and school boards are increasingly well-advised to prudently exercise
their regulatory authority. This self-regulation may indeed ultimately replace the Bill of Rights as the
most substantive restraint on educators' control over students as decisionmakers stop asking "Can we
do this?" and begin focusing more on the question of "Should we do this?"
440. "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,'
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 564-65 (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923)).
443. Id. at 563.
444. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
445. See supra notes 309-20 and accompanying text.
446. See West, 206 F.3d at 1365-66.
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the educational process" supported the district's anti-harassment policy and
plaintiff's discipline thereunder." 9
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the principle that the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when a student is "intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment. '450 In Smith v. Severn,45' a student alleged that his three day suspension
for performing an unauthorized lip-sync in a school talent show was harsher
punishment than that received by his fellow participants and thus, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.452 The court disagreed, finding a reasonable relationship
between the school's discipline and plaintiff's actions because plaintiff, unlike his
fellow pranksters, was disciplined for another improper lip-sync the year before, had
ignored a teacher's express warning not to perform, was the only student to bring
an unauthorized chain saw and boa constrictor to school that day, and was the only
student to. wield the chain saw in a "sexually explicit manner" and simulate the
"mutilation of a woman with her child" during his performance.453
The extreme nature of the facts in Smith shows that even when there is no
question that educators can properly prohibit the type of conduct engaged in by a
particular student, their treatment of that student under the relevant school policy
must bear a reasonable relationship to the violation and not be wholly arbitrary in
light of the discipline handed down for other students' violation of the same policy.
Thus, Earls and traditional equal protection doctrine fit together. Under both,
educators' policies must be founded in legitimate custodial or educational interests
and enforced consistent with those interests. Neither model permits a disconnect
between the reason a policy is in place and the manner in which it is enforced. Any
such disconnect simultaneously removes both the protection the custodial and
educational interests supply and the rational basis for the educator's action.
b. Suspect Classifications
Turning to equal protection cases involving suspect classifications, no good
reason emerges after Earls as to why the Court's traditional levels of scrutiny of
policies that discriminate against suspect classifications should not hold true in the
future. The strict scrutiny of race-based classifications and the mid-tier scrutiny of
gender-based classifications enjoy firmer footing in the Court's jurisprudence than
students' First and Fourth Amendment rights ever have.
Through its two Brown v. Board of Education decisions, the Court ensured
strong protection of public school students against invidious race-based
449. Id. Recall that the district instituted its policy in response to documented racial conflict on
its campuses. Id. at 1362.
450. Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Viii.
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)); see Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419,429 (7th Cir.
1997).
451. 129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997).
452. Id. at 421-24.
453. Id. at 429.
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segregation.454 Brown stands in contrast to public school students' first attempts to
protect their First and Fourth Amendment rights before the Court, which resulted
in the lowering of their fundamental rights under those amendments on school
grounds.455 The Court's willingness to dilute students' First and Fourth Amendment
rights because their full protection might disrupt the educational process456 was
nowhere to be found in Brown, through which the Court deliberately mandated
perhaps the most severe and extended period of disruption of the educational
process that this country has ever experienced. The Brown tradition continued in
United States v. Virginia,457 where the Court again refused to elevate educators'
claims that gender integration of the all-male Virginia Military Institute would
disrupt the educational process and alter the school's education mission over
women's equal protection rights. The Court, then, has not found that students'
equal protection rights are naturally diluted at school, as their First and Fourth
Amendment rights are.
The difference in the way the Court treats discrimination against suspect
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause and infringement of students' First
and Fourth Amendment rights points to a tolerance for disruption in the educational
process for the sake of allowing all students to participate in it in the first place.
Classifications based on race and gender can bar a student's participation in
educational opportunities available to other students through no choice of the
classified student. Restrictions of expressive and privacy rights, on the other hand,
control how students experience the education system and control the choices they
make within it.
Thus, continued protection of students' rights against invidious race and gender
discrimination ensures that all students enjoy the same educational opportunities.
Once all students are allowed into the educational process, educators' broad
custodial and educational interests kick in to ensure that the discretionary behavior
students engage in once inside the school community does not conflict with the
educators' dual goals of educating students and keeping them safe.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its simplest form, the structure of American constitutional law assumes that
public policy will yield to individual rights. The notion of a contextual exemption
for public educators is both extraordinary and ironic. It is not clear, at first glance,
nor under sustained observation, why this judicial reluctance to interfere with
454. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). This result was squarely reaffirmed in the
Court's most recent look at race-based classifications in the affirmative action context. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
455. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1984) (rejecting the higher probable cause
standard for educator searches of students in favor of the lower reasonable suspicion standard); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,509, 514 (1969) (requiring an actual or legitimate
fear of disruption of the educational process to trump students' First Amendment rights).
456. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (reasoning that the educational setting requires greater flexibility
in educators' ability to search students than is required by police in other law-enforcement settings);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-08 (reasoning that educators' need to control school environment justifies
lower First Amendment standard).
457. See 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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legitimate educational needs should generate such a broad departure from
constitutional norms. It is, in fact, the breadth of the model that is its most
significant feature, begging the question whether judicial accommodation of local
educational preferences requires such a level of deference that ordinarily
corresponds to a compelling governmental interest.
Future discussions of student rights must take on a different tone both as to
substance and procedure. The Earls model of deference effectively limits the
judicial function to watching for evidence of anomaly and abuse of authority,
yielding to even the imprecise implementation of a good faith attempt to match a
policy to a campus problem. Justice Harlan's belief, in his Tinker dissent, that
"school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline
and good order in their institutions,"45 is now the theme for a new constitutional
model that "cast[s] upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular
school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concern.... .""' The
disjunction between student rights and limits on authority in the context of public
primary and secondary schools has taken the good faith presumption about as far
as it can go.
Any attempt to reconcile the extraordinariness of the model must start with the
tenets of federalism. There has always been much implied in the observation made
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."46 Along with the commitment to equality of access comes an
invitation to a type of comity through judicial restraint: states should be left alone
to pursue approaches to "problem[s] for which there [are] no perfect solution[s]."461
This inference was formalized in the decision of San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, where the Court ruled that the federal interest, if any, in public education
was not of a constitutional dimension because a state-provided education was not
a fundamental right under federal law.462 The absence of judicial intervention in
public school policymaking, then, has a logical, if not a doctrinal foundation.
Beyond systemic justifications for such deference is the historic reality that
judges have not experienced much of a sense of accomplishment in past attempts
at micromanaging public-school policies. In the face of resistance,463 or outright
458. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
459. Id.
460. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954).
461. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
462. It is no surprise that many of the limitations on educators' authority in education law under
the Constitution are organized around the prohibitions against suspect classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause or arbitrary decisionmaking under the Due Process Clause. See supra text and notes
in Parts V.C.1.-V.C.3.
463. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering the federal courts to
issue orders to state officials to reopen public schools); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959)
(allowing state and local appropriations for tuition grants to students who did not want to attend racially
diverse schools). See generally Lino Graglia, The Busing Disaster, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13
(1992) (discussing the aftermath of Brown).
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avoidance,464 or hostility from those for whose benefit an order was issued,465 there
now appears to be a shared sense among judges to avoid assuming "a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in [the]
States.466 It is, however, a decidedly optimistic aversion, linked to the expectation
that the "democracy in a microcosm, '4 67 within which public education operates,
will produce workable safeguards at the margins, leaving the courts to invalidate
educational policies wholly unrelated to the legitimate goal of maintaining an
atmosphere conducive to learning.
The sway that results from the judicial aversion to a more active role in
balancing competing interests in public schools should attract a body of research
and commentary commensurate to its effects on students and communities. At the
outset, one should discover a set of ironies. First, educators have not demanded this
level of deference; rather, most state and local policymakers have simply sought
clarity in the rules of what the Constitution permits and requires of campus codes
of conduct. The clarity inherent in the restatement carries a message of
empowerment anchored in the presumption that educators will act reasonably to
protect "children ... who.., have been committed to the temporary custody of the
State as schoolmaster."" At the same time, practical ambiguities will surface as
to the nature of any limitations on such broad authority. On the surface, educators
are empowered to act in ways previously thought unreasonable provided the policies
are implemented in good faith in furtherance of the education mission. Reinforcing
the legitimacy of the policy is a sense of fairness as to any sanctions actually
imposed and validated through a modicum of community support. Discrimination
through selective enforcement of an otherwise valid policy appears to be the most
tangible constitutional limit on the new model.
The second irony is related to the first. This level of empowerment is not
necessarily good news for educators. A new era of policymaking should emerge,
particularly as to the wider range of provisions in codes of conduct that are far less
464. Remember, after the decision in Brown some state policymakers simply closed the public
schools in response to the order to desegregate. See generally Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the
Southside: A Desegregation Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 327, 330 (1997)
("Whites closed the public schools for four years, established a private white academy, diverted
property tax revenues from public schools, and resisted even the most innocuous court efforts to educate
whites and blacks together.").
465. See LeRoy Pernell, Suffering the Children: 35 Years of Suspension, Expulsion, and
Beatings-The Price of Desegregation, 7 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 119, 125 (1990) (describing the
"forgotten consequence[s] of desegregation"); Joshua Kimerling, Black Male Academies: Re-
examining the Strategy of Integration, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 829, 831-32 (1994) ("No longer is it
universally agreed upon that integration and equal education are synonymous. Increasing scrutiny has
been directed at the Brown strategy, which has 'treat[ed] desegregation litigation as a matter solely of
racial balance and assum[ed] quality education [would] come with that balance.' Due to this
reexamination, non-integration approaches ... are gaining increasing acceptance.") (alteratidn in
original); see also Raneta J. Lawson, The Child Seated Next To Me: The Continuing Quest For Equal
Educational Opportunity, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 35, 37 (1990) (arguing that racial balancing may
be "distracting to the effective education of children").
466. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
467. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
468. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995)).
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intrusive than the student drug testing upheld in the Earls decision. With it should
follow a change in both expectations and demands as to the quality and
effectiveness of the decisionmaking by public educators. Increased awareness of
what the law permits should influence an end to policymaking through timidity and
inaction. In its place, a duty impetus ought to prompt school officials to make
frequent, accurate assessments of current campus conditions leading to timely
responses. It will be important to measure the relationship between these forces for
change and any shifts that become apparent in public education policymaking.
Educators often exhibit a hate-love relationship with the substantive limits that the
law imposes on their policies. The ambiguity about student rights previously made
available a misleading justification for policy failures that may have been
attributable more to unwillingness than to inability to implement a new policy.
Under the Earls model a different type of accountability will pierce the veil of poor
leadership; ineffective or timid campus management will more easily be exposed
and confronted. This may be the most important practical contribution of the
accountability factor, giving rise to a more fluid, participatory process over both the
substance and the procedure of campus policymaking by those who are affected the
most.
Additional demands for safer campuses are likely to come from the legislature
and judiciary. One can easily see room within the doctrine of deference for a
correlative, affirmative duty to provide a safe campus as a way to make educators
accountable for their deliberate indifference to conditions that are known or
foreseeable with due diligence. The duty may arise in the form of state education
codes guaranteeing students a safe campus, 469 or through court decisions that
acknowledge the custodial relationship between students and educators in a manner
that triggers an affirmative duty to protect as a matter of state and federal law. State
courts and legislatures may adjust state tort immunity statutes to the same effect.
If the restatement heralds an era organized around the expectation of safer,
more effective campuses, then the true moral of the emerging model of authority
may be that educators should guard against the feeling that they are now above the
law. The new model contains the raw materials for education reform of a different
sort; a surer, more justifiable sanction against acts that are arbitrary, policies
implemented under the guise of good faith, disinterest in the condition of the
leaming environment, and policies implemented by school officials with the
knowledge that more, rather than less, harm may be done to the students who are
committed to their care.
469. For example, art. I, § 28, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution contains a "Right to
Safe Schools" provision: "All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior
high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful." This
provision provides the basis for future legislative imposition of an affirmative duty. But cf. Clausing
v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1236 (1990) (ruling that the provision
standing alone is not self-executing and does not create a private cause of action for damages).
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